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Since the late 1970s, state supreme courts have demonstrated an increased willingness to 
intervene in disputes on a host of issues ranging from defamation to budget deficits.   Activists of 
all stripes now pursue their agendas in the context of what Richard Nixon dubbed the “New 
Federalism,” and education reform—a function traditionally handled by state and local 
governments—has occupied much of their attention.  While a considerable amount of academic 
work has focused quite narrowly on either education policy or supreme court decision-making, 
few scholars have yet examined the intersection between the two; i.e., how have state and federal 
judges made education policy, and what reasons have they provided to justify their actions. For 
historians of education, law enters this story only peripherally as they focus on matters such as 
test scores and physical plant investments.   Legal historians analyze the ratio decidendi on 
which each decision was based, trying to determine whether a particular constitutional clause or 
juridical argument impelled the result.    
However, the complex and evolving relationship between race and class—seemingly 
indissoluble in the American setting—that plays out in the context of these school funding 
disputes cannot be captured by a single method of analysis or monocausal explanation.   By 
placing state supreme court decisions on school finance from the late 20th century in the context 
of constitutional framing and caselaw from the 19th, and weaving together judicial opinions, 
lawyers’ pleadings, law review articles, and transcripts of interviews with state supreme court 
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justices and appellate lawyers, I hope to produce a detailed history of legal conflicts over school 
funding that will fill any extant lacunae.  As policymakers at the state level attempt to forge more 
socioeconomically equitable and racially inclusive systems of education, it behooves them to 
contemplate the haphazard, contentious, and at times fructifying nature of these highly 
politicized judicial decisions. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1970s, state supreme courts have demonstrated an increased willingness to 
intervene in disputes on a host of issues ranging from defamation to budget deficits.   Activists of 
all stripes now pursue their agendas in the context of what Richard Nixon dubbed the “New 
Federalism,” and education reform—a function traditionally handled by state and local 
governments—has occupied much of their attention.  While a considerable amount of academic 
work has focused quite narrowly on either education policy or supreme court decision-making, 
few scholars have yet examined the intersection between the two; i.e., how have state and federal 
judges made education policy, and what have they written to justify their actions. For historians 
of education, law enters the story only peripherally as they focus on matters such as test scores 
and physical plant investments.   Legal historians analyze the ratio decidendi on which each 
decision was based, trying to determine whether a particular constitutional clause or juridical 
argument impelled the result.    
However, the complex and evolving relationship between race and class—seemingly 
indissoluble in the American setting—that plays out in the context of these school funding 
disputes cannot be captured by a single method of analysis or monocausal explanation.   By 
weaving together judicial opinions, lawyers’ pleadings, law review articles, and transcripts of 
interviews with state supreme court justices and appellate lawyers, I hope to produce a detailed 
history of legal conflicts over school funding that will fill any extant lacunae.  As policymakers 
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at the state level attempt to forge more socioeconomically equitable and racially inclusive 
systems of education, it behooves them to contemplate the haphazard, contentious, and at times 
fructifying nature of these highly politicized judicial decisions. 
State supreme court oversight of education policy increased in the wake of a 
controversial 1973 Supreme Court decision.  This case, San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez, presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine the 
constitutionality of property tax funding of public schools.   In justifying its decision, the Burger 
Court held that this policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because poverty was not a 
suspect class and public education was not a right implicitly or explicitly protected in the 
Constitution.   Had the Court’s 5-4 vote gone in the other direction, fifty states would have been 
required to restructure their school funding systems to achieve some rough measure of federally-
mandated parity.  Because the Rodriguez majority did not impose such a federal standard, nearly 
every state’s supreme court has grappled with education finance litigation. 
Here is how I intend to organize this narrative.  In the second chapter, I examine earlier 
issues in state school funding, beginning with a discussion of the federal government’s early 
involvement in education finance by means of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and other 
subsequent pieces of land grant legislation.    From there, I explore subsequent 19th century 
efforts at constitutional ordering that were resolved by the addition or subtraction of education 
clause language to state constitutions, culminating with a discussion of the constitutional re-
framing of public education that occurred in the American South after the end of Reconstruction. 
  Even as states in the North and West chose to continue expanding access to their public school 
systems, others—notably those states that comprised the Confederacy, as well as “near-South” 
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border states such as Missouri and West Virginia—added language to their constitutions that 
mandated segregation.   
In the third chapter, I demonstrate how these restrictive methods of constitutional framing 
precipitated a school funding crisis of considerable magnitude throughout the South and “near-
South”—a crisis that, far from improving, actually worsened with the passage of time. I proceed 
from a discussion of these disparities to an analysis of how the NAACP litigation team’s strategy 
of challenging the prevailing “separate but equal” doctrine succeeded in considerable part 
because these “separate” institutions were so poorly funded.  In the next section of this chapter, I 
continue to explicitly link notions of race and class—arguing for their fundamental conceptual 
inseparability—in the context of the US Supreme Court’s 1973 milestone school funding 
decision in Rodriguez as well as the school funding litigation that commenced at the state level 
afterwards.  The third section considers school finance litigation that occurred after 1989, a year 
when many scholars believe that a decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court shifted the nature of 
the judiciary’s involvement in these matters, making state supreme courts more amenable to 
siding with plaintiffs.  While conceding that plaintiffs have altered their litigation strategies and 
that there were indeed notable successes in terms of school finance reform in states such as 
Massachusetts and Vermont over this period, I also draw attention to plaintiffs’ defeats in Illinois 
and Pennsylvania—where the nineteenth-century interpretation of these education clauses 
remains the preferred interpretation of those courts—as well as a convoluted, voter-led 
movement for constitutional reform in Florida that has so far yielded few practical results.  
Finally, I close the chapter by discussing a Connecticut case where, for the first time in the 
history of this process, a majority of justices on a state supreme court agreed that, with regard to 
school funding disparities in their state, race and class were inseparably linked 
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Chapter four consists of my analysis of the DeRolph series of decisions in Ohio, 
presented here as a representative case study in school finance litigation that occurred in what is 
considered by many pundits to be “America’s most representative state.” Relying on interviews 
with principals to the litigation and enhanced by the inclusion of more primary sources and a 
new section on DeRolph’s salience—or lack thereof—in one especially fiercely-contested 
judicial election, this section enables me to better illustrate prior examples and claims about the 
judicial politics of education finance litigation while also demonstrating the vitality and utility of 
a “law and society” approach to exploring the sometimes-fraught relationship among judges, 
legislators, governors, interest group leaders, and other arbiters of public opinion.    
My final chapter offers a capstone to the narrative, examining the status of school finance 
litigation at the outset of the 21st century.  I give special attention to New Jersey Governor Chris 
Christie’s conflict with the New Jersey Supreme Court in the wake of the twenty-first decision in 
the ongoing Abbott v. Burke saga, a series of opinions in which the court held that the New 
Jersey government must provide additional funding to thirty-one “at-risk” school districts.  From 
there, I scrutinize the continuing relevance of race to the school funding narrative, linking the 
actions of the late 19th century “Redeemer Democrat” legislatures of the American South with a 
failed effort to amend the segregationist language of Alabama’s education clause and thereafter 
commenting on the implicitly race-based and impossible-to-ignore funding disparities that have 
been exacerbated in metropolitan areas such as Seattle and Los Angeles in the wake of the 2007 
U.S. Supreme Court decision Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1.  In my concluding remarks, I evaluate recommendations made by other scholars regarding 
the proper approach to resolving school finance inequalities through the courts.  After assessing 
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these recommendations, I close with one of my own:  an amendment to the federal constitution 
that would create a nationwide “unitary” school system.   
 6 
2.0  AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF 
CERTAIN PROVISIONS FOR EDUCATION FOUND IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
1800-1900 
In Brown v. Board of Education, Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for a unanimous Supreme 
Court, waxed rhapsodic about the role of public education in American life.  After noting that it 
was “perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,” he went on to observe 
that “it is the very foundation of good citizenship…[and] a principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment.”1  It is with the first part of Warren’s declaration that this 
chapter is concerned.  I investigate how education came to be the “most important function” of 
state and local governments.  How did legislators who remained generally distrustful of 
government intervention—state, federal, or otherwise—accede to the creation of an extensive 
network of publicly-funded schools?  And in what ways and to what extent did the framing and 
reframing of these subnational constitutions affirm, embody, and actualize this function?   
To answer these questions, I have organized this chapter into three sections.  The first 
section examines the earliest attempts at including provisions related to education in state 
constitutions.  The aim here is twofold:  first, to illustrate how these earliest provisions, 
regardless of wording (or re-wording, as the case may be), created no enforceable legal rights 
                                                 
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
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and duties; and second, to show how one notable court of the era, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court, twice interpreted its constitutional provision in exactly that manner.   
The second section concerns the flurry of constitutional re-framing that occurred in the 
middle of the 19th century.  Encouraged and assisted by education policy experts who were 
participating in a transatlantic conversation about school reform, numerous states added language 
to their state constitutions mandating the implementation of public school systems that would be 
“free,” “thorough,” “efficient,” “uniform,” and “open.”  However, these educational 
provisions—although quite different in their content than the provisions addressed in section 
one—still offered scant guidance to jurists forced to decide questions relating to the funding and 
composition of the public schools in their states.  The substantive reforms that did occur in the 
states of the North and the Middle West—enforcement of “free schooling,” admission of 
African-Americans and other minorities to public schools—during this period came through 
legislation, not constitutional convention or judicial decision.   
The final section examines the period from the Civil War to the end of the 20th century—
an era that, owing to extremely exigent circumstances, witnessed as much contradictory, 
confused, and paradoxical constitutional re-framing as any in the nation’s history.  For many 
Northern and Western states, the long process of expanding access to the public schools 
continued.  In the South, states such as Louisiana and South Carolina first amended their 
constitutions to expand access to public education, allowing for the operation of integrated 
schools.  Then, with the close of the Reconstruction and the ascent of “Redeemer” Democratic 
administrations throughout the South, the region’s state constitutions were amended to formally 
segregate the schools. Unable to available themselves of judicial assistance of any sort from the 
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Supreme Court or their respective state supreme courts, African-Americans living in those states 
would soon find themselves in failing, chronically under-funded, or simply inoperative schools.  
 
2.1 CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMING FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE 
ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS:  EARLY FEDERAL AND STATE PROVISIONS FOR 
EDUCATION, 1776-1815 
Many of the intellectuals who formed America’s so-called “founding generation” harbored 
strong views about the nexus between a well-educated populace and the preservation of 
“Republican virtue.”  Of course, these intellectuals also often espoused equally strong sentiments 
about the necessity of maintaining republican political structures and rights.  For example, 
Thomas Jefferson, who viewed only “the people themselves…[as a] safe depository of rights”2 
and thus a group whose discretion should be informed by discretion, also believed that the 
government should not “wast[e] the labors of the people, under the pretence of taking care of 
them.”3  In spite of the latter remark, he also wrote of the need for Virginia to include language 
in its state constitution respecting public education:  “ An amendment of our constitution must 
here come in aid of the public education…[because] the influence over government must be 
                                                 
2 As quoted in Gordon C. Lee, ed., Crusade Against Ignorance:  Thomas Jefferson on Education (New York, 1961), 
p. 100.   
3 Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, letter of November 29, 1802.  This passage is frequently misquoted, both by 
biographers as well as the anonymous authors of chain e-mails, as follows:  “If we can prevent the government from 
wasting the labors of the people, under the pretence of taking care of them, they must become happy.” 
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shared among all the people.”4 Federalists such as future Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story 
and John Adams also believed that, in the absence of a new “science” of civic education that 
would effect a “memorable change…in the system of education and knowledge [that will] 
become so general as to raise the lower ranks of society nearer to the higher,” the great body of 
Americans would be slow to slough off pre-revolutionary attitudes.5 
 It should not come as a surprise, then, that the nascent federal government involved itself 
in the construction of a system of common schools.  Nor, for that matter, should the nature of the 
involvement: the Ordinance of 1785, which specified the basic terms by which the lands further 
delineated in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 were to be settled, included among its provisions 
a “reservation” of a section of each township—“section 16” in the original language, “section 
36” in later-admitted states—which could be used as land for a school or sold to subsidize the 
construction and operation of one.6 
 In this way, as Daniel Feller has observed, the federal government could direct 
“developmental priorities in a diverse and rapidly expanding union.”7  And, as the area then 
defined as the “West” came to be settled, “territorial settlers came increasingly to regard land 
grants for education as an entitlement [rather than] a bargaining chip.”8  Congressional policy 
with regard to state education in the early 19th century, then, was not entirely dissimilar to its 
present-day equivalent:  a sort of “give-and-take,” whereby residents of states and territories 
                                                 
4 Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1784), pp. 146-149.  Accessed at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s16.html. 
5 David B. Tyack, “Forming the National Character:  Paradox in the Educational Thought of the Revolutionary 
Generation,” 36 Harvard Educational Review, pp. 29-41 (1966); John Adams, as quoted in David McCullough, 
John Adams (Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 364.  As Tyack notes repeatedly throughout his article, this “science” or 
“business” of civic education meant something rather different to each person who propounded it.  
6 28 Journal of the Continental Congress 375 (1785).  Accessed from http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=lljc&fileName=028/lljc028.db&recNum=386. 
7 Daniel Feller, The Public Lands in Jacksonian Politics (Madison, 1984), pp. 5-6. 
8 David Tyack, Thomas James, and Aaron Benavot, Law and the Shaping of Public Education 1785-1954 (Madison, 
1987), p. 34. 
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found themselves petitioning Congress for grants of additional “reserved” acreage which could 
thereafter be sold to offset the cost of internal improvements.9 
 State representatives had, from the founding of the United States, recognized education to 
be a public function of some level of importance. During the period from the drafting of the 
Declaration of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, eleven of the original thirteen 
states adopted constitutions, and five of them included provisions related to education.10  These 
provisions were a mixed bag:  some were grandiose, some mentioned universities and 
elementary schools in the same breath (and then only in passing), and only the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1790 contained a statement explicitly providing for free education.11   
 By 1800, twenty-five constitutions had been adopted or revised—the constant revision of 
these documents is a recurrent theme of subnational constitutional framing—with twelve 
containing educational provisions of some sort.12  Although these provisions were not 
themselves the subject of direct litigation until the 1820s, they do appear to have had two 
specific methods of operation.  The first, perhaps best exemplified by the lofty language 
composed by John Adams for the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, seems designed merely as 
an exhortation to legislators and other lawmakers rather than a direct order for specific 
performance:   
Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the 
people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these 
                                                 
9 Fletcher H. Swift, A History of Public Permanent School Funds in the United States (New York, 1911), pp. 59-65.   
10 Rhode island and Connecticut continued to operate under colonial charters that had been revised only slightly.   
11 The Federal and State Constitutions (Francis N. Thorpe, ed., 1909) was the reference used for examining many of 
the constitutional provisions mentioned in this section.  Various quotations from the state conventions, as noted by 
volume and page, are drawn from State Constitutional Conventions from Independence to the Completion of the 
Present Union (Cynthia E. Browne, compiler, 1973), a microfiche collection accessed at the Library of Congress, or 
via GoogleBooks.   
12 This represented seven of the sixteen States then in the Union, with several constitutions being counted twice:  
Pennsylvania (1776, 1790); North Carolina (1776); Georgia (1777 and 1798); Massachusetts (1780); New 
Hampshire (1784 and 1792).   
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depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of 
the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of 
legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the 
interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the 
university at Cambridge, public schools, and grammar schools in the towns; to encourage 
private societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the promotion of 
agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and a natural history of the 
country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general 
benevolence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in 
their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social affections, and generous sentiments, 
among the people.13 
 
The intended effect of this provision—if an account included in Adams’ collected writings is any 
guide—was to provide grounds for chartering the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and 
the rest of the language was filler that had been inserted in “good humor.”14 
 When first called upon to interpret this provision in Commonwealth v. Dedham (1819)—
a case concerned with the certificates and qualifications a schoolmaster must present prior to his 
employment in a “grammar school”—the Massachusetts Supreme Court, per Justice Samuel 
Wilde, observed that common schools, if operated at all, should “be maintained for the benefit of 
the whole town, as it is the wise policy of the law to give all the inhabitants equal privileges, for 
the education of their children in the public schools.”15  The holding in the case was narrowly 
related to what constituted a “license” to teach under an early Massachusetts statute, but Wilde 
also offered a statement regarding public education that has been echoed by many American 
courts down to the present: “it is [not] in the power of the majority to deprive the minority of its 
privilege…[for] every inhabitant of the town has a right to participate in the benefits of both 
                                                 
13 Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Part the Second, chapter V, § 2.  This provision is still in the Massachusetts 
Constitution and, except for an amendment to it passed in 1855 barring state assistance to religious institutions (a 
common practice in that period), remains largely unchanged.  However, owing to the decision McDuffy v. Secretary 
(1993) that is discussed in both chapter three and chapter five, it is now interpreted in a radically different manner 
than its framers had intended.   
 
14 Charles F. Adams, Ed’s note, in 4 The Works of John Adams 259-261 (n.1). 
15 Commonwealth v. Dedham, 16 Massachusetts 141 (1819).   
 12 
descriptions of schools…and it is not competent for a town to establish a grammar school for the 
one part of the town, to the exclusion of the other.”16 Thus, if schools of one particular kind—
here described as “grammar schools”—are maintained in a district, students cannot be prohibited 
from attending them, or sent to clearly inferior or “different” schools within that district.  Wilde, 
then, was concerned with intra-district equality, much as the justices in the majority in the much-
later Milliken v. Bradley decision were.17 
 However, Wilde’s opinion is silent on two other matters related to the operation of the 
state’s education clause:  Must municipalities maintain public schools at all?  And, if there are 
multiple schools of the same “kind” within a district, does a student have a right to attend the 
public school nearest his or her home?  These two issues were at contest in an 1849 action on the 
case brought by Sarah Roberts, a school-age African-American girl from Boston whose parents 
wanted her to attend a neighborhood grammar school rather than a grammar school for “colored” 
students that was maintained rather more distantly from her home. Noted abolitionist and 
statesman Charles Sumner agreed to represent her and her family in this litigation, bringing suit 
under a Massachusetts statute which provided that “any child, unlawfully excluded from public 
school instruction, in [the] Commonwealth, shall recover damages therefor.”18  Sumner’s 
argument before that court highlighted various Massachusetts constitutional principles, most 
notably that “all men, without distinction of color or race, are equal before the law.”19  He also 
cited Dedham as a controlling precedent, noting that “the courts of Massachusetts have never 
                                                 
16 id. at 146. 
17 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that, absent clear and convincing evidence of discriminatory 
intent on the part of districts outside of Detroit, a “bussing” remedy was limited to the area within the target district). 
Due to the risk of anachronism, of course, this comparison should not be taken too far.   
18 An Act Concerning Public Schools, ch. 214, 1845 Massachusetts Session Laws 545. 
19 Roberts v. Boston, 59 Massachusetts 198 (1849). The quote that appears in the text was based on Sumner’s 
reading of Articles I and VI from Part the First of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which concerned the 
equality of all men under the law.   
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admitted any discrimination, founded on color or race, in the administration of the common 
schools, but have recognized the equal rights of all the inhabitants.”20 In the course of presenting 
his argument, however, Sumner made no explicit mention of Adams’ hortatory provision in the 
Massachusetts Constitution. 
 Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, writing for the court, reaffirmed that “persons of African 
descent” were indeed “entitled by law, in this commonwealth, to equal rights, civil and social.”21  
He then sought to “ascertain what are the rights of the individuals, in regard to the schools,” 
concluding that the municipalities have “plenary authority” to organize their common schools as 
they see fit.22  Based on his reading of the statutes—which provide the framework by which the 
schools are to be organized and operated—as well as the constitution, individuals had no “right” 
to education:  “What those rights are, to which individuals, in the infinite variety of 
circumstances by which they are surrounded in society, are entitled, must depend on laws 
adapted to their respective relations and conditions.”23  In other words, it was left to state and 
local legislators to determine the parameters of their systems of education.  As for Roberts’ 
statutory claim, it failed on its face:  there was a “colored” school in operation within the city 
limits, and a walk across Boston would—in Shaw’s view—“ be scarcely an inconvenience to 
require a boy of good health to traverse daily the whole extent of it.”24 Racial prejudice—
opposition to the existence of which had motivated Sumner to represent Roberts—was “not 
created by law, and probably cannot be changed by law.”25 
                                                 
20 id. 
21 id. 
22 id.   
23 id. 
24 id. 
25 id.   
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 However distasteful to modern sensibilities it seems, Shaw’s reading of the 
Massachusetts Constitution was not without substantial legal justification.  Other early 
constitutional provisions, though, seem to contain language imposing an affirmative duty on state 
legislatures to establish and oversee a system of public schools: 
That a school or schools shall be established by the Legislature, for the convenient 
instruction of youth, with such salaries to the masters, paid by the public, as may enable 
them to instruct at low prices; and all useful learning shall be duly encouraged, and 
promoted, in one or more universities.26 
 
This passage, found in the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, was echoed in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776 (“a school or schools shall be established in each county by legislature…”) 
and the Vermont Constitution of 1777 (“a school or schools shall be established in each 
town…[and] one grammar school in each county, and one university in this State, ought to be 
established by direction of the General Assembly”).27  The provision in the Georgia Constitution 
of 1777 was written in language firmer still:  “Schools shall be erected in each county, and 
supported at the general expense of the State, as the legislature shall hereafter point out.”28 
 The firmness of this language aside, it took the legislatures in all four of these states quite 
some time to pass legislation relating to the establishment of public schools.  The Pennsylvania 
legislature’s only notable enactment regarding public education in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries involved revoking the charter of the College of Philadelphia in order to charter the 
University of the State of Pennsylvania, and it established no schools of any kind until after the 
Constitution of 1790.29 Perhaps owing to these delays, such obligatory language was softened 
                                                 
26 North Carolina Constitution of 1776, art. XLI.   
27 Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, § 44; Vermont Constitution of 1777, § 40.  
28 Georgia Constitution of 1777, art. LIV. 
29 Louise G. Walsh and Matthew J. Walsh, History and Organization of Education in Pennsylvania, p. 85 (1930).  
However, according to 12 Statutes at Large of Pennyslvania 1682 to 1801 224, Act of April 7, 1786, ch. 724 § 7, the 
government did reserve a small amount of state-owned lands for endowing schools, but—per Walsh and Walsh, pp. 
85-86—no schools were established by the legislature prior to the rewriting of the state constitution in 1790. 
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not long after it had been adopted. The education clause in Vermont’s 1786 and 1793 
Constitutions was amended to read “schools ought to be maintained,” while in 1790 
Pennsylvania added “as soon as conveniently may be” after “shall be established.”30  The 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 was notable in that it provided for free education—the first 
such constitution in the United States to do so—but only for people defined as “poor.”  This 
proved tremendously difficult to implement, given that parents had to be designated by a local 
administrator as “paupers” before the children could receive free schooling.  A subsequent 
attempt in 1824 to clarify the law to provide education to a greater number of students met with 
opposition—again due to its cost—and a complete system of free public schools was not 
established in Pennsylvania until 1834.31   
Although North Carolina and Georgia were alone among the South Atlantic states in 
inserting provisions regarding education in their constitutions, it would be many years before any 
legislative action was taken in pursuit of these objectives.”32  And this is in itself something of an 
understatement: North Carolina established its system of common schools in 183933, and 
Georgia did not provide regular funding for its system of public schools until 1873.34  Prior to 
1873, it was left to Georgia’s towns and cities to provide education to their residents, albeit with 
support from a meager “poor school fund” created in 1822. It was not until 1866 that Georgia’s 
                                                 
30 Vermont Constitution of 1786, ch. II, § 38; Vermont Constitution of 1793, ch. II, § 41; Pennsylvania Constitution 
of 1790, art. VII, § 1.  
31 Walsh and Walsh, History and Organization of Education in Pennsylvania, pp. 95-96, 119. See also “Records of 
the Department of Education Agency History,” accessed at http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/bah/dam/rg/rg22ahr.htm, as 
well as Jacob Tanger and Harold Alderfer, Pennsylvania Government, State and Local (1939), p. 281. 
32 Fletcher M. Green, Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860 (Chapel Hill, 1930), p. 95.   
33 “History of the North Carolina State Board of Education,” accessed at 
http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/stateboard/about/history/chapters/one.  This law—similar to others that were being 
passed at the time in places such as Ohio—“established the principle of combined State and local funding for public 
schools.” 
34 “Public Education” in The New Georgia Encyclopedia.  Accessed at 
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-2619.  
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legislature approved a bill creating a statewide system of free public schools, as an earlier bill—
passed in 1837—had been almost immediately repealed due to intense public opposition rooted 
in anxiety over its purported costs.  Even after the passage of that 1866 bill, the state school 
system did not come into actual existence until 1873, when the state allocated revenues to it that 
were sufficient to subsidize its operation—at which point it was totally segregated by race.35 
 Thus, while there were two forms of education clause to be found in the state 
constitutions of the late 18th century—hortatory provisions and facially obligatory provisions—it 
appears that this amounts to a “distinction without a difference.”  Vermont, Georgia, 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina did not face litigation of the sort that the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court grappled with in Roberts—although issues of access and cost were certainly not far from 
the thoughts of legislators who continually attempted to reform (and, in some cases, “re-form”) 
systems of public education in these states. Assuming that they had, however, it is unlikely that 
they would have returned a result different from the one reached by Shaw and his colleagues.  
Indeed, even putting aside the judicial innovations of the age—and there were many—“an 
element of conservatism,” as the Massachusetts attorney Rufus Choate put it, pervaded the bar.  
Certainly no “fundamental right” to education could have been announced during this period—
not by jurists, more than a few of whom refused to view law as “the transient and arbitrary 
creation of the majority will.”36  It had been left, and would continue to be left until well into the 
20th century, to the state legislatures to effect any and all reforms appertaining to public 
education.   
                                                 
35 id. 
36 Rufus Choate, as quoted in William M. Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought:  Law and Ideology 
in America, 1886-1937 (Oxford, 1998).   
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2.2 OPENING THE FRAME:  EDUCATING THE “COMMON MAN” IN THE 
EARLY AND MID NINETEENTH CENTURY, 1800-1865 
As additional states were admitted to the Union—eight between 1803 and 1821—six of them 
adopted provisions relating to education that were modeled on either the language found in the 
Northwest Ordinance (“schools and means of education shall forever be encouraged”37) or the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.38 Moreover, as these territories were admitted to statehood, 
they added provisions to their constitutions related to the care and maintenance of the school 
lands granted to them by the federal government.39  In its Constitution of 1835, Michigan 
adopted an education provision, based on the revenues from this “common fund” of donated 
lands—that for the first time appeared to contain a genuine enforcement provision: 
The legislature shall provide for a system of common schools, by which a school shall be 
kept up and supported in each school-district at least three months in every year; and any 
school-district neglecting to keep up and support such a school may be deprived of its 
equal proportion of the interest of the public fund.40 
 
On the surface, this provision appears to do two things.  First, it couples the requirement that the 
“legislature shall provide for a system of common schools”—language seen in earlier education 
provisions—with a specific command that “a school shall be kept up in each school-district at 
least three months every year.”  Second, it contains a penalty for districts that fail to do so, which 
would be an inability to partake in the revenues produced by the public fund created by land 
grants from the Northwest Ordinance.  However, as John Eastman pointed out in a study of this 
provision, the primary motivation for that precise language was owing to the fact that “the funds 
                                                 
37 Northwest Territory Ordinance Article III, § 14 (1787); 1 Stat. 51. 
38 The Ohio Constitution of 1802, the Mississippi Constitutions of 1817 and 1832, and the Alabama Constitution of 
1819 adopted the language of the former.  The Indiana Constitution of 1816, the Maine Constitution of 1819, and 
the Tennessee Constitution of 1834 borrowed the language of the latter. 
39 e.g., Indiana Constitution of 1816, art. IX, § 2 and Missouri Constitution of 1820, art. VI, § 1.   
40 Michigan Constitution of 1835, art. IX, § 2.   
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were…a source of temptation for the legislature, and an obligatory provision of some kind was 
needed to keep the school fund from being spent elsewhere.”41 As such, “the clause was not 
intended to establish a right to free education or to compel the provision of education” but rather 
to provide a mechanism by which school districts that did not offer schooling for three months a 
year could be deprived of their share of the school fund.42  And this was exactly how one justice 
of the Michigan Supreme Court characterized that clause in an 1869 decision: “It cannot be 
claimed that the legislature could not make or authorize any regulation they should see fit, in 
regard to the management of different scholars.”43 
These provisions regarding public education funds would prove especially nettlesome 
during the middle part of the century, when financial crises—the Panic of 1837 most notable 
among them, although there were various other regional economic “busts” as well—forced states 
such as Michigan to borrow against the school funds that they had promised to preserve.44  The 
fund itself experienced a significant setback, with purchasers of those school lands negotiating 
more favorable payment terms at the fund’s expense.  In response, the state legislature legalized 
the practice of charging tuition to students, in the event that the fund became completely 
exhausted.45  The quarrels of the ensuing years involved considerable public debate over the 
issue of taxation and school finance, with one of the main objectives of the Michigan 
Constitutional Convention of 1850 being to determine “how [public education] should be 
                                                 
41 John C. Eastman, “When Did Education Become a Civil Right?” 42 American Journal of Legal History 1 (1998). 
Eastman, a former law clerk for Justice Clarence Thomas, is an “originalist” who concludes that education became a 
“right” only when “activist” 20th century state supreme court justices began to declare it one.   
42 id. at 14.    
43 The People ex rel. Workman v. Board of Education of Detroit, 18 Michigan 400, 418 (1869) (Campbell., J. 
dissenting). This majority opinion in this case, authored by Justice Thomas Cooley, will be discussed in greater 
detail later in this section. 
44 George W. Knight, “History of the Land Grants for Education in Michigan,” 7 Report of the Pioneer Society of 
the State of Michigan 17-35 (1884). 
45 David Tyack, Thomas James, and Aaron Benavot, Law and the Shaping of Public Education, 1785-1954 
(Madison, 1987), pp. 84-85. 
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financed and how prominent [was to be] the role of the state in comparison with that of local 
districts.”46 
  Informing these debates over the role of the state in public education in Michigan as 
well as other “Western” states was an English translation of the French philosopher Victor 
Cousin’s Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia produced in 1834 by Sarah 
Austin.47 After being translated and published in England, the work was soon being reprinted by 
the legislatures of New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New York and distributed to educators 
working in those states’ public schools.48  The Report specified a method of organization for the 
educational bureaucracy, a program of teacher education, and emphasized the importance of 
compulsory primary education as a “civic duty.”  Exposure to it prompted Ohio educator Calvin 
Stowe—of whom more is said in chapter three—to travel abroad and make his own report on 
European public schools for the Ohio legislature, and it also influenced Michigan lawmakers 
John Pierce and Isaac Crary to press their state’s legislature to organize their schools along 
Prussian lines.49  After traveling back to the East to meet with like-minded education reformers, 
he returned to Michigan in 1837 with a plan that would utilize the public fund—already a subject 
of much controversy—to fashion a system of compulsory public education for children ranging 
from five to seventeen years of age.  Staffed by qualified administrators and professionally 
trained teachers and subsidized by local property tax increases as well as the public fund, 
                                                 
46 id. 
47 Victor Cousin (trans. Sarah Austin), Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia (London, 1834).  
Accessed at 
http://books.google.com/books/about/Report_on_the_state_of_public_instructio.html?id=BjidqK3qAUUC&utm_so
urce=gb-gplus-share via the Library of the University of Michigan. 
48 “Cousin, Victor” in 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.  Accessed at 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Cousin,_Victor.   
49 John D. Pierce, “Origin and Progress of the Michigan School System,” 1 Report of the Pioneer Society of the State 
of Michigan 37 (1876). Also discussed, passim, in Tyack et al.   
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Pierce’s plan was intended to “infallibly secure the interest of the great mass of the people in the 
welfare of the public schools.”50  
 Such a proposal was, of course, quite controversial in part because it promised to be quite 
expensive.  And, setting aside the scholarship that influenced education policymakers during this 
period, the Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1850, in the words of David Tyack, 
“concerned not ends but money.”51  That is, this convention—as well as the state’s subsequent 
186752 and 1908 conventions—“showed the same disputing over means within a larger 
consensus over purposes that characterized state educational policy to 1850,” with disagreements 
over the length of the school term and the costs of school finance remaining major, unresolved 
issues throughout that period.  Although some delegates supported a version of Pierce’s proposal 
for free schools supported by general taxes on all citizens, others worried about the dangers of 
centralization and the imposition of an oppressive financial burden on the public.53   
What emerged from the convention, then, was a compromise:  the Constitution of 1850 
would contain a clause mandating a system of free schools as well as a proviso giving the 
legislature five years to accomplish this.54  This “free schools” provision comported with 
developments in states such as New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon, which coupled such language 
with a requirement that these systems be “thorough and efficient.”55  Wisconsin’s Constitution of 
1848 and Minnesota’s Constitution of 1857 went further than those three, both stating that these 
                                                 
50 id. at 38. 
51 Tyack et al. at 85 (emphasis added). 
52 At the 1867 convention, the issue of compulsory education was again raised. In response, one delegate snappishly 
remarked  “we do not live in Prussia.”  Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of 
Michigan, 1867, vol. I, pp. 304-308.   
53 id. at 304-308, 404-419. 
54 Michigan Constitution of 1850, art. XIII.  Of the delegates that attended this convention, Tyack et al. report that 
“almost half were farmers, and the next largest group were lawyers” (p. 232).  Only a handful identified as teachers.   
55 New Jersey Constitution of 1844, art. IV, § 7, pt. 6; Ohio Constitution of 1851, art. VI, § 2; Oregon Constitution 
of 1857, art. VIII, § 3.  Of the genesis of art. VI, § 2 in the Ohio Constitution of 1851, much more is said in chapter 
four.   
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school systems—which should be “general and uniform”—would necessitate the establishment 
of “public schools in each township in the state.”56  However, all of this constitutional language 
was simply not relevant to state supreme courts faced with the legislation of this period:  As with 
the Dedham and Roberts cases in Massachusetts, the courts’ holdings turned on whatever statutes 
the legislatures had passed to “enable” this language—and even then the results occasionally 
went against the ostensible “plain text” of the statute at issue. 
In Van Camp v. Board of Education of Logan (1859), the Ohio Supreme Court was faced 
with a set of facts that compelled just such a seemingly contradictory result:  Enos Van Camp—
the ancestry of whom was debated, although he referred to himself and the other members of his 
family as “white”—applied to have his children admitted to a public school that was partially 
subsidized out of the state’s public fund.  The Board of Education of Logan, though receiving 
monies from the state, refused to admit them in spite of an 1853 Ohio statute that imposed an 
affirmative duty on the state’s school districts to educate both “white” and “colored” children 
together if they had no separate school for “coloreds.”57  The Ohio Supreme Court, per Justice 
Peck, held that this statute—which seemed on its face to impel a result in Van Camp’s favor—
was merely classificatory in nature, rather than one that required districts to educate all children, 
“white” and “colored,” living therein.58 As for the lack of separate schools in Logan—like in 
other districts “in which the number [of African-Americans] is so limited…”, that was a “matter 
for the consideration of the legislature, and not for the judiciary.”59  In Peck’s opinion, because 
                                                 
56 Wisconsin Constitution of 1848, art. X, §§ 3-5; Minnesota Constitution of 1857, art. VIII, § 3.  The former 
constitution also banned sectarian instruction in these schools, and stated that these district schools should operate 
“without charge” for residents living with the district.  
57 Van Camp v. Board of Education of Logan, 9 Ohio 406, 410 (1859).  The opinion states that this man’s children 
were “five-eighths” white and “three-eighths” African, and were “distinctly colored and regard as colored children 
by the community where they reside,” at 409. 
58 id. 
59 id. at 415. 
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some schools were provided for “colored” students—at least somewhere in the state, if not in 
Logan—the law did not exclude them altogether from the “means of education.”60  This was, one 
must conclude, an even harsher result than the holding in Roberts, where the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court indicated that Sarah Roberts would have been entitled to attend a “white” public 
school in her district if there were no schools for “coloreds.”  Furthermore, no mention was made 
whatsoever of Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution:  regardless of how unjust this result 
seemed, the system of schools then established in Ohio was “thorough and efficient.”  A fairer 
result for Van Camp, it seems, would be left to the legislature—which would itself have to pass a 
clearer, more unequivocal statement regarding access to public education.   
Where such language was indeed unequivocal, plaintiffs seeking access to public 
education achieved more favorable results. New Jersey’s Constitution of 1844, which stated that 
the school fund should be “for the equal benefit of all people in the state,” was buttressed in 1874 
by legislation that ordered public schools to be “open and free” to all students living within a 
given school district.61 Pierce, a biracial resident of the New Jersey city of Burlington, attempted 
to have his children admitted to the nearest public school in his district (which was a “white” 
school), and, after they were denied admission, sued the district’s school trustees to enforce the 
terms of the 1874 statute.  Writing for a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court in Pierce v. 
Union School District (1874), Justice Dixon announced that “the power of the legislature to 
enact the law which has been promulgated on the subject is indubitable” and thus the refusal to 
                                                 
60 id. 
61 Pierce v. Union School District, 46 N.J. (Vroom) Law Reports 76 (1874).  Not available via Westlaw, but 
accessible at 
http://books.google.com/ebooks/reader?id=W9UaAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=GBS.PA
76.   
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admit Pierce’s children was illegal.62  However, Dixon observed, by way of dicta, that if all of 
the schools in Pierce’s district were full, the court might reach a contrary result and Pierce, the 
plain text of the statute notwithstanding, would have no legal or equitable remedy (at which point 
he would need to move to another district, one assumes).63   
In 1886, an inter-district remedy was denied the plaintiff in State ex rel. Comstock v. 
Joint School District No. 1 of Arcadia.64  Comstock, a citizen of Wisconsin living in a school 
district where no school was in session sued to have his sons admitted without charge to a school 
outside the district in which he resided, basing his suit on the provision in that state’s constitution 
that schools should be “as uniform as possible” and “free and without charge for tuition, to all 
children between the ages of four and twenty years.”65  Focusing on the district-based nature of 
the state’s system of public education, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held against the plaintiff, 
explaining that because there was no right to attend schools outside the district, it was not 
inappropriate for the other school to charge tuition to the plaintiff’s children. Using language that 
would continue to appear in decisions pertaining to this issue well into the 20th century, the court 
stated that “wherever [the district] system has prevailed, the absolute right to the privileges of the 
school in any given district is confined to children residing such district, and having the 
prescribed qualifications.”66  The plaintiff—like so many after him—was limited in his relief by 
the arbitrary boundaries established via this method of school organization:  absent the 
expenditure of $10 in tuition payments (not an insubstantial sum in the deflationary economy of 
                                                 
62 id. at 78. 
63 id.  “No doubt such a refusal would be legal, but no such grounds can be discovered in the evidence.” 
64 State ex rel. Comstock v. Joint School District No. 1 of Arcadia, 65 Wisconsin 631 (1886).  Again, the relation of 
this case to Milliken v. Bradley is noteworthy.   
65 Wisconsin Constitution of 1848, art. X, § 3.   
66 Comstock at 636. 
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1886), he could not fashion his own inter-district solution that ensured his sons received a 
“general and uniform” education.   
In People ex rel. Workman v. Detroit Board of Education (1869), the venerable Justice 
Thomas Cooley of Michigan was faced with a case relating to access to schools within a single 
district.  As in Pierce and Van Camp, the plaintiff Workman sought to have his children admitted 
to a Detroit school that had excluded them on the grounds that they were “mulattoes.”67  Here 
too Cooley and his colleagues had a recent statute to interpret; in this instance, an 1867 
amendment to the state’s primary school law that read “all residents of any district shall have an 
equal right to attend any school therein…providing that this shall not prevent the grading of 
schools according to the intellectual progress of the pupils.”68 Cooley, who wrote in his treatise 
on the legislative powers of the American states that it fell to judges to declare laws 
unconstitutional only where “the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits” 
and “deliberately disregarded the limitations imposed [upon it],” viewed judicial review of 
legislative enactments as a “solemn” duty and “only to be entered upon with reluctance and 
hesitation.”69  In Workman, his majority opinion focused exclusively on the statute at issue, 
leaving aside any discussion of the education provisions in the state’s constitution.  His initial 
reading of the statute, and the Detroit district’s resistance to it, was dismissive:  “It cannot be 
seriously urged that with this provision in force, the school board of any district which is subject 
                                                 
67 People ex rel. Workman v. Detroit Board of Education, 18 Michigan 400, 401 (1869). 
68 id. at 409.   
69 Thomas Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States 
of the America (Boston, 1878), p. 195.  Accessed at 
http://books.google.com/ebooks/reader?id=_zo1Gg3fStYC&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=GBS.PA195.  
However, with regard to the constitutionality of legislation segregating the schools, Cooley writes the following:  
“Confining colored children to schools specially organized for them, does not impair or abridge any right, conceding 
that the right exists; it is a simple regulation of rights, with a view to the most convenient and beneficial enjoyment 
of them by all, and deprives no one of what is justly his own” (pp. 596-7). 
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to it may make regulations which would exclude any resident of the district from any of its 
schools because of race or color...[and] it is too plain for argument that an equal right to all the 
schools, irrespective of all such distinctions, was meant to be established.”70 
 The “equal right” adverted to here is, of course, an “equal right of access to all the 
schools,” not some larger “fundamental right to education.”  Considered even in this manner and 
predicated on a statute that could be revoked at any time, this is still a fascinating declaration—
the limitations of which were discussed by Justice Campbell in his dissent.  As noted earlier in 
this section, Campbell was quick to point out that there were no constitutional limitations on the 
right of the legislature to organize “different scholars” as they saw fit.  In other words, if a 
different body of lawmakers were elected to serve in Lansing, Cooley’s decision could quickly 
be reversed by legislative fiat.   
 The framing and re-framing of subnational constitutions during the middle of the 19th 
century to include passages relating to the establishment of “free,” “thorough,” “open,” 
“efficient,” and “uniform” schools in one sense reflects the democratizing tendencies of that age.  
Moreover, it offers evidence of the impact of educational reformers who were exchanging ideas 
in a transnational context.  That developments in public schooling in distant Prussia could 
prompt critical reevaluations in Ohio and Michigan indicates that knowledge in the Atlantic 
region was now traveling far beyond 18th century nodes of access such as Boston, Philadelphia, 
and Charleston.   However, one must not overstate the significance of all this:  state supreme 
courts found little guidance in this new constitutional language—perhaps no more than they had 
with earlier language, as in the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s Dedham and Roberts decision.  
Where constitutional text did compel a particular result, such as was the case in Comstock, that 
                                                 
70 Workman at 410.  
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text was severely limited in its application.  What progress was made in terms of access to public 
education in the states of the North and the Middle West came via statutes passed by legislatures.  
New Jersey and Michigan had yet to add any specific language to their constitutions integrating 
the public schools, but legislation passed to advance these objectives served the same purpose 
(although it was, of course, always subject to repeal).  Finally, Michigan’s long struggle to create 
“free” public schools—a struggle that, owing to financial anxieties and a fear of oppressive 
taxation, culminated in a compromise to create “free” schools within five years—would have its 
analogs in the school funding crises of the 20th century.71  
2.3 REBELLION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND “REDEMPTION”:  MISSED 
OPPORTUNITIES TO CHART A NEW COURSE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1860-
1900 
The period from the Civil War to the beginning of the 20th century was a watershed moment in 
the framing of language related to education in subnational constitutions.  It was not, like the era 
that had immediately preceded it, one concerned primarily with issues of “free” and 
“compulsory” schools; rather, many of the states that grappled with the re-framing of their 
education provisions during this time did so in large part to determine issues of access.  As had 
been the case with the statute at issue in Van Camp, they were concerned with questions of 
classification:  Who would attend the public schools?  Were they to be “free and open” for all?  
                                                 
71 A point that will be made again both with reference to the push for Proposition 13 (the “People’s Initiative to 
Limit Property Taxation”) in California that followed the Serrano v. Priest decisions in the 1970s that is discussed in 
the succeeding chapter, as well as to the decision, addressed in chapter five, of Alabama voters in 2004 to reject a 
referendum that would have excised outdated, segregation-era language from that state’s constitution. 
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“Free and open” but separated along racial lines?  This was, of course, a corollary of the long 
national debate over the legality of slavery in the states and territories—with education but one 
of the many aspects of American society that would be shaped and re-shaped by developments 
occurring within those states. 
 Quite understandably, the outbreak of war forced parties to the hostilities to engage in the 
hasty drafting of new constitutions.  The “free-soiler” Kansas Constitution of 1855 borrowed the 
language of Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution of 1851, stating that “the general 
assembly shall make such provision as will secure a thorough and efficient system of common 
schools throughout the state.”72  Pro-slavery delegates at Lecompton—established as a territorial 
capital-to-be by President James Buchanan—responded in 1857 with a constitution that also 
contained a mandate to the legislature to establish public schools throughout the state, albeit with 
a proviso:  “The legislature shall, as soon as practicable, establish one common school (or more) 
in each township in the State, where the children of the township shall be taught gratis.”73 
 Of course, the matter was, here as in other Western states, academic:  Kansas did not 
have a consolidated system of public schools that serviced all students in the state until late in the 
19th century.74  The true distinction between the two constitutions was on the legality of slavery 
in the territory.  The “free-soiler” constitution prohibited it; the “Lecompton” constitution did 
not.  This was, along with the need to formalize various secession amendments or ordinances 
passed at the beginning of hostilities, the critical reason for the re-drafting of constitutions in all 
eleven of the States of the Confederacy.75 At the close of the war—when those states either 
                                                 
72 Kansas Constitution of 1855, art. I, § 2.   
73 Kansas (Lecompton) Constitution of 1857, art. XIV, § 3. 
74 “Education in Kansas” in Kansapedia:  A Publication of the Kansas Historical Society.  Accessed at 
http://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/education-in-kansas/14231. 
75 i.e., now that they had severed ties from the United States, they needed new governing documents.   
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revoked their prior constitutions or established new ones—education was not addressed at great 
length.76  The most notable provision related to education finance could be found in the Texas 
Constitution of 1866: 
The Legislature shall, as early as practicable, establish a system of free schools 
throughout the State; and as a basis for the endowment and support of said system, all the 
funds, lands and other property heretofore set apart and appropriated, or that may 
hereafter be set apart and appropriated for the support and maintenance of public schools, 
shall constitute the public school fund; and said fund, and the income derived therefrom, 
shall be a perpetual fund exclusively for the education of all the white scholastic 
inhabitants of this State, and no law shall ever be made appropriating said fund to any 
other use or purpose whatever.77 
 
Here, then, was a prototype—and an explicit statement, at that—of how disenfranchisement in 
the South was going to proceed.  It would, of course, be based on a the codification of an unequal 
racial classification—“whites” who could reap the benefits of the fund, as against “blacks” who 
could not—and it was to be effectuated here through the “power of the purse.”  The Texas 
Constitution of 1866 did, however, contain a sop for African-American students:   
The Legislature may provide for the levying of a tax for educational purposes; provided, 
the taxes levied shall be distributed from year to year, as the same may be collected; and 
provided, that all the sums arising from said tax which may be collected from Africans, 
or persons of African descent, shall be exclusively appropriated for the maintenance of a 
                                                 
76 In order, the states adopting new constitutions at the close of hostilities were:  Arkansas (1864), Louisiana (1864), 
Virginia (1864), Alabama (1865), Florida (1865), Georgia (1865), South Carolina (1865), Mississippi (1865), North 
Carolina (1865), Tennessee (1866), and Texas (1866).  These constitutions were themselves upended after the 
formal imposition of federal Reconstruction, with all states save Tennessee enacting different constitutions in 1868, 
largely to deny political office to Confederate leaders.  Information related to this welter of constitutional 
formation—which is difficult to keep track of even with the clearest of heads—can be found in Franklin B. Hough 
(ed.), Constitutional Provisions in Regard to Education in the Several States of the American Union, US Bureau of 
Education, Circular of Information no. 7 (Washington, D.C., 1875).  It is also summarized in Eric Foner, 
“Reconstruction Revisited,” 10 Reviews in American History 90-94 (1982) and discussed in greater depth in David 
Tyack and Robert Lowe, “The Constitutional Moment:  Reconstruction and Black Education in the South,” 94 
American Journal of Education 236-256 (February 1986).   A typical (and very simple) education provision of this 
time could be found in the Georgia Constitution of 1865, §5-3:  “The General Assembly shall have power to 
appropriate money for the promotion of learning and science, and to provide for the education of the people, and 
shall provide for the early resumption of the regular exercises of the University of Georgia, by the adequate 
endowment of the same.” 
77 Texas Constitution of 1866, art. X, § 2 (emphasis added).   
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system of public schools for Africans and their children; and it shall be the duty of the 
Legislature to encourage schools among these people.78 
 
The door was left open for a legislative “solution” of some sort—taxes may be levied—but the 
text of the constitution appears to militate against the imposition of a statute such as the one 
Justice Cooley was left to interpret in Workman.  As federal intervention in the South increased 
after 1867, Texas was forced to adopt a new constitution.  In the West Texas Constitution of 
1868—a document ratified prior to the conclusion of the 1869 Texas constitutional convention, 
when a split of the state into two parts seemed a possibility—this classificatory language had 
been excised, as had the precatory remarks about the legislature, should it deem such activity to 
be prudent, providing for African-American education.  The following was substituted in its 
place: 
And the Legislature shall appropriate all the proceeds resulting from sales of public lands 
of this State, to such Public School Fund. And said Fund, and the income derived 
therefrom, shall be a perpetual fund, to be applied as needed, exclusively for the 
education of all scholastic inhabitants of this State, and no law shall ever be made 
appropriating such fund, for any other use or purpose whatever.79 
 
At least for the moment, and at least in West Texas, the nexus between race and financial 
disenfranchisement had been severed. The results of the state’s 1869 constitution convention, 
however, were more muted—although the convention, which featured a great deal of rough-and-
tumble action, certainly was not: during the eight months it took place “one delegate committed 
suicide, at least eight others were involved in fisticuffs on or off the convention floor, the Klan 
murdered another delegate, and another was expelled for the alleged rape of an eleven-year-old 
                                                 
78 Texas Constitution of 1866, art. X, § 7.  The original document may be accessed at 
http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/image/F30.html. 
79 West Texas Constitution of 1868, art. XII, § 6.  Accessed at 
http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/image/h32.html.  
 30 
girl.”80  Despite radical demands on both sides—a proviso from one delegate requesting 
language related to integration in single-school districts, another from a delegate attempting to 
mandate segregated schools, and a third from a white representative to make a “guarantee” of 
education to children of all races81—the resulting language was similar to what appeared in the 
West Texas Constitution of 1868:  “ The Legislature shall establish a uniform system of Public 
Free Schools throughout the State…[which shall be supported by the public] fund…with the 
income derived therefrom, and the taxes herein provided for school purposes…to be applied 
exclusively for the education of all the scholastic inhabitants of this State.”82 
In Washington, the intellectual vanguard of the “Radical Republicans” then in control of 
Congress had commenced a serious discussion about ordering the defeated Confederate states to 
create free, integrated public schools as a condition of returning to the Union.  Education was, of 
course, not the most important item on the agenda—securing universal male citizenship and 
suffrage was—but it was viewed by some legislators as absolutely essential to the proper 
exercise of both of those rights.  Charles Sumner, whose abolitionist views had led him to 
represent Sarah Roberts in her attempt to gain access to a neighborhood school in Boston and 
eight years later landed him on the wrong side of a ferocious beating from the metal-tipped cane 
of South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks, rose to offer a plea to his fellow senators to 
amend the Reconstruction Act to create a right of free access to the public schools for all 
                                                 
80 Richard L. Hume and Jerry B. Gough, Blacks, Carpetbaggers, and Scalawags:  The Constitutional Conventions of 
Radical Reconstruction (Louisiana State University Press:  Baton Rouge, 2008), p. 211.  Considering that there were 
only 92 delegates at this convention, and eleven of them were implicated in the passage quoted here, it must have 
been quite the event.    
81 id. at 214 (emphasis added). 
82 Texas Constitution of 1869, art. IX, §§ IV, VI.  Accessed at 
http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/image/G31.html.  One of the major issues discussed at this convention 
was whether to divide the state.  This was why the West Texas Constitution of 1868, mentioned supra, had been 
drafted in the first place.   
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citizens, as he believed the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution empowered them 
to do83:   
You have prescribed universal suffrage.  Prescribe now universal education.  The power 
of Congress is the same in one case as in the other.  And you are now under an equal 
necessity to exercise it.  Voters by the hundred thousand will exercise the elective 
franchise for the first time, without delay or preparation.  They should be educated 
promptly.84 
 
This is, in and of itself, a significant statement.  Prior to the Civil War, sectional conflict had 
precluded the implementation of any systematic federal mandate regarding education.  But here 
Sumner, who had waited out the long struggle for abolition, articulated a clear rationale for 
creating what might have, with the passage of time and various favorable judicial decisions, 
crystallized into a “fundamental right” alongside such rights as the right to vote, the right to 
procreate, and so forth.85  What also warrants notice is how Sumner, after a lengthy but vague 
description of the “value” of education, then characterized the sectional conflict of the pre-war 
years in terms of differing approaches to education taken in the North and South:   
The contrast between the rebel States and the loyal States appeared early.  It was 
conspicuous in two Colonies, each of which exercised a peculiar influence.  
Massachusetts began her existence with a system of free schools…[and] at the same time 
Virginia set herself openly against free schools.  The papers of the day…show how the 
original spirit of Virginia…still animates these states.  A motion to print two hundred 
copies of the report of the State Superintendent of Public Education was promptly voted 
down in the Senate of Louisiana, while a Senator…‘denounced the public education 
scheme as an unmitigated oppression, an electioneering device, an imposition…’86 
                                                 
83 “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”  Sumner read 
this provision as granting Congress to order the readmitted states of the Confederacy to include provisions for “free 
education for all citizens” in their state constitutions.  
84 Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 1st Session, March 16, 1867 (emphasis added).  Accessed at 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=078/llcg078.db&recNum=302. 
85 As in, for example, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which is discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter.  Had that Court—or even the Brown Court—been presented with longstanding 
federal legislation or perhaps even a special “sixteenth amendment” (which Sumner is not advocating, as discussed 
in f.n. 81, supra, but which could very well have been passed during this period) ordering universal access to 
education, it is likely that the holdings in those cases would have been quite different (more radical in the case of 
Brown; a decision in the opposite direction in the case of Rodriguez).    
86 Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 1st Session, March 16, 1867. Accessed at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=078/llcg078.db&recNum=302. 
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Sumner’s proposed amendment was opposed by New Jersey senator Frederick Theodore 
Frelinghuysen, who viewed the measure as a bridge too far:   
The proposition is that we shall provide free schools without distinction of race.  The 
reconstruction law already provides that there shall be no discrimination in legislation on 
account of race or color.  The fourteenth amendment has that provision, and that 
amendment must be part of the constitution before any one of these states can be 
introduced.  There is, therefore, no necessity for that part of the senator’s amendment.87 
 
Frelinghuysen’s sentiments were echoed by others, who either saw it as a pointless imposition or 
something that was covered, at least implicitly, by legislation that had already been approved.  
The vote on the amendment ended in a tie, with 20 voting for it and 20 against, and so a very 
brief “federal moment”—or at least a moment when the federal government might have engaged 
in dictating the terms of the subnational constitutions of the states that comprised it—came to an 
end.  Frelinghuysen and his supporters would be proved incorrect—the limitations of the 
Reconstruction Act and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments soon became all too 
manifest—but that outcome was likely not something in contemplation of many members of a 
Republican Party then in its ascendancy.88   
 With two significant exceptions, the remaining Reconstruction-era constitutional 
conventions were much like the Texas convention discussed earlier:  comprised largely of white 
southerners, chaired by southern whites, and with a majority of white moderate Republicans at 
least partially counterbalanced in most instances by whites who voted somewhat more 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
87 id. 
88 As in, for example, the Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (holding that the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship of the United States were to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship of a state) and most notably in Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that the 
“separate but equal” provision of private services mandated by state government is constitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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conservatively.89  The role of African-Americans and “carpetbaggers,” then, was largely 
overstated—blown up and distorted by authors and artists interested in perpetuating a “Lost 
Cause” mythology—and the reforms that emerged from these conventions were much more 
measured, having been in most cases the product of serious deliberation and the result of close 
committee votes.  The provisions related to education that these delegates drafted were, in the 
aggregate, designed to bring state oversight of education in line with developments in the North 
and Midwest mentioned earlier.  All ten of the Reconstruction constitutions created the position 
of a state superintendent or commissioner of public education, and all but three established a 
board of education to manage the system.90  The constitutions of Arkansas and Mississippi 
contained language, similar to that found in the Wisconsin and Michigan constitutions, 
mandating the forfeiture of a school district’s claim to monies from the state fund if those 
districts did not maintain public schools for a set number of months each year.91  However, not 
all developments were so positive:  Alabama’s Constitution of 1867, the product of a somewhat 
more conservative convention, allowed for the establishment of ‘one or more schools’ in each 
                                                 
89 Richard L. Hume and Jerry B. Gough compiled precise tallies for Blacks, Carpetbaggers, and Scalawags:  The 
Constitutional Conventions of Radical Reconstruction, p.  257:  “In seven of the eleven conventions, native white 
southerners actually comprised delegate majorities.  Over half of all the standing committees (108 of them, or 
53.7%) were chaired by southern whites.  Outside whites presided over the bulk of the remainder (79, or 39.3%), 
while blacks secured a scant 13 chairmanships.”  
90 The Reconstruction constitutions of Georgia (1868), Louisiana (1868), and Texas (1869) did not establish boards 
of education.  In his Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions (Oceana Publications, New York: 1979), 
William Swindler observes that such measures were “in part a reflection of the awakening national interest in 
universal public schooling and in part a Radical [Republican] device to create a major division of the government,” 
at p. 100, n. 6.  Such a federal Department of Education was indeed created in 1867 by the Department of Education 
Act, but it was reduced to an office in 1868 and later became a small bureau within the Department of Interior, 
where it would remain until it was transferred to the Federal Security Agency during Franklin Roosevelt’s second 
term in office.   
91 Arkansas Constitution of 1868, art. IX, § 6; Mississippi Constitution of 1868, art. VIII, §5.  The North Carolina 
Constitution of 1868, art. IX, § 3 allowed for arrest of local school officials who were not maintaining public 
schools in their districts for four months out of the year.   
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district, language that appears to leave the door open to the creation of a segregated school 
system.92  
 Of course, that same “one or more schools” language appeared in the two most “radical” 
of the Reconstruction constitutions, those of South Carolina and Louisiana. Both states saw 
substantial participation from black delegates in their conventions—50 in Louisiana, 72 in South 
Carolina—as well as a fair number of outside or “carpetbagger” whites.93   In the latter state, 
where Radical Republicans held a considerable majority of the delegate positions, Afro-Jewish 
educator Francis Cardozo—who had been graduated from the University of Glasgow and was a 
distant cousin of future Supreme Court justice Benjamin Cardozo—led a push to create a system 
of public schools that would be open to all and supported by a statewide policy of compulsory 
attendance.  “We may never have a more propitious time,” he observed during the convention, 
“for when the old aristocracy…get[s] into power…they will never pass a law such as this.”94  
One of the provisions emerging from this convention—that of public schools open to students 
“without regard to race, color, or previous condition”— horrified delegates such as Odell 
Duncan, who believed this clause to be “fraught with danger to the peace and harmony of the 
                                                 
92 Hume and Gough at 254.   
93 id. at 185-186.  Also see Rebecca J. Scott, Degrees of Freedom (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 41-46 for a discussion of 
the 1868 Louisiana Convention:  “Elections for the new Constitutional Convention took place across the 
state…[and] Republicans won in nearly every district, and roughly half of the ninety-eight seats went to candidates 
of some African ancestry.” Scott goes on to situate the convention in a transatlantic context, emphasizing the “Afro-
Creole political tradition” of many of the delegates and its accompanying “commitment to rights [that] reflected an 
even deeper and more radical insistence on the morality of all human beings…[owing to its] roots…in a 
combination of Christianity with French and American revolutionary ideologies, sometimes accompanied by an 
acknowledgement of the Haitian struggle and the republican creed of the 1848 Revolution in France.”   
94 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of South Carolina of 1868 at 696, 707. However, Cardozo thought 
setting a date as early 1875 for the full implementation of this school system to be “extremely ridiculous,” believing 
that 1890 would be more appropriate.  Cardozo, who later served as secretary of state and then secretary of the 
treasury for South Carolina, did not endure long past 1875 in that state himself:  after being tried and convicted for 
conspiracy in 1877 and serving six months in jail, he moved to Washington, D.C., where he worked for the Treasury 
Department. 
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State, and to the friendly relations between the two races.”95  Jonathan Wright, another white 
delegate, mollified the other members of the convention by noting that even though that passage 
provided for integrated schools, he did “not believe the colored children will want to go to the 
white schools, or vice versa…and I think there will be separate schools established, and there is 
no clause in our Constitution that prevents it.”96   The article—which, rather than prohibiting 
segregated schools, simply did not mandate them—passed easily, by a vote of 96 to 4.97  The 
constitution adopted by the Louisiana delegates—some of whom were influenced by what 
Rebecca Scott has characterized as “a combination of Christianity with French and American 
revolutionary ideologies, sometimes accompanied by an acknowledgement of the Haitian 
struggle and the republican creed of the 1848 Revolution in France”98—took a different position:  
“There shall be no separate schools or institutions of learning established exclusively for any 
race by the state of Louisiana.”99  
This was a moment of triumph for reformers, but another trend in the framing of 
education provisions had already begun.  The Missouri Constitution of 1865 contained the 
following language:  “Separate schools may be established for children of African descent.”100  
That permissive language gave way during Missouri’s 1875 constitutional convention, where 
delegates voted to replace “may” with “shall.”101  West Virginia had already taken similar 
                                                 
95 id. at 891-902.   
96 id.  
97 id.  See Hume and Gough at p. 177 for a discussion of this vote.  Although this provision was never at contest in 
any recorded appellate court decision that I could discover, this bit of legislative history—and the resulting 
affirmative vote for it—suggests that this is how it was meant to be interpreted.  It also bears noting that African-
American delegates were not always in favor of integrated schools.  One delegate in North Carolina stated that he 
would “always do all what I can to have colored teachers for colored schools...[which] will necessitate separate 
schools as a matter of course.” Carolina Convention Journal of 1868, 342.   
98 Scott, Degrees of Freedom at p. 45.  See also n. 91, supra. 
99 Louisiana Constitution of 1868, title VII, art. 135.  Accessed at 
http://www.archive.org/stream/constitutionadop1868loui#page/16/mode/2up. 
100 Missouri Constitution of 1865, art. IX, § 2.   
101 Missouri Constitution of 1875, art. XI, § 3.   
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measures in 1872, adding a provision that “white and colored persons shall not be taught in the 
same school.”102  The actions taken by delegates in such “nearly-Southern” states—which were 
not covered by the terms of the Reconstruction Act—offered a foretaste of what sort of 
constitutional re-framing would take place once federal supervision in the South had ceased.103 
 The period from the end of Reconstruction to the beginning of the 20th century was 
characterized by the drawing of these sharp sectional distinctions regarding education.  New 
York, as well as the new states of the West—Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Washington, 
Wyoming, and Utah—added passages ordering the legislature to create public school systems 
that were open to all children.104  Florida, on the other hand, deleted its reference to a school 
system open to all children, replacing the lofty exhortation that “it is the paramount duty of the 
State to make ample provision for the education of all the children residing within its borders, 
without distinction or preference” with a much more subdued statement:  “the Legislature shall 
provide for a uniform system of public free schools, and shall provide for the liberal maintenance 
of the same.”105 
 Although de facto segregated schools had already appeared in both states long before the 
fact, Louisiana and South Carolina held constitutional conventions where the earlier education 
clauses, and the constitutions that contained them, were formally revoked.  Chairman Robert 
Aldrich, in his address to the South Carolina’s 1895 constitutional convention, spoke of the 
sacred mission facing the delegates:  to frame a constitution that would undo the 1868 
                                                 
102 West Virginia Constitution of 1872, art. XII, § 8.  Accessed at 
http://www.wvculture.org/history/government/1872constitution.html.   
103 The fate of Francis Cardozo, discussed in n. 92, supra, was also intimately linked to these events.   
104 New York Constitution of 1894, art. XI, § 1; Montana Constitution of 1889, art. XI, § 7; North Dakota 
Constitution of 1889, art. 8, § 147; South Dakota Constitution of 1889, art. VIII, § 1; Washington Constitution of 
1889, art. IX, § 1; Wyoming Constitution of 1889, art. VII, § 9; Utah Constitution of 1895, art. X, § 1.   
105 Florida Constitution of 1868, art. IX, § 1; Florida Constitution of 1885, art. XII, § 1 (accessed at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/conhist/1885con.html). 
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constitution, which had been forced upon South Carolina by “the Reconstruction Acts, which 
were notoriously unconstitutional” and written by “aliens, negroes, and natives without 
character, all enemies of South Carolina…[who desired to] insult our people and overturn our 
civilization.”106  The delegates complied, and, among other changes, the old education article—
which Francis Cardozo had urged delegates at the 1868 convention to adopt, because such an 
opportunity might never again arise—was replaced with language ordering that “separate schools 
shall be provided for children of the white and colored races, and no child of either race shall 
ever be permitted to attend a school provided for children of the other race.”107 
 Louisiana Democrats, once again in firm control of the state after a tense period in the 
late 1880s and early 1890s when a “fusion” ticket of white Farmers’ Alliance supporters and 
African-Americans had challenged them legislative supremacy, held a constitutional convention 
in 1898 to consolidate their gains.  The central provisions of this new constitution—Article 197, 
Sections 3 and 4—concerned the implementation of a combined literacy test and property tax 
qualification for voting, the effect of which was to disenfranchise nearly every African-American 
voter in the state.108  Section 5 of that article contained a “grandfather clause” allowing males 
who were able to vote before January 1867 to continue to do so, but only if they registered to 
vote by September 1st of 1898.109  The old education clause, which had prohibited segregated 
                                                 
106 Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of South Carolina, p. 2.  Accessed at 
http://books.google.com/ebooks/reader?id=mQhAAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=GBS.PA
2. 
107 South Carolina Constitution of 1895, art. XI, § 7.  Accessed at 
http://www.archive.org/stream/cu31924030491900#page/n47/mode/2up. 
108 Louisiana Constitution of 1898, art. 197 §§ 3, 4.  Accessed at 
http://books.google.com/ebooks/reader?id=97ESAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=GBS.PA7
7. 
109 id. at § 5.  Rebecca Scott notes that equal-rights activists in the North intended to challenge this constitution as 
contrary to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but “time was against them…and [soon] not only would the 
Republican Party in Louisiana collapse completely, but the faint final hope of using the ballot to extract concessions 
from Democrats would fast disappear as well” (p. 166). 
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schools, was replaced with a new one that now mandated them:  “There shall be free public 
schools for the white and colored races, separately established by the General Assembly, 
throughout the State, for the education of all the children of the State between the ages of six and 
eighteen years.”110 Murphy Foster—the last governor of Louisiana to face a serious challenge 
from a Republican candidate for nearly eight decades—remarked with satisfaction on what the 
delegates had wrought:  “The white supremacy for which we have so long struggled at the cost 
of so much precious blood and treasure, is now crystallized into the Constitution as a 
fundamental part and parcel of that organic instrument.”111 
 These late 19th-century Southern constitutional conventions and the “Redeemers” who 
served in them had, then, succeeded in redrawing formal distinctions among the races.   Many 
states in the North went in the opposite direction, using constitutional language to formally 
integrate their schools.  In both cases, constitutional framing was the instrument by which 
sectional differences were redrawn—and the operation of these new “apartheid” education 
provisions, as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter two, would precipitate the greatest 
school funding crisis in the nation’s history.   
 Three notable state supreme court cases from this period serve to inform our 
understanding of the “weight,” or lack thereof, that these provisions carried in the minds of those 
tasked with interpreting them.  In Grove v. School Inspectors of Peoria, a challenge to the school 
inspectors’ ability to apportion and establish the school district of Peoria, Illinois, as they saw 
fit—which was then only capable of serving a quarter of the district’s students—was met with a 
curt rejoinder from Justice Sidney Breese.112  Writing for the majority, Breese held that it was 
                                                 
110 Louisiana Constitution of 1898, art. 248. 
111 Quoted in Scott, p. 164.   
112 Grove v. School Inspectors of Peoria, 20 Illinois 532 (1858).   
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left to the inspectors to operate as they deemed fit, with the court able to intervene only in 
situations where “oppression, corruption, or act of gross injustice” had occurred—and no such 
condition was met, even where the school system could not accommodate 3,000 of its 4,000 
possible pupils.113 Of course, working as they were from the Illinois Constitution of 1848, the 
justices had little to interpret—the only mention of education in that constitution, besides an 
earlier passage exempting school property from taxation, was found in Article IX, Section 5 in a 
sentence vesting school districts with “the power to assess and collect taxes for corporate 
purposes.”114 
 A pair of cases considered the implications of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 
1868, as it related to the provision of education in the states.  In Ward v. Flood, the Supreme 
Court of California was asked to make a final determination on African-American Harriet 
Ward’s petition to have her daughter admitted to the public school nearest her home.115  
California had enacted a statute in 1869 ordering that “the education of children of African 
descent, and Indian children, shall be provided for in separate schools,” and the case turned on 
how that law was impacted, if at all, by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.116  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William T. Wallace stated that “[this] 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment referred to did not create any new or substantive legal right, 
or add to or enlarge the general classification of rights of persons or things existing in any State 
under the laws thereof…[but rather] operated upon them as it found them already established, 
and it declared in substance that, such as they were in each State, they should be held and 
                                                 
113 id. at 543. 
114 Illinois Constitution of 1848, art. IX, § 5.  Accessed at 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Illinois_Constitution_of_1848#Article_IX._Revenue.   
115 Ward v. Flood, 48 California 36 (1874). 
116 id. at 48. 
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enjoyed alike by all persons within its jurisdiction.”117  As for whether that amendment affected 
in any way “the policy of separation of the races for educational purposes,” Wallace looked to 
Justice Shaw’s Roberts decision as persuasive authority:  “ But when this great principle [of 
equality, as embodied both in the Massachusetts Constitution and in the Equal Protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment] comes to be applied to the actual and various conditions of 
persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion that men and women are legally clothed with 
the same civil and political powers, and that children and adults are legally to have the same 
functions and be subject to the same treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled 
and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the 
law.”118  Ward, then, would find no relief in the Fourteenth Amendment—although Wallace 
added, by way of conclusion, that this only obtained insofar as California school districts, such as 
Ward’s district in San Francisco, formally maintained separate schools.119 
  The Ohio Supreme Court reached a similar result in State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann 
(1871), which concerned the African-American plaintiff’s petition to have his children admitted 
to a public school in a district that maintained no separate school for African-Americans.120  
Ohio’s “classificatory” education law—which had also been at issue in Van Camp—was again 
implicated here, in that it permitted school districts with fewer than 20 African-American 
residents of “school age” to operate only a school for whites, while “setting aside” any monies 
(i.e., not including them in the school fund) raised from those African-American families.121  
Restating the court’s holding in Van Camp, Justice Luther Day—whose son William Day would 
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serve on the United State Supreme Court—wrote that “the [Ohio] constitution contains no 
restrictions upon the ‘legislative discretion,’ in regard to the classification of the youth of the 
State for school purposes.”122  As for the discretion afforded by Article 6, Section 2 of that 
constitution, it extended to any and all laws that “are ‘suitable’ to secure the organization and 
management of the contemplated system of common schools, without express restriction, except 
that ‘no religious or other sect or sects shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any 
part of the school funds of the State.’”123  In other words, the discretion of the legislature in 
matters relating to public education was constrained only by an explicit provision in the 
constitution so limiting it. 
 Day, however, recognized that this case had not been brought to upset the holding in Van 
Camp, but rather to test the limits of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:  
“It is quite apparent from this state of the case, that the proceeding is brought, not because the 
children of the plaintiff are excluded from the public schools, but to test the right of those having 
charge of them to make a classification of scholars on the basis of color.”124  Although he knew 
that a proper interpretation of this amendment had not yet been “judicially settled,” he had 
“strong reason to believe” that “it includes only such privileges or immunities as are derived 
from, or recognized by, the constitution of the United States.”125  Moreover, the Equal Protection 
Clause “only affords to colored citizens an additional guaranty of equality of rights to that 
already secured by the constitution of the State.”  In Day’s view, the law at issue here—Ohio’s 
“classificatory” education law requiring separate schools for African-American and white 
                                                 
122 id. at 204. 
123 id. 
124 id. 
125 id. at 211. And this is indeed how the Supreme Court would resolve the matter two years in the Slaughter-house 
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).  See n. 86, supra. 
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students—fully “recognizes their right, under the constitution of the State, to equal common 
school advantages, and secures to them their equal proportion of the school fund…[while 
regulating] the mode and manner in which this right shall be enjoyed by all classes of 
persons.”126  The law, in Day’s view, was “equal” in that it applied equally to both African-
Americans and whites. 
 Absent statutory measures to the contrary, then, federal or state judicial relief would not 
be forthcoming for those who lacked full access to public education at the end of the 19th 
century.  But, given the appalling disparity in resources directed to African-American students in 
segregated schools, this denial of access became untenable.  Or, to put it a bit differently, the 
Supreme Court near the middle of the 20th century would begin to hold that this was so.  
2.4 CONCLUSION:  ACCESS, AND CRISIS 
Three conclusions emerge from this survey of the development and interpretation of education 
provisions added to state constitutions over the course of the 19th century.  The first is simple 
enough:  with the possible exception of those Radical Republicans who discussed “nationalizing” 
the education system during the late 1860s, no person involved in the framing of these provisions 
intended to make education a “fundamental right” of the citizens of their states in the sense that 
the term is used today.   Yet this all-too-facile first conclusion leads directly to the second:  
however much the arguments over education finance that will be discussed in chapter three 
invoke “history” and “the intent of the framers” as a means of dispute resolution, those subjects 
                                                 
126 id. at 210. 
 43 
have little to do with the legal significance of such provisions.  Of course, one can, by examining 
the imbrication of these constitutional framings and re-framings and attending carefully to the 
discourse out of which they were written, determine what their framers intended; it is, in this 
case, especially easy to do, since their framers intended them to mean very little at all.127  
However, the thesis that these framers’ intentions are in any way controlling today is as 
flimsy as the oft-amended and/or superseded state constitutions in which they appear.  Put 
plainly, to argue in this way is to ask the following question:  Did the framers intend their 
intentions to matter?  And, short of the appearance of such language in the text itself—say, a 
footnote in the constitution stating that “for all matters to be adjudicated in years to come 
regarding the Article VI, Section 2, please refer to pages 100 through 200 of the Journal of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1898 for specific guidance”—then the answer to this question 
would seem to be of no consequence whatsoever. An examination of the 20th century decisions 
regarding these education provisions confirms that:  while those state supreme courts did not 
reach their holdings “as they pleased” or “under self-selected circumstances,” each of them 
wound up “making law,” including those that claimed to have “found” it in an age-old precedent 
or organic law.   
This brings us, then, to the third conclusion:  What exactly was created by these 
provisions, if not a “fundamental right” to education?  I would argue that it was a right of access 
to education, at a minimum.  Excepting the “Redeemer” constitutions of the post-Reconstruction 
South, there was a noticeable trend in the 19th century toward expanding opportunities for 
                                                 
127 A fuller discussion of this—and one that ranges far beyond my competency to articulate it in sufficiently precise 
terms—may be found in Quentin Skinner, “Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts,” 20 The 
Philosophical Quarterly 79 (April 1970), pp. 118-138.  Accessed at http://www.scribd.com/doc/25403136/skinner-
quentin-conventions-and-the-understanding-of-speech-acts.  H. Jefferson Powell, “The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent,” 98 Harvard Law Review 885 (1985); William W. Fisher, “Texts and Contexts: The Application to 
American Legal History,” 49 Stanford Law Review 1065 (1997); and Hans W. Baade, “‘Original Intent’ in 
Historical Perspective:  Some Critical Glosses,” 69 Texas Law Review 1001 (1991) are also instructive here.   
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children to attend public schools.  This is a trend reflected not only in the increasingly detailed 
education clauses found in many of these constitutions but also in those statutes passed to enable 
them, such as the statute mandating integration of the schools upon which Justice Cooley passed 
judgment in Workman.  In other words, it was the effort of policymakers of this generation to 
make education such a critical function of their state and local governments that provided Chief 
Justice Warren the basis from which to remark, as quoted supra, that this was so.   
As for those “Redeemer” constitutions:  they too were concerned with access to 
education, in the sense that they sought to restrict it.  And the statutory means of enabling these 
provisions, which precipitated the great school funding crisis discussed in the next chapter, were 
so egregious that they galvanized a well-coordinated response from civil rights activists that 
eventually led to the result in Brown v. Board of Education. It is to this response that our 
attention now turns. 
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3.0  THE STRUGGLE FOR SCHOOL FINANCE EQUITY IN THE COURTS, 1900-
2000 
In the previous chapter, I examined the origins and evolution of public education provisions 
codified in state constitutions and looked at how various state supreme courts had interpreted 
these provisions.  After surveying developments during the post-Revolutionary and late 
antebellum periods that had led, in fits and starts, to the growth of public education in the United 
States, I concluded with a discussion of the constitutional reframing that had occurred during and 
after Reconstruction.  There I noted how some states—primarily those in the North and West—
chose to continue expanding access to their public school systems, while others—notably those 
states that had comprised the Confederacy, as well as “near-South” border states such as 
Missouri and West Virginia—added language to their constitutions that mandated legal 
segregation.   
Here is how I will proceed in chapter three.  In the first section, I intend to show how the 
restrictive methods of constitutional framing in those states precipitated a school funding crisis 
of considerable magnitude throughout the South—a crisis that, far from improving, actually 
worsened with the passage of time.  After demonstrating how stark these funding disparities had 
become, I will analyze how the NAACP litigation team’s strategy of challenging the prevailing  
“separate but equal” doctrine succeeded in considerable part because these institutions were so 
poorly funded.   
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Of course, the notion that America’s system of apartheid schooling collapsed because its 
foundational myth proved untrue is not in itself an especially novel claim. In the next section of 
this chapter, though, I continue to explicitly link notions of race and class—arguing for their 
fundamental conceptual inseparability—in the context of the US Supreme Court’s 1973 
milestone school funding decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez as 
well as the school funding litigation that commenced at the state level afterwards, thereby 
substantiating political scientist Douglas Reed’s claim that “race and class disadvantages, 
combined, produce a common core of inequality that blurs legal and theoretical distinctions 
[between the two].”1 Moreover, I place these cases within the movement toward a “New Judicial 
Federalism” that began in the late 1970s. My treatment of the notable state cases following 
Rodriguez consists of a careful interpretation of the legal theories advanced by the justices 
writing those opinions as well as the response from policymakers to them—both in their public 
statements and at the various state constitutional conventions held throughout this period.2  In 
addition to emphasizing the nexus between race and class that appears in all of these examples, I 
situate incidences of negative public reaction to this litigation, where applicable, within the 
context of what sociologist Isaac Martin has termed “the permanent tax revolt.”3  In other words, 
the backlash to school funding decisions in California and elsewhere would, much like the 
related anti-bussing and anti-property tax movements, emerge from a grassroots, multi-class 
network of activists to become one of the many “third rails” of what today constitutes 
“mainstream” conservative politics.   
                                                 
1 Douglas Reed, On Equal Terms (Princeton, 2002), p. 163. 
2 I have chosen to confine my analysis to “representative” cases throughout the decades, as an exhaustive survey of 
this litigation would spill into the thousands of pages.  In the subsequent chapter, I move from a treatment of cases 
to a detailed examination of a single case—an examination which is designed to illustrate, in microcosm, the 
policymaking give-and-take that has characterized so much of this litigation.   
3 Isaac Martin, The Permanent Tax Revolt (Stanford University Press, 2008). 
 47 
The third section of this chapter considers school finance litigation that has occurred after 
1989, a year when many scholars believe that a decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court altered 
the nature of the judiciary’s involvement in these matters.  While conceding that plaintiffs have 
amended their litigation strategies and consequently achieved notable successes in terms of 
school finance reform in states such as Massachusetts and Vermont over this period, I also draw 
attention to plaintiffs’ defeats in Illinois and Pennsylvania—where the nineteenth-century 
interpretation of these education clauses remains the preferred interpretation of those courts—as 
well as a convoluted, voter-led movement for constitutional reform in Florida that has so far 
yielded few practical results.  Finally, I close the section by discussing a Connecticut case where, 
for the first time in the history of this process, a majority of justices on a state supreme court 
agreed that, with regard to school funding disparities in their state, race and class were 
inseparably linked.   
In doing all of this, I hope to accomplish several objectives.  First, I seek to challenge the 
notion, put forward by many scholars, that there is or at least should be a single preferred model 
for adjudicating these cases.4  My second and related objective is to argue that this litigation is 
best understood as “judicial policymaking” and should be treated as such.  As the previous 
chapter established, understanding the original application of these clauses, however helpful 
from a historical standpoint, offers little guidance for how they should be interpreted and 
effectuated in the present.  Accordingly, however useful periodizing this litigation into “waves” 
of cases—a “second wave” after one decision, a “third wave” commencing after another—might 
be, my final and chief object is to reclassify them as parts of a single “wave”:  one that began as 
                                                 
4 See, for example, William Thro’s four-category breakdown of education clauses—with each category yielding an 
“obvious” or “self-evident” litigation outcome—in “The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School 
Finance Litigation,” 79 Education Law Reporter 19 (1993). 
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a ripple with a handful of early victories by the NAACP’s litigation team, crested with the 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, declined until it had reached a trough with San Antonio 
v. Rodriguez in 1973, and proceeded with varying outcomes at the state level up until the present.  
In other words, these cases are all parts of the same process, regardless of whether they were 
treated with “strict scrutiny” because the challenged laws explicitly made a racial classification 
or given “rational basis” review because they merely concerned economic classifications.  The 
decision by many jurists—even many of those who ultimately found against their state’s method 
of funding the public schools—to maintain an analytical distinction between race and class has 
complicated and prolonged the resolution of an issue that is, in the minds of many who are 
internal to the system, spurious at best and harmful at worst: 
‘Is it a matter of race?’ I ask [Samantha, an East St. Louis high school student].  ‘Or 
money?’  ‘Well,’ she says…‘the two things, race and money, go so close together—
what’s the difference?’5 
3.1 JIM CROW AND SCHOOL FINANCE INEQUALITY, 1900-1960 
The political leaders of the post-Reconstruction South, far from disentangling “money” and 
“race,” had formally linked them.  Such public schools as did exist for African-Americans were 
the remnants of the Reconstruction period, when delegates to constitutional conventions had 
attempted to standardize the systems of public education in this region along the same lines as 
those obtaining in the North and West.   These “colored” school systems were situated in an 
especially precarious position.  The property tax assessments as would be levied to support the 
public schools in areas where African-Americans constituted the majority of the population 
                                                 
5 Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities (New York: Crown Publishers, 1991), p. 31. 
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would, one assumes, inure to the benefit of that majority in proportion to its share of the 
population.6  And yet in Mississippi in 1900—a state where 60 percent of the school-age 
population was African-American—4,419 white teachers taught 253,153 white students, with 
3,033 African-American teachers left to supervise nearly 400,000 African-American students.7  
The disparity in per capita expenditures in some Mississippi counties was nearly 20:1, with the 
overall wage gap between African-American and white teachers increasing by nearly twenty 
percent between 1884 and 1895.8  Within the United States generally in 1900, fewer than 33% of 
African-American school-age children were attending public schools.9 
This state of affairs suited many enterprising Southern politicians.  In a 1910 speech, 
Governor James Vardaman of Mississippi remarked on how education funding constituted an 
important front in the conflict between the races: 
God Almighty created the negro for a menial—he is essentially a servant [and] when left 
to himself he has universally gone back to the barbarism of his native jungles.  While a 
few mixed breeds and freaks of the race may possess qualities which justify them to 
aspire above that station, the fact still remains that the race is fit for that and nothing 
more…[And thus] it is inexplicable to me how an observant white man, informed of all 
the facts in the case, and who really understands the negro, can hold to any other view.  
The evidence is overwhelming and the conclusion inevitable.  Why the Legislature should 
hesitate to submit to the people an amendment to the Constitution, so as to change the 
absurd and expensive system now in vogue, is an inscrutable mystery to me. Until the 
                                                 
6 W.E.B. DuBois (ed.), The Negro Common School (1901), p. 75.  Accessed at 
http://books.google.com/books/reader?id=iFoOAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=GBS.PA75.  
The authors of this report calculated that, in many Southern states, African-Americans were “without doubt paying 
for all their schools by their direct taxes and their just share of other sources of income; and are also contributing a 
considerable sum to the training of white children.”  
7 id. 
8 id. at 80.  However, in “Race Differences in Public School Expenditures,” Robert Margo—a student of Robert 
Fogel and Stanley Engerman—argues that this process of disfranchisement took far longer than either DuBois or 
Horace Mann Bond, who will be discussed infra, claimed.  Analyzing Louisiana school funding between 1890 and 
1910, Margo noted that expenditures at African-American schools remained “relatively equal” long after 
Reconstruction’s end, due to the “tenuous” nature of “Redeemer” administrations in these areas. As for why the 
“disfranchisement” that did occur, Margo is in agreement with DuBois and Bond:  Southern white elites “bought” 
poor white votes by redistributing education revenue to white schools.  Vardaman’s speech (n. 10, infra) offers one 
such example of this.  Donald G. Nieman (ed.), African Americans and Education in the South, 1865-1900 (New 
York:  Garland, 1994).  
9 DuBois at 85. 
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Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution shall be repealed, in 
dealing with race questions in educational, as in other matters, we must ‘sweep the 
horizon of expedients’ to find a way around them, and the way around them in this 
instance is to change the Constitution of Mississippi that the whole matter shall be left to 
the wise discretion of the Legislature...who will…enact laws…to disburse the public 
school fund as the interests of the public may dictate…Remove the Constitutional 
hindrance and the remedy will be discovered.  Money spent today for the maintenance of 
the public schools for Negroes is robbery of the white man, and a waste upon the negro.  
You take it from the toiling white men and women, you rob the white child of the 
advantages it would afford him, and you spend it upon the Negro in an effort to make of 
the negro what God Almighty never intended should be made, and which men cannot 
accomplish.10 
 
Here, then, we have a politician arguing for a creative usage of “judicial federalism” that is not 
entirely dissimilar, at least formally speaking, to the “new judicial federalism” discussed later in 
this chapter.  Vardaman viewed the process of amending Mississippi’s constitution—an easily 
altered document indeed, as is the case with all state constitutions—as an “end-around” play 
enabling the state to remove any remaining strictures from a system of education he perceived as 
a vestige of federal Reconstruction.  In order to placate his poor white constituents, he offered a 
promise that the legislature, duly empowered by a revision of the state’s constitution, would then 
be able  “to disburse the public school fund as the interests of the public may dictate”; i.e., it 
would be able to redirect monies earmarked for African-American schools to white ones.  In 
educator Horace Mann Bond’s opinion, this state of affairs could be understood only if one also 
                                                 
10  “Message of James K. Vardaman, Governor of Mississippi, to the House and Senate of Mississippi, Thursday 
January 9, 1910” quoted in Horace Mann Bond, The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order 
(Octagon:  New York, 2d ed. 1966), p. 103.  In conjunction with the excerpt from Vardaman’s message, Gunnar 
Myrdal’s discussion of “white skin privilege” and cross-class racial alliances in An American Dilemma (New York, 
1944) is instructive here:  “Segregation and discrimination have had material and moral effects on whites, too. 
Booker T. Washington's famous remark that the white man could not hold the Negro in the gutter without getting in 
there himself, has been corroborated by many white southern and northern observers. Throughout this book, we 
have been forced to notice the low economic, political, legal and moral standards of Southern whites-kept low 
because of discrimination against Negroes and because of obsession with the Negro problem. Even the ambition of 
Southern whites is stifled partly because, without rising far, it is so easy to remain ‘superior’ to the held-down 
Negroes” (p. 644). C. Vann Woodward explains that the extremely racist rhetoric employed by turn-of-the-century 
was due to the weakening of any credible opposition (e.g., northern Populist radicals, Northern liberals, “old” 
Southern conservatives who found “negrophobia” to be a distasteful lower-class phenomenon) to politicians like 
Vardaman.  See Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York, 1955), pp. 50-52.   
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understood a particular aspect of Southern life:  “the intense opposition to the education of Negro 
children…[was a result of the fact that] Negroes stood between two economic classes of white 
people and were innocent victims of the system by which school funds were expended.”11 After 
“demagogues…went before their white constituents with the blame of a poor school system for 
whites laid at the doors of Negro children,” even those public funds intended to support schools 
in areas with a majority African-American population were instead “spent for the benefit of the 
few white children in those areas where Negroes were in a vast majority.”12  By 1909, Bond 
reports that in some Mississippi counties, per capita expenditures for white and African-
American students stood in an 80:1 ratio.   
For similar reasons, and in similar respects, this re-appropriation of education resources 
by Democratic governments in the South continued throughout the teens and twenties.  In 1915, 
South Carolina spent $24 on each white student educated in its public schools; $3 on each 
African-American student.13  Even in counties where its residents were mostly African-
American, Virginia allocated four times as much money to white teachers for white students than 
it did for teachers in African American schools.14 In 1924-5, North Carolina’s legislature 
approved $6,667,797 for use in the construction of white school facilities, as against $444,285 
                                                 
11 Bond at 100.  This argument is also found in C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York, 
1955), p. 114 and John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom (3d ed., 1967), pp. 478-486. 
12 id. at 101 
13 Louis Harlan offers the following data regarding African-American and white school expenditures in Georgia in 
1915:  Out of total expenditures of $6,194,875.80, $4,621,173.69 was directed to white schools and $740,782.71 to 
African American schools.  As for education above the elementary level, “ninety-two schools and sixty-seven 
teachers were reported to be training 1,411 Negro students…[although] the record does not explain how sixty-seven 
teachers could give courses in ninety-two schools.”  As for South Carolina, he makes a comparison between 1900 
(out of $827,012.66 dollars, $588,414.53 were allocated to white schools and $177,954.69 to African-American 
schools) and 1915 (out of $3,295,506.58, $2,924,859.68 went to white schools and $370,646.90 to African-
American schools).   See Harlan, Separate and Unequal (Chapel Hill, 1958), pp. 205, 247.  See also A. Leon 
Higginbotham, Shades of Freedom (Oxford, 1996), p. 184. 
14 In five “black counties” in Virginia, $78,615.71 was directed to teachers in schools that educated 5,840 white 
students, with only $20,852.16 going to teachers in schools that educated 13,462 African-American students.  
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for African-American schools.15   Most notable, perhaps, is the fact, until 1920, Georgia had no 
operative public high school for African-Americans—and had not had one since the 1899 
Supreme Court decision Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education (1899).16 
The facts of Cumming warrant recapitulation, since in some ways the case is reminiscent 
of those Ohio state supreme court decisions—Van Camp v. Board of Education of Logan (1859) 
and State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann (1871)—concerning African-American access to the public 
schools that were discussed in the previous chapter.17  Moreover, it constitutes a fascinating 
companion case to Plessy v. Ferguson—an opportunity for the Court to make a statement, should 
it wish to do so, about the value of public education.18  And in Cumming, which concerned the 
decision by the Richmond County Board of Education to close a public high school for African-
Americans because its members believed that the county lacked the resources to support both the 
high school and an African-American elementary school, the Court did indeed make such a 
statement, voting unanimously to uphold the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court.   That 
court, per its Chief Justice Thomas Simmons, had dispatched the case using reasoning similar to 
what had been employed in Van Camp and State ex rel. Garnes: “If, in the judgment of its 
members, it was better for the interests of the people that 400 colored children should obtain the 
elements of a common-school education than for 50 or 60 colored children to receive the 
advantages of a high-school education…the board of education did not abuse its discretion in 
                                                 
15 Bond at 165.  He notes that North Carolina, far from being an outlier in this respect, was among the “most 
progressive” Southern states with regard to funding its African-American schools.  Louis Harlan notes that “even 
Negro schools in North Carolina were improved during this period [1900-1915], except in the all-important matter 
of relative status,” p. 134. 
16 Higginbotham at 184; Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
17 Van Camp v. Board of Education of Logan, 9 Ohio 406, 410 (1859); State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio 198 
(1871).   
18 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that the “separate but equal” provision of private services 
mandated by state government is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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discontinuing the high school established for the colored race.”19  The Supreme Court, per justice 
John Marshall Harlan, conceded that no constitutional argument had been presented and that the 
case would therefore turn on whether the Richmond County Board of Education had acted in bad 
faith or abused its discretion.  This being an extremely high bar to reach in any court case, he 
was left to conclude that the board had not.  As for the seeming inequality of this state of affairs, 
Harlan remarked, “We may add that while all admit that the benefits and burdens of public 
taxation must be shared by citizens without discrimination against any class on account of their 
race, the education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to 
the respective states, and any interference on the part of Federal authority with the management 
of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of 
rights secured by the supreme law of the land.”20   
3.1.1 Charles Hamilton Houston and the “Gradualist” Approach to Public School 
Integration 
This state of affairs—both legally and practically—would not last forever.  Even as revenue 
disparities widened between schools for African-American students and schools for whites, 
NAACP litigation director Charles Hamilton Houston was developing a plan for systematically 
testing segregation laws in various contexts.21  For his first challenge to the segregation in the 
                                                 
19 Board of Education of Richmond County v. Cumming, 103 Georgia 641, 643 (1898). 
20 Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899). 
21 Houston’s story has been told—well-told, in fact—in many works, most recently Rawn James, Jr., Root and 
Branch:  Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall, and the Struggle to End Segregation (New York:  
Bloomsbury, 2010). 
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federal courts, Houston started at the post-secondary level:  the University of Missouri Law 
School.22   
Missouri, as noted in the previous chapter, was among the “near-Southern” states that 
began imposing segregation laws even as federal Reconstruction continued in the South itself.   
Its policy had long been “to segregate the white and negro races for the purpose of education in 
the common and high schools of the State.”23  To the extent that the state provided any form of 
higher education for African-Americans, it did so through Lincoln University, which it had 
opened as an agricultural and industrial school in 1891.24  In 1935, Lloyd Gaines sought to enroll 
in law school, a program of study not offered by Lincoln.  Rather than requesting that the 
administrators of Lincoln University offer such a program or asking them for funds to attend law 
school in another state, Gaines, acting at the behest of the NAACP litigation team, sued to enter 
the University of Missouri Law School, which was then the only such institution in the state.25 
The Missouri Supreme Court, per Judge William Francis Frank, held against Gaines.  
Repeating an argument seen frequently in these opinions, Frank wrote that “equality, and not 
identity of privileges and rights, is what is guarantied to the citizen” by the Missouri 
Constitution.26  The fact that Missouri would “open” a law facility at Lincoln University27 or 
                                                 
22 He and Thurgood Marshall had successfully litigated Pearson et al. v. Murray, 166 Maryland 478 (1936) two 
years earlier at the state supreme court level (holding that where African-Americans were denied admission to only 
law school maintained by state, provision by state for limited number of scholarships of $200 each for African-
American students to enable them to attend colleges outside of state to do work in any department held not to 
provide facilities for legal training substantially equal to those furnished for white students as required by equal 
protection clause of U.S. Constitution). 
23 Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Missouri 546 (1891). 
24 State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 342 Missouri 121, 130 (1937). 
25 Gaines’ tuition would not have been paid by the state; it would pay the difference between tuition charged at the 
University of Missouri and wherever Gaines had been admitted.  After noting this, Judge Frank then offered a table 
showing that Gaines’ transportation costs to various law schools in nearby states would be lower than his 
transportation costs to Columbia, Missouri.    
26 id. at 133. 
27 Dean W. E. Masterson of the University of Missouri testified that such a “law faculty” could be created with 
considerable ease and at what he viewed as a reasonable cost:  “Q. Now at what expense could a law school be 
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provide funding to Gaines to attend school in another state dispensed of the matter; although 
Gaines was concededly a “taxpayer of [the state of] Missouri” and so entitled to “equal 
advantage” arising from school funds, this did not also entitle him to the “privilege” of admission 
to the University of Missouri.28   
At the U.S. Supreme Court level, however, such arguments failed to secure a majority.  
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, writing for the Court, observed that “the basic 
consideration is not as to what sort of opportunities, other States provide, or whether they are as 
good as those in Missouri, but as to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students 
and denies to negroes solely upon the ground of color.”29  Considered in that light, then, “a 
privilege has been created for white law students which is denied to negroes by reason of their 
race.”30 Contrary to the claims made by the state’s representatives, “the provision for the 
payment of tuition fees in another State does not remove the discrimination.”31 
 Missouri ex rel. Gaines (1938) constituted a modest first step at the federal level.  
Nothing in Hughes’ opinion spoke to the necessity of completely equalizing funding at separate 
law schools in a state.  Instead, the opinion offered a remedy for African-Americans living in 
                                                                                                                                                             
established in Lincoln University for the instruction in law of one or two students, to give them such law school and 
standard of training equal to that in the Missouri University Law School? 
A. Since you have the library there and the buildings-about the only item of expense would be the salaries of those 
two instructors. 
Q. What would that be, to get men of equal grade with what you have in Missouri University? 
A. I should say that you could get very excellent teachers of law varying from $3,500.00 to $5,000.00 a year. 
Q. Assuming the top figure, could you establish a law school in Lincoln University for the instruction of one or two 
students and on a level of scholarship and training equal to that in Missouri University for a maximum of $10,000.00 
a year? 
A. I think so.”  Respondents’ Supplemental Brief to Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada at 2. 
28 id. at 134.  Frank distinguished this case from Pearson v. Murray (n. 21) by explaining that Missouri had long had 
a “tuition reimbursement” program in place and an adequate amount of funding to cover it, whereas the Maryland 
program had been enacted in 1935, offered only 50 slots for qualified students, and could not meet the demand of 
the hundreds of applications that were received.    
29 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938). 
30 id. 
31 id. 
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those states egregious enough to flout the holding in Plessy by not even providing separate 
facilities for minority students.  Although tentative, it was nevertheless a critical advance, one 
that the justices deciding cases such as Van Camp and State ex rel. Garnes and Cumming could 
not have foreseen:  legislatures and education boards, however much discretion they were 
afforded, could not, when offering higher education opportunities to whites, simply offer nothing 
to African-Americans.  At the federal level, issues of access to education—for which the 19th 
century rule had always been one of deference to legislatures and statutory enactments—were 
now being considered in a more critical light. 
 From there, in a pair of cases litigated by Charles Hamilton Houston’s protégé Thurgood 
Marshall, the Court was forced to think more seriously about the resource disparities between 
segregated educational institutions.  In a terse 1948 per curiam opinion in Sipuel v. Board of 
Regents of Univ. of Okla., the Court ordered Ada Sipuel admitted to the University of Oklahoma 
Law School, the only taxpayer-funded law school in the state.32  In his brief to the Court, 
Marshall urged the justices to reexamine the holding in Plessy v. Ferguson, but they simply 
reaffirmed their prior holding in Missouri ex rel. Gaines with little discussion.    But in Sweatt v. 
Painter, the Court confronted a more complicated question:  What would be done in a situation 
where the state had created an educational facility that, while not the least bit equal in resources, 
nonetheless provided an equivalent “service” to African-Americans?  
                                                 
32 Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).  Prior to this case and based on the 
holding in Missouri ex rel. Gaines, Marshall had experienced mixed success at the state supreme court level in State 
ex rel. Bluford v. Canada, 153 S. W. (2d) 12 (1941) (holding that, when presented with a demand by an African-
American student, the board of curators of Missouri’s Lincoln University either needed to establish the requisite 
degree program offered at the University of Missouri or admit the student to that university) and State ex rel. 
Michael v. Whitham, 165 S.W.2d 378 (1942) (holding that a Tennessee statute ordering the state’s board of 
education to create equivalent graduate programs to those at the University of Tennessee for African-Americans 
satisfied the US Supreme Court’s holding in Missouri ex rel. Gaines).   
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In Sweatt v. Painter (1950), the Court was asked to consider Herman Sweatt’s petition for 
admission to the University of Texas Law School. 33  The state of Texas had, during the course 
of Sweatt’s original lawsuit in 1946, made provisions to open a law school for African-American 
students that would have been adjunct to the University of Texas Law School itself.  However, 
the “school,” which lacked independent faculty, a law library of any sort, or accreditation, failed 
to open.  A separate law school, based at the Texas State University for Negroes, opened in 1948 
with “a faculty of five full-time professors; a student body of 23; a library of some 16,500 
volumes serviced by a full-time staff; a practice court and legal aid association; and one alumnus 
who has become a member of the Texas Bar.”34 This stood in stark comparison to the University 
of Texas Law School, which had a student body of 850, a library stocked with 65,000 volumes, 
19 faculty members, money for scholarships, and affiliation with the prestigious Order of the 
Coif honor society.35 
Once again, Marshall in his brief pressed for reconsideration of Plessy.  Chief Justice 
Fred Vinson, writing for the majority in Sweatt, praised the “excellent research and detailed 
argument presented in these cases” but noted that “we have frequently reiterated that this Court 
will decide constitutional questions only when necessary to the disposition of the case at hand, 
and that such decisions will be drawn as narrowly as possible.”36  Thus, in reaching a decision, 
the majority relied on an examination of the fundamental disparity in resources available 
between the two schools rather than on a detailed discussion of Plessy’s continuing viability.  To 
this end, Vinson observed “in terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity 
for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and 
                                                 
33 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
34 id. at 633. 
35id. 
36 id. at 631. 
 58 
similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior.”37  Moreover, the school to 
which Texas would readily admit Sweatt was an “academic vacuum” where he would be denied 
the opportunity to interact with “85% of the population of the State…[including] most of the 
lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be 
dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar.”38  As a result of these two factors—a 
lack of actual resources, as the benefit inhering to individuals from studying with “85% of the 
population of the state”—there was no “substantial equality” between the institutions, and so 
Sweatt was ordered to be admitted to the University of Texas Law School. 
On the eve of Brown, this presented a very fascinating precedent.  Sweatt was narrowly 
tailored in its holding, yet not in the presentation of the evidence the Court deemed important.  
Library volumes, numbers of full-time faculty, and even the racial complexion of the student 
body warranted attention when considering whether one institution was deemed “substantially 
equal” to another.39 Surely the old rule of deferring to the legislature’s reasoned judgment, to be 
overturned only when that discretion had been abused, would have led to a favorable result for 
Texas in this case.  It seems likely that Missouri, had it chosen to open just such a law school as 
Texas had opened, however under-staffed and under-supplied, might have prevailed against 
Gaines.  But times were changing, and the Court was becoming more comfortable with the act of 
                                                 
37 id. at 633.   
38 id. at 634. 
39 The statistical evidence presented in Marshall’s brief for the petitioner—more detailed by far than his work in 
Sipuel—paints an even grimmer picture.   The NAACP litigation team had commissioned a report from Dr. Charles 
Thompson to make a “scientific study of the comparative educational facilities for Negroes and whites in Texas” (p. 
68).  Among some of the findings in Marshall’s report was the following:  In 1943-44, $11,071,490 in state, county 
and district funds was appropriated for higher education in Texas. The amount of $10,858,018 was appropriated to 
white institutions, i. e., $1.98 per capita to every white citizen. The sum of $213,472 was appropriated to Negro 
schools, or 23 cents per capita. The white institutions thus received 8.06 times more funds than were allocated to the 
Negro institutions” (p. 69).   Marshall concluded the brief with a powerful statement regarding facilities inequality:  
“Whenever segregation is decreed and enforced, you will find inequality…[and the] results of authoritative studies 
prepared by educators, psychologists, legal scholars and social scientists are all in agreement with petitioner's 
contentions that: there can be no separate equality” (p. 97).   
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explicitly making policy from the bench, a notion long championed by many Legal Realists.40  
Brown would mark another step forward in this process, and in many respects was the 
culmination of the Court’s work in the field of education policy. 
3.1.2 Brown:  Justices as Policymakers  
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) arrived at the Supreme Court as the consolidation of cases 
that had originated in four separate states.  Owing to the significance and scope of the decision, a 
welter of briefs were filed, with arguments ranging from a demand for the overturning of Plessy 
to claims that the petitioners simply be admitted to the schools of their choosing.  The Court, in 
reaching a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, made an important 
statement—but did so in a manner similar to that suggested by Chief Justice Vinson in the earlier 
Sweatt case, deciding the case so as to leave undisturbed as much constitutional jurisprudence as 
possible.   
 It was, in spite of that “cautious” approach, a remarkable document.  Instead of 
examining the “intent of the framers” of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court looked explicitly 
to recent developments in social science:  “Segregation of white and colored children in public 
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children…[and] whatever may have been the 
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply 
supported by modern authority.”41  Instead of merely announcing that Plessy v. Ferguson was 
legally unsound, Warren, relying on this “psychological knowledge” and “modern authority,” 
                                                 
40 As, for example, articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in The Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Review 457 
(1897): “I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations 
of social advantage.” Accessed at http://www.constitution.org/lrev/owh/path_law.htm. 
41 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) at 495. 
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wrote that “any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to th[ese] findings is rejected.”42  
Because the weight of the evidence indicated that separate facilities were “inherently unequal,” 
they violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This left open a 
fascinating question:  If the evidence had indicated that separate facilities could be equal, would 
they be unconstitutional? 
In the course of his 1959 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School, 
Herbert Wechsler remarked that Brown v. Board of Education was “an opinion which is often 
read with less fidelity by those who praise it than by those by whom it is condemned.”43  
Wechsler was concerned that Brown, like the desegregation decisions that had preceded it, was 
not rooted in a principled interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment but rather a belief, 
buttressed by social statistics, that discrimination was harmful to the party being discriminated 
against.44  He viewed this as both a potential weakness of the opinion, since it failed to articulate 
any “neutral principles” that could be applied systematically in subsequent cases.  In that respect, 
it represented to him a prime example of Realist overreach—the Brandeis brief from Muller v. 
Oregon (1908) written into law.   
Wechsler’s concerns are, of course, valid only insofar as one adheres to a belief that the 
so-called “legal model” informs the judicial decision-making process.45 If that is indeed the case, 
the failure of Brown to provide “neutral principles” to be employed by courts faced with similar 
litigation is indeed problematic.  But Brown was not some isolated incident; rather, it was the 
                                                 
42 id. 
43 Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law ,” 73 Harvard Law Review 1, 32 (1959).  
This talk, like Learned Hand’s critique of due process adjudication of all sorts during the 1958 Holmes Lecture (later 
collected as The Bill of Rights (Cambridge, 1959)), sought to examine aspects of “progressive” jurisprudence that, 
however beneficent the intentions of the jurists who supported it, seemed to make little sense from a legal-
philosophical standpoint.   
44 id. at 33. 
45 See, for example, Barry Friedman, “Taking Law Seriously.”  4 Perspectives on Politics 261 (June 2006).  
Friedman merely notes that positivist scholarship should have “normative bite”; others would go much further. 
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harbinger of things to come.  The rule prior to Brown had been deference to legislative 
enactments regarding education; the rule after it demanded that courts make a policy decision, 
using social science data as well as constitutional pronouncements to justify their conclusions.  It 
is critically important to understand this fact before examining the involvement of the courts in 
the complicated school finance litigation of the later 20th century.  Whether they were merely 
operationalizing policy preferences or acting strategically in resolving these cases, jurists at the 
US Supreme Court and state supreme court level—courts of last resort—found themselves 
constrained by notions of stare decisis and the strictures of the “legal model” only to the extent 
that they allowed themselves to be.46  
3.2 THE “VOLTE-FACE”:   SERRANO, RODRIGUEZ, ROBINSON AND THE 
“NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM” 
 
Following the close of a decade spent trying to enforce the Brown mandate, a change in Court 
personnel at the beginning of the 1970s marked the start of a new direction in federal education 
jurisprudence.  Led by Nixon appointee Warren Burger, the Court began to gradually curtail the 
utility of race-based Equal Protection Clause claims as a method of achieving school district 
equality.  In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), Chief Justice Burger, 
                                                 
46 Although political scientists differ regarding whether an “attitudinal model” or a “strategic model” better 
characterizes judicial behavior, it is clear that the work of philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin and H.L.A. Hart 
does not serve as the prime mover behind their activities (the question of whether it should be is one for 
philosophers!).   For a thorough discussion of the former model, see Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The 
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge, 2002); for the latter, see Thomas H. Hammond, 
Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan, Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Stanford, 2005).  The behavior of the appellate courts, which are more constrained and thus largely outside the 
scope of the present analysis, is described in David E. Klein, Making Law in the United States Courts of Appeals 
(Cambridge, 2002). 
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writing for the majority, held that the bussing of students within a single school district was 
constitutional.47   In the course of reaching this holding, however, Burger made the following 
somewhat ambiguous remark:  “Independent of student assignment, where it is possible to 
identify a ‘white school’ or a ‘Negro school’ simply by reference to the racial composition of 
teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings and equipment, or the organization of sports 
activities, a prima facie case of violation of substantive constitutional rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause is shown.”48  One reading of this suggests that the very nature of how the 
school was funded could constitute a violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.   
Statements such as this by the Court seemed to presage further steps into the realm of 
education policymaking:  the Supreme Court could examine data presented in the record and 
reach a decision on the merits of the case.  Furthermore, this appeared to be a task the Court was 
perfectly capable of undertaking:  “The reconciliation of competing values in a desegregation 
case is, of course, a difficult task with many sensitive facets but fundamentally no more so than 
remedial measures courts of equity have traditionally employed.”49  The Court, acting as an 
arbiter of competing policy visions, would be engaged in something little different than what 
“courts of equity” had traditionally done.   
  These were, however, false indicators, and provided readers with little information about 
how difficult the behind-the-scenes wrangling over the Swann opinion had been.50  With cases 
such as Milliken v. Bradley (1974) and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (1977), the 
                                                 
47 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).  In Bob Woodward, The Brethren (New 
York, 1979) pp. 340-343, the evolution of the opinion in Swann is discussed in considerable detail.  Burger, who 
apparently had neither an understanding of nor much interaction with people from minority backgrounds, initially 
produced a draft that precluded all city-urban bussing; after reading it, the other justices prevailed upon him to 
soften the language in the opinion.  Although they were successful in this instance, Burger’s original opinion would 
eventually become the Court’s position on the matter. 
48 id. at 18. 
49 id. at 33. 
50 See n. 47, supra. 
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Court limited legal redress only to those claimants who could demonstrate that their school 
district’s administrators had intentionally separated black and white students.51 Districts that 
merely contained a preponderance of one racial group or another and, as a result, had de facto 
segregated schools, were not guilty of a constitutional violation and could not be consolidated to 
remedy the effects of decades of residential decisions made by private citizens.  Derrick Bell, 
writing several years after Milliken and Dayton, presented a description of what he believed to 
have happened between 1954 and 1977:  “The convergence of black and white interests [over the 
necessity of industrializing the South and improving the standing of the United States among the 
world community] that led to Brown had begun to fade…[despite the fact] that poor whites who 
opposed social reform as ‘welfare programs’ for blacks…[still had] employment, education, and 
social service needs that differ from poor blacks by a margin that, without a racial scorecard, is 
difficult to measure.”52 
3.2.1 Wealth, Not Race? 
Thus, although Brown marked a genuine turning point in race-and-class-conscious jurisprudence, 
its effect on the operation and funding of most school districts was minimal.53  Moreover, in 
                                                 
51 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (limiting power of federal courts to mandate interdistrict remedies to 
address intradistrict racial disparities in enrollment); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) 
(holding that desegregation orders issued by courts should go no further than creating the racial mix that would have 
existed in the absence of the constitutional violations found to have occurred).  
52 Derrick A. Bell, Jr. “Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma.”  93 Harvard Law 
Review 518, 525-526 (1980). 
53 Paul Minorini and Stephen Sugarman “School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity:  Its 
Evolution, Impact, and Future” in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance (National Academy Press, 1999), pp. 
35-36. In fact, the “massive resistance” offered by many Southern politicians (prompting, inter alia, the “Southern 
Manifesto” written by “Dixiecrat” Strom Thurmond and signed by 99 federal legislators) ensured that the reforms 
promised by Brown would take nearly a decade to implement. The key point of the “Manifesto” was one that would 
actually prove critical to the outcome of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:  “The original 
Constitution does not mention education. Neither does the 14th Amendment nor any other amendment. The debates 
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certain urban areas, the phenomenon of “white flight” in response to desegregation led to the 
diminution of tax revenues.54  Even as the federal judiciary rethought the salience of race as a 
principal determinant of educational inequality, some sociologists in the late 1960s began to 
underscore the importance of wealth rather than race as the main determinant of life outcomes 
for students.55  In doing so, they provided the statistical foundation for the attorneys who 
represented the Edgewood Concerned Parent Association (“ECPA”).  The ECPA brought an 
Equal Protection Clause case, based on the grounds of discrimination based on poverty rather 
than race, against six Texas school districts that would reach the Supreme Court as San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez in 1973.56   
Already the process of data collection had commenced:  the first comprehensive study of 
national school performance and school funding, the Equality of Educational Opportunity report, 
compiled for the U.S. Office of Education under the legislative mandate of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.57 The report assessed the availability of equal educational opportunities to children of 
                                                                                                                                                             
preceding the submission of the 14th Amendment clearly show that there was no intent that it should affect the 
system of education maintained by the States.”  This point, of course, was accurate, but—as I have attempted to 
show in this chapter as well as the preceding one—is no more critical to the determination of cases involving 
education policy than the Court (or any court) wanted it to be.   
54 id.  Also see Gary Orfield, “Conservative Activists and the Rush Toward Resegregation” in Jay P. Heubert (ed.), 
Law and School Reform (Yale, 1999), pp. 39-87.  Orfield argues that today’s conservative “originalist” jurists are 
themselves every bit as “activist” as their liberal predecessors, and far more effective at pressing their policy claims 
because they cloak their “reforms” in language that indicates they are restoring an earlier “restrained” approach to 
decision-making rooted in what he views as false reverence for the “legal model.” 
55 Helen F. Ladd and Janet Hansen (eds.), “Shifting Expectations of School Finance,” pp. 19-21 in Making Money 
Matter:  Financing America’s Schools (National Academy Press:  Washington, D.C., 1999).  In Rich Schools, Poor 
Schools: The Promise of Equal Education Opportunity (University of Chicago Press, 1968), sociologist Arthur Wise 
argued that the preeminence of the race-based Brown decision has linked inextricably the notion of race and 
inequality in the national consciousness, thereby obscuring attention from inequalities related to wealth but unrelated 
to race—this in spite of the fact that Brown and the prior desegregation cases used social statistics in a way that 
seemed to connect the two.     
56 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
57 James S. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity Study, (United States Department of Education, 1966).  
Computer file accessed 01-12-2010 from the University of Michigan Inter-university Consortium for Political and 
Social Research.  The EEOS consisted of test scores and questionnaire responses obtained from first-, third-, sixth-, 
ninth-, and twelfth-grade students, and questionnaire responses from teachers and principals.  Data on students 
included age, gender, race and ethnic identity, socioeconomic background, attitudes toward learning, education and 
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different race, color, religion, and national origin.   Relying on a national sample of school test 
score data and student questionnaire responses, the report’s principal investigator James 
Coleman concluded that environmental aspects of students’ lives were more significant 
predictors of school achievement than the financial resources available to those schools, although 
the latter were not wholly insignificant.58   
While conceding the correctness of some aspects of Equality of Educational Opportunity, 
the sociologist Arthur Wise argued in his 1968 book Rich Schools, Poor Schools:  The Promise 
of Equal Educational Opportunity that one simply could not discount the invidious impact of 
spending inequalities.59  Wise advanced the idea, later used by litigants in federal and state 
constitutional cases, that these “unequal per-pupil expenditures…may constitute a denial of equal 
protection.”60 He analyzed various standards of school funding before settling on a rigid “one 
dollar-one scholar” principle that he believed would guarantee equal opportunity to all students 
who were studying within a state system of education.   
                                                                                                                                                             
career goals, and racial attitudes. Scores on teacher-administered standardized academic tests reflected performance 
on tests assessing ability and achievement in verbal skills, nonverbal associations, reading comprehension, and 
mathematics. Data on teachers and principals included academic discipline, assessment of verbal facility, salary, 
education and teaching experience, and attitudes toward race.  With regard to the possibility of true educational 
equality, Coleman wrote the following in “The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity,” 38 Harvard 
Educational Review 7 (1968):  “Complete equality of opportunity can be reached only if all the divergent out-of-
school influences vanish, a condition that would arise only in the advent of boarding schools; given the existing 
divergent influences, equality of opportunity can only be approached and never fully reached.  The concept becomes 
one of degree of proximity to equality of opportunity.  This proximity is determined, then, not merely by the 
equality of educational inputs, but by the intensity of the school’s influences relative to the external divergent 
influences” (21-22). 
58 Coleman also found, inter alia, that African-American students performed better in racially mixed classrooms and 
that, on average, spending in predominantly African-American schools was higher than it had been prior to Brown.  
The former finding was recently discussed and tested in Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain, and Steve G. Rivkin "New 
evidence about Brown v. Board of Education: The complex effects of school racial composition on achievement," 27 
Journal of Labor Economics 349 (2009).  While Hanushek et al. confirmed that a higher percentage African-
American classmates has a small negative correlation with African-American achievement (as measured by test 
scores), they found that this same condition (a high percentage of African-American classmates) has a minimal 
effect on white students.  
59 Arthur Wise, Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Promise of Equal Education Opportunity (University of Chicago 
Press, 1968).  See also n. 55, supra. 
60 id. at 4.  Wise premised this argument on the notion that “the quality of a child’s education in the public schools of 
a state should not depend upon where he happens to live or the wealth of his local community” (xi).   
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Despite the cogency of this appeal, it did not offer advocates of education reform a 
rationale for spending more per-pupil in poorer areas.  Early federal court challenges to school 
district funding systems relied on Wise’s approach, which mandated funding equalization, and 
were met with little success because courts refused to interfere in the allocation of revenue, 
which they continued to view as a legislative function.61 Taking his cue from the results of those 
cases, law professor John Coons outlined a theory in his 1970 book Private Wealth and Public 
Education that combined flexible fiscal neutrality with the claim that education was a 
fundamental right protected by the Constitution.62 
Coons participated in the oral argument for the key California Supreme Court case on 
school funding, Serrano v. Priest (1971), which predated Rodriguez by two years and was thus 
thought by many experts to provide some hints as to the result in that later case.63  In Serrano, 
when faced with a class action brought by a group of students and parents seeking to have the 
state’s method of public school financing declared unconstitutional, the California Supreme 
Court accepted Coons’ argument.  Relying primarily on the United States Constitution’s 
Fourteenth Amendment as its ratio decidendi (but noting in footnote 11 that the California 
Constitution’s own Equal Protection Clause also applied), that court, per Justice Raymond 
Sullivan, held that the state’s “[school] funding scheme invidiously discriminated against the 
poor because it made the quality of a child’s education a function of the wealth of his parents and 
                                                 
61McInnis v. Shapiro 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (holding that district court could not determine judicially 
manageable standards to gauge what students’ needs were and whether they were being met) (1968); Burrus v. 
Wilkerson 310 F. Supp. 572. (W.D.. Va. 1969) (holding that courts do not have the competence to “tailor the public 
moneys to fit the varying needs of these students throughout the state”) at 574.   
62 John Coons, Private Wealth and Public Education (Cambridge, 1970).  With regard to fiscal neutrality, Coons 
argued that the objectionable discrimination should be “based on school district poverty, rather than personal 
poverty, and was measured by the assessed value of property per pupil that a district could tax…” because this offset 
the problem of “large cities [that] often spent more on their students than the statewide average per pupil.”  
63Paul Minorini and Stephen Sugarman “School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity:  Its 
Evolution, Impact, and Future” in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance (National Academy Press, 1999). 
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neighbors.”64  Furthermore, the court rejected the defendants’ claim of a compelling interest in 
local control of the operation of these school districts, calling that form of control a “cruel 
illusion” that prevented residents in impoverished districts from exercising effective control over 
their schools.65  Like most of the state constitutional decisions that followed it, Serrano would be 
reheard several times, but the court’s first rehearing of this case would not appear on its docket 
until after the Supreme Court had decided Rodriguez. 
Rodriguez arrived at the Supreme Court under most auspicious circumstances, both due 
to the earlier result in Serrano and because the Texas federal court had accepted Coons’ 
arguments. According to some observers, “it appeared for a short time that the federal 
Constitution—and the Coons team’s [plan]—would play a central role in shaping America’s 
school finance system.”66  The attorneys for the plaintiffs propounded their now-crystallized 
positions about education constituting a “fundamental right” and wealth a “suspect 
classification,” but the Court, with Justice Lewis Powell writing for the majority, refused to 
accept either argument.  Instead, the Court held that although education is an important public 
service, it was not a fundamental right found anywhere in the Constitution.  Moreover, the Court 
                                                 
64 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (California 1971). 
65 id. at 1261.  In both Milliken v. Bradley and Dayton Board of Eduation v. Brinkman, the US Supreme Court would 
enshrine “local autonomy” in matters related to school funding as a “vital national tradition,” remarking in Milliken 
that “no single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; 
local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for the 
public schools and to quality of the education process.”  433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977); 418 U.S. 717, 741-742 (1974). 
66 Paul Minorini and Stephen Sugarman “School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity:  Its 
Evolution, Impact, and Future” in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance (National Academy Press, 1999), p. 
39.  The prospect of continued involvement by the courts was met with extreme trepidation by policymakers such as 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who believed that judges would do a poorer job than legislators when it came to handling 
such matters:  “For the courts to order it is to risk scandal.  The scandal may be simply stated.  It is that of middle-
aged and elderly men imposing social nostrums which recent social science [meaning, inter alia, the Coleman 
Report] has seriously questioned, if not demolished, and doing so slothfully, without having mastered the not always 
simple modes of analysis by which social scientists have developed the new evidence.” From “Equalizing 
Education:  In Whose Benefit?” in Donald Levine and Mary Jo Bane (eds.), The “Inequality” Controversy (Basic 
Books:  New York, 1975), p. 116.  As for the answer posed to the question in the title of his essay, it was relatively 
simple:  Teachers would benefit, in the form of higher salaries, but with little return on this investment.  In spite of 
all this, Moynihan did heap praise on John Coons, referring to him as a “razor-sharp” man (p. 116). 
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explained that the funding disparities described in the case—Edgewood received $389 fewer 
dollars per pupil than the much richer Alamo Heights district—did not exclude pupils from 
receiving these essential public services.67  In other words, as long as some form of public 
education was available to students in the district, the Court would not find a constitutional 
violation.  In a dissent joined by William Douglas and William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall 
offered a possible solution.  First, he argued that the Court’s enumeration of fundamental rights 
should not be limited to rights specified in the Constitution. From there, he cited the Court’s 
precedent in Sweatt v. Painter—where the majority noted that no rational student would choose 
the under-funded, under-staffed African-American law school over the whites-only alternative—
to buttress his argument that “it is difficult to believe that if the children of Texas had a free 
choice, they would choose to be educated in districts with fewer resources, and hence with more 
antiquated plants, less experienced teachers, and a less diversified curriculum.”68  Finally, 
foreshadowing Justice Brennan’s later, grander call for action at the state level, Marshall wrote in 
                                                 
67 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 12 (1973).  Powell summarized the disparities as 
follows:  “The school district in which appellees reside, the Edgewood Independent School District, has been 
compared throughout this litigation with the Alamo Heights Independent School District. This comparison between 
the least and most affluent districts in the San Antonio area serves to illustrate the manner in which the dual system 
of finance operates and to indicate the extent to which substantial disparities exist despite the State's impressive 
progress in recent years. Edgewood is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 
22,000 students are enrolled in its 25 elementary and secondary schools situated in the core-city sector of San 
Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. The residents are 
predominantly of Mexican-American descent: approximately 90% of the student population is Mexican-American 
and over 6% is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil is $5,960-the lowest in the metropolitan area-
and the median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest.30 At an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed 
property-the highest in the metropolitan area-the district contributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-
1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation Program 
contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local total of $248.31 Federal funds added another $108 for a total of $356 per 
pupil. Alamo Heights is the most affluent school district in San Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately 
5,000 students, are situated in a residential community quite unlike the Edgewood District. The school population is 
predominantly ‘Anglo,’ having only 18% Mexican-Americans and less than 1% Negroes. The assessed property 
value per pupil exceeds $49,000,33 and the median family income is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 
per $100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled 
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by a $36 
per-pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights spent $594 per pupil.” 
68 id. at 84. 
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a footnote that “nothing in the Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state 
educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.”69 
Marshall’s remarks foreshadowed the deluge of state litigation that followed Rodriguez.  
Serrano, for example, was re-litigated throughout the 1970s.70  In 1976, the California Supreme 
Court held that funding legislation passed in response to the first decision was insufficient 
because “local wealth [remained] the principal determinant of revenue.”71  Following this 
decision, the legislature implemented an equalization plan that narrowed the gap between high-
revenue and low-revenue districts.  But parity came at a price, as this program further inflamed 
anti-tax advocates such as Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann, who had begun organizing in the wake 
of the modernization of the state’s property tax system that had begun in the 1960s.72 Two years 
                                                 
69 id. at 133 n.100. According to Woodward’s The Brethren, Marshall, “unhappy with the Court’s position” had 
“assigned one of his law clerks, among the best at the Court, to prepare a devastating legal analysis of the majority 
opinion.”  When Lewis Powell asked his own clerks how Marshall had produced the opinion, they explained that the 
clerk had written it and “Marshall himself had spent maybe fifteen minutes to an hour going over the draft.”  When 
asked by Powell about one of the key points made in the dissent, Marshall allegedly responded “Did I say that?” (pp. 
311-312).   
70 The impact of Serrano was wide-ranging.   When delegates at the Montana Constitutional Convention of 1971-
1972 met to discuss new language for their education clause, the debate over this language centered on the degree of 
judicial oversight they wished to permit.  Unlike at the 19th century conventions, where no evidence of future 
judicial consideration of these clauses appears to exist, the Montana delegates had Serrano well in mind.  Gene 
Harbaugh, who supported the provision that had been drafted, said the following in response to delegates who 
wished to draft a provision that unequivocally left all matters concerning the functioning of the state’s school system 
to the legislature:  “The last sentence of subsection two is directed toward the financing of the school system.  Now, 
a great deal has been said about the Serrano-Priest case and other decisions across the land affecting the financing of 
the public school system.  In analyzing our Montana finance structure, the committee found that there is a great 
disparity between the level of school financing among the various districts of the state…It’s our feeling that the state 
should make every effort to insure that insofar as it is possible, equality of financial expenditures for school children 
of our state is implemented.” 8 Montana Convention of 1971-1972 at 6016.  The proposed language was accepted, 
and—as supporters like Harbaugh would not deny—indeed proved to be outcome-determinative in Helena 
Elementary School District No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (1989) (holding that spending disparities among the various 
school districts of the state amounts to a denial of the equality of educational opportunity).  This case, along with 
cases in Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, and Vermont, will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
71 Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 938-939 (California 1976). 
72 As described in Isaac Martin, The Permanent Tax Revolt (Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 80:  “The Serrano 
decision seemed to require a redistribution of property tax revenues that would further increase taxes in some 
wealthy districts.  The decision thereby put the courts on a collision course with the property tax revolt.”  Kirk Stark 
and Jonathan Zasloff deny that Serrano contributed much to the movement, despite the fact that it was frequently 
referenced in their public statements.  In “Tiebout and Tax Revolts:  Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?” 50 
UCLA Law Review 801, they use multiple regression analysis to support their claim that the measure passed because 
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later, they spearheaded a campaign that led to the passage of Proposition 13 by a considerable 
margin.73  Proposition 13 added Article 13A to the state constitution, which capped ad valorem 
taxes on real property at one percent of the full cash value of the property, required a two-thirds 
vote for state tax increases, and prohibited the imposition of a statewide property tax.74  The 
effect of this constitutional amendment on the legislature’s equalization plan was significant, 
“requiring a totally new method of school funding skewed toward state funding…[that] 
essentially nullified the district power-equalizing plan adopted by the legislature.” In less than a 
decade, overall school spending in California would fall below the national average.75  More 
significantly, Proposition 13 now serves to limit local control of the schools by placing a de facto 
ceiling on their spending, an unintended result of a measure spurred largely by activists who 
were, at base, “localist” in their orientation.76 As a consequence, many California districts have 
become reliant on state funds, which have varied from legislative session to legislative session, 
in order to meet their operating budgets.77  The vicissitudes of partisan politics in Sacramento, 
coupled with several no-revenue or low-revenue growth years during the 1990s, has made it 
                                                                                                                                                             
“of institutional rigidities of the fiscal decisionmaking process [that] precluded a rational response to the 
extraordinary housing inflation of the early 1970s.”  William Blankenau and Mark Skidmore, “The Relationship 
between Education Finance Reform and Tax and Expenditure Limitations,” 32 Journal of Regional Analysis 1 
(2002) is contra.  A fuller discussion of this specific incident is outside the scope of the present project, but it seems 
likely that Serrano factored into the process to a degree greater than what Stark and Zasloff suggest. 
73 Owing to the successful work of Jarvis and Gann, far more people with an interest in passing the measure showed 
up at the polls.  It passed by a vote of 4,280,689 to 2,326,167. Martin, p. 80. 
74 California Constitution, Article 13A. 
75 Paul Minorini and Stephen Sugarman “School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity:  Its 
Evolution, Impact, and Future” in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance (National Academy Press, 1999), p. 
49.  This same narrative is presented in numerous other accounts.  See, for example, Molly S. McUsic, “The Law’s 
Role in the Distribution of Education:  The Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation” in Law and School 
Reform (Yale:  New Haven, 1999), pp. 88-160.  With regard to the possibility of challenging the Rodriguez holding, 
McUsic notes that “with a politically conservative federal judiciary there seems little potential anytime soon for a 
court-declared federal right to a changed school finance system” (p. 103).   
76 Jeffrey I. Chapman, Proposition 13: Some Unintended Consequences (Public Policy Institute, 2000).   
77 id. at 16:  “In the past, local school districts were always heavily dependent on state aid (and faced state 
mandates). However, with Proposition 13 eliminating the ability of local school districts to raise property tax rates 
for their schools, and with Proposition 98 establishing a floor (or ceiling, depending on the economy and 
legislature), for all practical purposes, aggregate school finance is now almost entirely centralized at the state level, 
and school districts are now passive recipients of state revenues.” 
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extremely difficult for the state to allocate sufficient money to the districts to raise per-pupil 
spending up to the national average.78 
3.2.2 The Turn to the States 
Although it had been a groundbreaking decision for advocates of school funding reform, Serrano 
was not decided by means of an entirely novel reading of the California Constitution. As noted 
supra, the California justices based their decision on a reading of the U.S. Constitution, while 
noting only in a footnote that the California Constitution also applied.  As the Burger Court 
slowed the Warren Court’s so-called “rights revolution” that had resulted in decisions such as 
Brown v. Board of Education, many “activist” jurists and scholars came to view state 
constitutions and state supreme courts as another avenue through which individual rights and 
liberties could be expanded.79  Justice William Brennan offered a notable early exhortation for 
state courts to “step into the breach” that he believed to have been left abandoned by the federal 
courts:   
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending 
beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.  The legal 
revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the 
independent protective force of state law—for without it, the full realization of our 
liberties cannot be guaranteed.80 
 
                                                 
78 id. 
79 For more on the “rights revolution,” see Charles R. Epp, “Courts and the Rights Revolution,” in Kermit Hall and 
Kevin McGuire (eds.), The Judicial Branch (Oxford, 2005), pp. 343-375.  Of the Burger Court’s position on 
education litigation, Epp writes:  “The Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley contributed to the rapid expansion of 
generally white suburbs around old urban core cities in such metropolitan areas as Detroit, Kansas City, St. Louis, 
and Atlanta, and contributed to the depth of already great disparities in public school financing” (p. 371).  
80 William J. Brennan, Jr., “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” 90 Harvard Law Review 
489, 491, 502-503.  This is, as noted supra, quite similar to the exhortation contained in Thurgood Marshall’s 
dissent in Rodriguez.  As cited (and first encountered) in Kermit Hall and Peter Karsten’s The Magic Mirror (2d ed.:  
Oxford, 2007), Brennan’s short speech also served as the starting point for this project. 
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Professor G. Alan Tarr, reflecting on the significance of Richard Nixon’s appointments to the 
Supreme Court and the Burger Court’s subsequent retrenchment on issues relating to civil rights, 
noted that this “encouraged civil liberties litigants to look elsewhere for redress…[which] 
suggests that, paradoxically, the activism of the Warren Court, which was often portrayed as 
detrimental to federalism, was a necessary condition for the emergence of a vigorous state 
involvement in protecting civil liberties.”81  This “New Judicial Federalism,” then, allowed for 
the articulation of a diverse body of state civil liberties jurisprudence. 
 Rutgers-Newark Law School professor Paul Tractenberg was one such scholar who 
came to believe that “state constitutional law could and should recognize a substantial right to 
equal educational opportunity” that was rooted in the “thorough and efficient” education clause 
of New Jersey’s constitution rather than in any provision in the federal constitution.82  When 
asked to co-litigate a school finance lawsuit with Jersey City attorney Harold Ruvoldt, 
Tractenberg successfully persuaded the New Jersey Supreme Court to rely exclusively on the 
state constitution’s education clause to justify its decision in Robinson v. Cahill (1973).83  After 
analyzing a series of unhelpful federal precedents, Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub, writing for 
the majority in Robinson, undertook a historical evaluation of the New Jersey Constitution.  His 
detailed analysis proceeds from a discussion of the niceties of late 19th-century taxation measures 
to the proceedings of a constitutional convention in 1947 where the delegates “did not act upon a 
                                                 
81 G. Alan Tarr, “The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism,” 24 Publius 63, 72-73 (Spring 1994). 
82 Michael Paris, Framing Equal Educational Opportunity:  Law and the Politics of School Reform (Stanford, 2010), 
p. 66.  New Jersey Constitution, art. IV, § 7:  “The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a 
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in this state between the 
ages of five and eighteen years.” 
83 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (New Jersey 1973).  According to Michael Paris, Tractenberg and Ruvoldt were 
at odds about the goals of the litigation, with Ruvoldt favoring wealth neutrality and Tractenberg believing—as 
Arthur Wise had—in wealth equalization.  The latter goal, Paris goes on to report in his monograph-length account 
of the still-ongoing New Jersey school finance litigation, proved rather problematic from a political standpoint (pp. 
66-73).  Tractenberg’s continued devotion to “wealth equalization” is discussed in the concluding chapter of this 
text, in the context of the lengthy Abbott v. Burke (1985) litigation.  
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recommendation of the New Jersey Federation of Labor that education be funded out of State 
revenues.”84  Finally, Weintraub claimed—as many justices have before and since—that history 
can only go so far in informing the decisions of the present:  “It cannot be said the 1875 
amendments were intended to insure statewide equality among taxpayers…[but] we do not doubt 
that an equal educational opportunity for children was precisely in mind.”85 
What mattered for Weintraub, then, were not the precise intentions of the various framers 
of New Jersey’s constitution, but rather the fact that their work on the subject of education 
evinced a generalized desire to afford all students an “equal educational opportunity.”86 From 
there, he determined that, with regard to the significant dollar input per pupil discrepancies then 
obtaining in New Jersey, the state had not met its obligation to provide a “thorough and 
efficient” system of public schools.87  Although he also articulated a qualitative requirement that 
the state afford students the “educational opportunit[ies] that will equip them for their role as 
citizens and as competitors in the labor market,” he then focused his attention on dollar inputs 
because there was “no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional 
standard.”88 
After rejecting a “guaranteed tax base” plan proposed by newly elected Governor 
Brendan Byrne for fears that it would unduly weaken local control of public education, 
                                                 
84 id. at 294. 
85 id. 
86 id.  See the conclusion of the previous chapter for a discussion of the different ways that the 19th century 
education clauses might be understood.  Here the intentions of the New Jersey Constitution’s various framers were a 
bit murkier, since several constitutional revisions may have altered the relationship between the public schools and 
the legislature, but it was not at all clear that the constitution imposed any affirmative duty on the legislature to 
remedy these per-pupil spending disparities. Weintraub and his colleagues decided that it did, and in the process 
engaged in “making law.” 
87 id. at 296.   
88 id. at 293, 296.   
 74 
legislators passed the Public School Education Act of 1975.89  This complicated plan allowed 
“each district [to] retain the authority to set its own school tax rate, while the state supplied aid 
sufficient to provide each district with the revenues it would have reaped from its chosen tax rate 
had its property wealth equalized 135 percent of the statewide average property wealth per 
student.”90  It was “equalizing up to a point….[after which] wealthy districts would be free to 
spend as they wished, and they would still be receiving other forms of state aid.”91 Following the 
implementation of this plan, several urban school districts, prompted by Paul Tractenberg, 
immediately sued the state to remedy funding disparities left unaddressed by PSEA.  These suits 
would persist through five additional iterations of Robinson and over twenty-one versions of the 
companion Abbott v. Burke litigation.92 Although successful in terms of their courtroom 
results—the plaintiffs have almost always prevailed, and the New Jersey legislature is still under 
a judicial mandate to “equalize” funding in the state’s poorest and wealthiest districts—they have 
prompted considerable criticism from scholars and politicians, and will be discussed in greater 
detail in the “remedies” section of the concluding chapter.93    
                                                 
89 Paris at 70-71. 
90 Paul Enrich.  “Leaving equality behind:  New Directions in school finance reform,” 48 Vanderbilt Law Review 
101, 132 (1995).   
91 Paris at 71. 
92 Beginning with Abbott v. Burke, 100 New Jersey 296 (1985) (holding that the education provided to school 
children in poor communities was inadequate and unconstitutional and mandating that state funding for these 
districts be equal to that spent in the wealthiest districts in the state) and continuing all the way up to Abbott v. 
Burke, M-1293-09, May 2011. 
93 The most recent and notable critic has been Republican Governor Chris Christie (see Richard Pérez-Peña and 
Winnie Hu, “Court Orders New Jersey to Increase Aid to Schools” in The New York Times, 05-24-2011) but see also 
Eric A. Hanushek (ed.), Courting Failure:  How School Finance Lawsuits Exploit Judges’ Good Intentions and 
Harm Our Children (Hoover Institution Press:  Palo Alto, 2006). 
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3.2.3 Horton v. Meskill, Pauley v. Kelley and the Uneasy 1980s 
Although it prompted more litigants to commence school finance lawsuits at the state level, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson did not inspire an immediate renascence of 
state constitutional jurisprudence regarding the issue of school finance. Most of the other major 
lawsuits brought in the 1970s failed.  State supreme courts in Oregon, Idaho, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania either refused to intrude on matters reserved for their states’ legislatures or were 
unwilling to deviate from federal courts’ interpretations of this issue.94  However, as the decade 
drew to a close, the supreme courts of Connecticut and West Virginia broke new jurisprudential 
ground:  in addition to mandating that their state legislatures reform unequal school funding 
systems systems, they also declared education to be a fundamental right belonging to all of their 
citizens.95 
 In Connecticut, an attorney whose son attended kindergarten in Canton Elementary 
School brought a lawsuit alleging the unconstitutionality of the state’s method of financing its 
schools.96  When the case reached the Connecticut Supreme Court in 1977, the majority, per 
Justice Charles House, held in the plaintiffs’ favor in most unambiguous language:  “We 
                                                 
94 Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Idaho 1976); Board of Educ. v. 
Walter, 390 N.E. 2d 813 (Ohio 1981); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979).  The Thompson court refused to 
accept the argument that school funding had anything to do with educational quality, while the Danson court held 
that these issues were non-justiciable.  Walter is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
95 Horton v. Meskill, 172 Connecticut 615 (1977); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 West Virginia 672 (1979).  Seattle School 
District No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Washington 1978) constituted another victory for plaintiffs seeking to have their 
state’s system of school financing overturned.  Instead of finding that education was a “fundamental right,” 
however, the Washington Supreme Court interpreted Article 9, Section 1 of its state constitution to impose a 
“paramount duty” on the legislature to “make ample provision” for the education of resident children.  The majority 
explicitly recognized that it was altering the letter, but not the spirit, of the constitutional provision at issue:  
“However, to recognize changing times is not to change the constitution. Quite the contrary. We must interpret the 
constitution in accordance with the demands of modern society or it will be in constant danger of becoming 
atrophied and, in fact, may even lose its original meaning. It is the judiciary's duty to ensure that the constitution 
does not become ‘a magnificent structure . . . to look at, but totally unfit for use.’” id. at 96. 
96Horton v. Meskill, 172 Connecticut 615 (1977). 
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conclude that without doubt the trial court correctly held that, in Connecticut, elementary and 
secondary education is a fundamental right, that pupils in the public schools are entitled to the 
equal enjoyment of that right, and that the state system of financing public elementary and 
secondary education as it presently exists and operates cannot pass the test of ‘strict judicial 
scrutiny’ as to its constitutionality.”97 The way that House reached his conclusion is especially 
important.  Instead of examining the intent of the framers, he offered his particular interpretation 
of the Rodriguez case.98  After referencing Justice Marshall’s dissent in Rodriguez in which he 
exhorted future plaintiffs to look to state courts for redress, House then recapitulated the “test” 
presented in that case for whether education constituted a “fundamental right” and its 
unhelpfulness in this situation:  “The answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to 
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution…[but we find this] test for the 
fundamentality of the right to an education of no particular help, although under that test it 
cannot be questioned but that in the light of the Connecticut constitutional recognition of the 
right to education (article eighth, s 1) it is, in Connecticut, a ‘fundamental’ right.”99 From there, 
he explained that “educational equalization cases are in significant aspects sui generis and not 
                                                 
97 id. at 649. 
98 Indeed, the framers had no intention of creating such a right, as Justice Loiselle correctly explains in his dissent:  
“As I review the history of education in Connecticut, it does not support the “fundamentality” of the right. Education 
was not required to be free until 1869. Public Acts 1869, c. 71; compare with Rev. 1866, tit. 16, c. 3, s 98. In 1894, 
this court spoke of education as a privilege or advantage, rather than a right in the strict technical sense of the term: 
‘This privilege is granted, and is to be enjoyed upon such terms and under such reasonable conditions and 
restrictions, as the law-making power, within constitutional limits, may see fit to impose; and, within those limits, 
the question what terms, conditions, and restrictions will best subserve the end sought in the establishment and 
maintenance of public schools, is a question solely for the legislature and not for the courts.’ The history of the 
addition of the provision on education to our constitution in 1965 is, like most legislative history, ambiguous. 
Statements made at the constitutional convention could be interpreted either way depending upon which point of 
view is fostered. Taken as a whole, this history is indicative of what the majority opinion has stated, that the 
constitutional amendment regarding free education on the elementary and secondary level was merely a 
‘codification’ of the obligation assumed by the state in its statutory enactments. The constitutional provision would 
prevent the state from requiring students to pay for education or from denying free education to some while making 
it available to others, but I do not see that the provision renders education a ‘fundamental’ right.” id. at 656-657.  
None of this, however accurate, prevented the Horton majority from declaring that it was, nor could it have. 
99 id. at 641. 
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subject to analysis by accepted conventional tests or the application of mechanical standards.”100  
It was left to the courts, then, to fashion a remedy to “the present-day problem aris[ing] from the 
circumstance that over the years there has arisen a great disparity in the ability of local 
communities to finance local education, which has given rise to a consequent significant 
disparity in the quality of education available to the youth of the state.”101   
House ordered no specific relief, but wrote his opinion in such a way as to indicate that 
all future legislation pertaining to education would be treated by Connecticut courts with “strict 
scrutiny” (i.e., the state would have the burden of showing it must meet a “compelling interest” 
in defending the litigation).  Eight years later, however, this standard of review was challenged 
and qualified in the third rehearing of Horton.  Chief Justice Ellen Ash Peters, writing for the 
majority, explained her decision as follows:  “The sui generis nature of litigation involving 
school financing legislation militates against formalistic reliance on the usual standards of the 
law of equal protection, in particular against the requirement that the state must demonstrate a 
compelling state interest.”102  In place of this traditional standard of review, the court adopted the 
three-part test used in Supreme Court cases on the issue of legislative reapportionment, one 
requiring the plaintiffs to make a prima facie case showing persistent meaningful disparities that 
are jeopardizing the fundamental right to education, after which the burden would shift to the 
state to show how the continuing disparities created by the challenged legislation advance a 
legitimate state interest.  Remedial hearings on compliance with judicial rulings would require 
the trial to engage in a balancing test that would attempt to align the rights of the plaintiffs with 
                                                 
100 id. at 645. 
101 id. at 648. 
102 Horton v. Meskill, 195 Connecticut 24, 35-36 (1985). 
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“the need to avoid embarrassment to the operation of government.”103  This was, of course, a 
concession to the realities of the process of interacting with other coequal branches of 
government; such concessions are the leitmotif that unifies all of this post-Rodriguez litigation.  
Political scientist Douglas Reed viewed the actions of the court in a positive light:  “The court 
demonstrated an astute capacity for political learning…[and] the flexibility allowed the judiciary 
to exercise influence over school finance reform but in a more nuanced way.”104 It most 
assuredly did not end the struggle over school funding in Connecticut, of which more will be 
said in section 3.3, infra. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also reached the conclusion that education 
was a fundamental right of resident students, yet arrived at that decision in a markedly different 
way.105  Writing for the majority, Justice Sam Harshbarger focused on the origins of the 
“thorough and efficient” education clause in the West Virginia Constitution.106 Wary of deciding 
the case entirely on equal protection grounds, Harshbarger found merits in the method of 
historical analysis used by the Robinson majority:  “Our research produced useful dialogues in 
the [19th-century] Ohio and West Virginia Conventions, and we have included abbreviated parts 
in this opinion.”107  His analysis of the Ohio Convention, which first adopted the “thorough and 
efficient” language that West Virginia and other states borrowed, centered on snippets of 
delegate dialogue that suggested to him that education was intended to be a paramount function 
of that state—statements along the lines of education being “an important function of the state,” 
“of inestimable value for raising up an informed public,” etc.—and then traced the adoption of 
                                                 
103 id. at 45. 
104 Douglas Reed, On Equal Terms (Princeton, 2002), p. 81. 
105 Pauley v. Kelly, 162 West Virginia 672 (1979).  
106 “The legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free schools.”  West 
Virginia Constitution, art. XII, sec. 1. 
107 Pauley at 684. Of the Ohio Convention of 1851 and Pauley’s impact on future discussions of it, more is said in 
the next chapter.   
 79 
this clause by other states and its interpretation by their courts.  After concluding that the weight 
of the decisions indicated the “plenariness” of legislative authority in matters relating to 
education, Harshbarger turned to Robinson v. Cahill as well as dictionary definitions of 
“thorough” and “efficient” to justify the majority’s conclusion that education was a fundamental 
right.108  He concluded with two helpful remarks, the first a simple formula for a state assistance 
package to public schools that would pass constitutional muster and the second a clear statement 
of what constituted a “thorough and efficient” education in West Virginia:   
We may now define a thorough and efficient system of schools: It develops, as best the 
state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to 
prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so 
economically. Legally recognized elements in this definition are development in every 
child to his or her capacity of (1) literacy; (2) ability to add, subtract, multiply and divide 
numbers; (3) knowledge of government to the extent that the child will be equipped as a 
citizen to make informed choices among persons and issues that affect his own 
governance; (4) self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her total environment to allow 
the child to intelligently choose life work to know his or her options; (5) work-training 
and advanced academic training as the child may intelligently choose; (6) recreational 
pursuits; (7) interests in all creative arts, such as music, theatre, literature, and the visual 
arts; (8) social ethics, both behavioral and abstract, to facilitate compatibility with others 
in this society.109 
 
This was, of course, a powerful vision, but as in Connecticut, litigation would continue 
throughout the decade as plaintiffs sought to determine the contours of Harshbarger’s 
                                                 
108 id. at 700:  “A Complete and Universal English Dictionary, by Rev. James Barclay, London, Richard Edwards, 
1815, defines ‘thorough’: ‘(T)he word through extended into two syllables . . . complete; passing in at one side, and 
beyond the other . . . .’ It defines ‘efficient’: ‘(A) cause; one that makes or causes things to be what they are . . . 
having the power to produce or cause alteration or change in things, either by altering the qualities, or in introducing 
new ones . . . .’ (at 326) Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, G. & C. Merriam Company, 
Springfield, Mass., 1976, definitions are: ‘Thorough . . . marked by completeness; . . . carried through to completion 
especially with full attention to details; . . . marked by sound systematic attention to all aspects and details; . . . 
complete in all respects . . . .’ ‘Efficient . . . marked by ability to choose and use the most effective and least wasteful 
means of doing a task or accomplishing a purpose: competent . . . marked by qualities, characteristics, or equipment 
that facilitate the serving of a purpose or the performance of a task in the best possible manner; eminently 
satisfactory in use . . .’ Lexically, then, the words have not changed. The mandate, incorporating the sense of the 
definitions, becomes a command that the education system be absolutely complete, attentive to every detail, 
extending beyond ordinary parameters. And further, it must produce results without waste (emphasis added).”  
109 id. at 706.  This definition warrants comparison with the one offered by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose v. 
Council for Better Education, 790 S.W2d 186 (Kentucky 1989), discussed infra. 
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pronouncement.110  It was also, despite the somewhat anachronistic nature of the historical 
analysis used to buttress it, a thoroughly defensible conclusion about the spirit in which these 
mid-19th century education clauses had been drafted.111  
Horton and Pauley were not entirely anomalous, but throughout most of the 1980s, 
“judicial restraint and deference to the legislative process—the Rodriguez perspective—
continued to characterize most judicial decisions.”112  Plaintiffs during this period typically 
framed their cases in two ways: first, that education, based on the state constitutional education 
provision at issue, constituted a “fundamental right”; and second, that educational “equity”—the 
near-equalization of school district expenditures—was compelled by the equal protection clauses 
in those states’ constitutions.113    Between 1980 and 1988, reformers using these arguments 
encountered a host of setbacks at the state supreme court level.114  While most of these adverse 
decisions were decided in accordance with federal precedents, those courts that did examine their 
                                                 
110 e.g., in Pauley v. Bailey, 171 West Virginia 651 (1983); Pauley v. Bailey, 174 West Virginia 167 (1984); Pauley 
v. Gainer, 177 West Virginia 464 (1986).  The latter two cases concerned the responsibilities of state superintendent 
of schools and the governor, respectively, to foster a “thorough and efficient” system of education.  In 2003, 
Governor Robert Wise, who had been a witness for the plaintiffs during the initial Pauley case, would sign papers 
officially ending the process of school finance litigation in West Virginia.  Reflecting on Pauley at a conference at 
Columbia Teachers College in 2007, he said, “What I observed in our proceeding as it unfolded over twenty years 
was that the court pushed, but it stopped short of provoking a constitutional crisis whenever it could.  The legislature 
was always trying to stay just far enough ahead….to avoid a contempt citation...So over the fifteen to twenty years, 
the judge was able to get the legislature and the governors to move significantly, but at the same time, the legislature 
could say, ‘You can’t tell us fully what to do.’  Where the court runs short, I believe, is in its ability to enforce.” 
Quoted in Michael Rebell, Courts and Kids (Chicago, 2009), p. 119. 
111 The distinction between the “framers’ intent” and the larger meaning of these clauses is the subject of the 
conclusion of the previous chapter.   
112 Paul Minorini and Stephen Sugarman “School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity:  Its 
Evolution, Impact, and Future” in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance (National Academy Press, 1999), p. 
55.  
113 See “Equity I—Spending on Schools” in Helen F. Ladd and Janet S. Hansen, Making Money Matter, pp. 83-88 
for a thorough summary of “equalization” efforts during this period. 
114 In the following cases, state supreme courts upheld their states’ school funding systems:   McDaniels v. Thomas, 
285 S.E.2d 156 (Georgia 1981); Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (New York 1982); Lujan v. Co. Bd. Of Educ., 
649 P.2d 1005 (Colorado 1982); East Jackson v. Michigan, 348 N.W.2d 303 (Michigan App. 1984); Fair School v. 
Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135 (Oklahoma 1987); Britt v. North Carolina, 357 S.E.2d 432 (North Carolina 1987); 
Richland v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (South Carolina 1988).  During this period, state supreme courts in Wyoming 
and Arkansas held their states’ school funding systems to be unconstitutional:  Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 
606 P.2d 310 (Wyoming 1980); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Arkansas 1983).   
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states’ education clauses did not read them as mandating school financing equity.115 “For the 
present, solutions to serious disparities in educational opportunities must come from our 
lawmakers,” wrote the Georgia Supreme Court in 1981.116  A year later, the Colorado Supreme 
Court, after acknowledging that “while it is clearly the province and duty of judiciary to 
determine what the law is,” proceeded to hold that “the fashioning of a constitutional system for 
financing elementary and secondary public education in Colorado is not only the proper function 
of General Assembly…[but also] expressly mandated by the Colorado Constitution.”117  In 1987, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected a lawsuit brought by plaintiffs on equal protection 
grounds:  “We find that neither the United States nor the Oklahoma Constitution requires the 
school funding regime to guarantee equal expenditures per child, at least where there is no claim 
that the system denies any child a basic, adequate education.”118  As cases built on arguments 
claiming equal protection violations or attempting to characterize education as a fundamental 
right failed to make headway in most state courts, “the concept of an ‘adequate education’ 
moved to center stage in [legal] discussions of fairness in school finance systems.”119 
                                                 
115 J.K. Underwood.  “School finance equity as vertical equity,” 28 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
493, 500 (1995).   
116 McDaniels v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 (Georgia 1981). 
117 Lujan v. Co. Bd. Of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 (Colorado 1982). 
118 Fair School v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135, 1151 (Oklahoma 1987). 
119 “Equity II—The Adequacy of Education” in Helen F. Ladd and Janet S. Hansen, Making Money Matter, p. 101. 
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3.3 FROM EQUITY TO ADEQUACY, 1989-2000 
In 1989, the Kentucky Supreme Court reignited the process of state constitutional reform by 
declaring its state’s entire education system to be unconstitutional.120  The court in Rose v. 
Council for Better Education held that its state constitution’s education clause mandated equal 
access to adequate educational opportunities for all students.121  Based on the set of guidelines 
for what constitutes an adequate education limned by the court in its opinion, the Kentucky 
legislature enacted reform legislation that “increased the per-pupil expenditure statewide…[and] 
mandated a new statewide performance-based assessment system tied to new content-education 
standards, [a] statewide curriculum framework…[and] school-based decision-making 
statewide.”122 
This case had the effect of establishing adequacy—as opposed to the notions of equity or 
wealth equalization advocated by John Coons and mandated in Serrano v. Priest—as “a distinct 
theory in school finance litigation.”123  In an influential journal article, former Coons associate 
William Clune defined adequacy as a “high-minimum” system of finance that meets the needs of 
a diverse class of students.124  Instead of comparing and then equalizing spending in districts, a 
                                                 
120 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W. 2d 186 (Kentucky 1989). 
121 See M. Heise. “State constitutions, school finance litigation, and the ‘third wave’:  From equity to adequacy,”  68 
Temple Law Review 1151, 1160 (1995) for a fuller discussion of the efficacy of this case as persuasive authority in 
other jurisdictions.   
122 Paul Minorini and Stephen Sugarman, “School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity:  Its 
Evolution, Impact, and Future” in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance (National Academy Press, 1999), p. 
59.  The guidelines stated that students should have a “sufficient” knowledge of economic and political systems, 
governmental processes, physical and mental wellness, history and art, oral and written communication skills, 
academic skills, and vocational skills.     
123 Paul Minorini and Stephen Sugarman, “Educational Adequacy and the Courts:  The Promise and Problems of 
Moving to a New Paradigm” in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance (National Academy Press, 1999), p. 
195.   
124 See William Clune, “New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez:  Ending the Separation of School 
Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy,” 24 Connecticut Law Review 
721, 728 (1992):  “In the time since Rodriguez, the theoretical problem of cost/quality has been considerably 
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state would spend what is needed in each district to achieve the appropriate outputs.125  This 
movement toward “adequacy” as a litigation strategy addressed what Peter Enrich described as 
the two most significant problems with “equity” arguments:  “First, despite the appealing 
apparent simplicity of the concept of equality, the task of specifying its precise content in the 
context of education funding turns out to be devilishly difficult…[and] second, when deployed in 
relation to a subject as important, and as emotive, as education, equality—whatever its precise 
meaning and whatever its centrality among our shared societal and legal norms—can suddenly 
loom too large, threatening to demand too much and to overwhelm other important concerns.”126 
Plaintiffs who used versions of “adequacy” arguments would successfully litigate many 
subsequent cases; the period after Rose featured several notable successes at the state level. The 
supreme courts of Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio followed the Kentucky decision, relying 
on the definition of adequacy found in Rose to justify their decisions.127  Texas and Vermont also 
held their state education systems to be unconstitutional during this period, using equity 
definitions that at various points appeared mixed with adequacy notions.128 
                                                                                                                                                             
clarified. The heavy influence of student and family inputs on achievement, revealed in the once-shocking Coleman 
report is now accepted as obvious and considered no obstacle to the educational policy goal of improving student 
achievement. The focus now is not on making students absolutely equal with each other but rather on providing a 
gain in achievement from particular kinds of schools, classrooms, teaching, and educational programs. And the 
possibility of gain is actually quite clear. Certain kinds of schools, classrooms, teachers, and programs produce 
substantial gains in student achievement, as well as other valuable educational outcomes (like staying in school)… 
Because there really is no spending level that can be specified as ‘correct’ in either a constitutional or a policy sense, 
the rule of fiscal neutrality states simply that the same kind of decision be made for all the children in the state—a 
decision free from the influence of local wealth. The core of the wrong identified in school finance litigation is not 
the deprivation of any particular level of education but the deprivation of a fair decision about the spending level.” 
125 See also William Clune, “The shift from equity to adequacy in school finance,” 8 Educational Policy 376, 394 
(1994) for a recapitulation and refinement of the above argument.  
126 Paul Enrich.  “Leaving equality behind:  New Directions in school finance reform,” 48 Vanderbilt Law Review 
101, 145 (1995).   
127 McDuffy v. Secretary of Education, 615 N.E.2d 516 (Massachusetts 1993); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State 
of New York, 86 New York 2d 307 (1995); DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).  The first two cases are 
discussed infra; DeRolph is the subject of the next chapter.  
128 Edgewood v. Kirby 777 S.W.2d 391 (Texas 1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vermont 1997). These cases 
are discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. 
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3.3.1 The Tide Turns in 1989:  Montana, Kentucky, and Texas 
Though it would prove to be a landmark year for “adequacy”-based school finance litigation, 
1989 commenced with one of the most notable “equality”-based decisions of the decade.  In 
Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State, the Montana Supreme Court, with Justice 
Weber writing for the majority, held that the state’s system of funding its public schools violated 
Article X of its state constitution.129  Article X, which had been drafted during the state’s 
contentious 1971-1972 constitutional convention, contained the following language:  “Equality 
of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state.”130  During the convention, 
delegates had quarreled over the wording of this provision, with some worrying that it left the 
state open to a school finance lawsuit like the contemporaneous Serrano v. Priest decision.  
Some of those who supported the provision agreed that such an outcome was possible, perhaps 
even likely, and not necessarily unwelcome.131  For once, the State’s argument that the “framer’s 
intentions” militated against such a finding that the provision in question was “an aspirational 
goal only” was clearly contradicted by the record.132  As such, the case required no analysis 
beyond a plain reading of the text of the Article X:  equality had been explicitly guaranteed here, 
and so an argument alleging inequality of educational opportunity, when coupled with clear 
evidence that Montana’s Foundation Plan was under-funded, was sufficient to prove a 
                                                 
129 Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State, 236 Montana 44 (1989). 
130 Montana Constitution, Article X, Section 1. 
131 “Now, a great deal has been said about the Serrano-Priest case and other decisions across the land affecting the 
financing of the public school system.  In analyzing our Montana finance structure, the committee found that there is 
a great disparity between the level of school financing among the various districts of the state…It’s our feeling that 
the state should make every effort to insure that insofar as it is possible, equality of financial expenditures for school 
children of our state is implemented.” 8 Montana Convention of 1971-1972 at 6016.  See n. 71, supra. 
132Helena Elementary School at 52.  
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constitutional violation.133  It would not, however, “spell out the percentages which are required 
on the part of the State under the Foundation Program and for the districts under the voted levy 
system…[because] we are not able to reach that type of a conclusion…[and] the control of such 
funds is primarily in the Legislature.”134 
 Thus, while interesting from a historical perspective, Helena offered little in the way of 
policy advice.  In fact, the court’s conclusion was no different than those reached by courts for 
decades:  allocating revenue is a matter left to the legislature.  All that had occurred here was an 
instance of a court saying that this particular allocation would not pass muster.  This decision 
led, as expected, to subsequent litigation, and a “final” determination of the issue would not 
occur until 2005.135 
 In June of that year, a very different sort of school finance lawsuit was decided. The chief 
litigator on the case was not, like John Coons and Paul Trachtenberg, an “ivory-tower” sort of 
academic; it was former Kentucky governor Bert T. Combs.136  It was not brought by a handful 
of school districts and plaintiffs; it was supported by dozens of school districts from all corners 
of the state, coordinated through two well-organized not-for-profit education coalitions.137  And 
the result was one of the first triumphs of the “adequacy” litigation strategy, one that would 
                                                 
133 The court had no need to go further in its analysis:  “Because we have concluded that the school funding system 
is unconstitutional under Art. X, Sec. 1, Mont. Const., we do not find it necessary to consider the equal protection 
issue. We therefore make no decision with regard to the findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the equal 
protection of the laws analysis of the District Court, and in particular do not rule upon the determination by the 
District Court that education is a fundamental right.” id. at 55.     
134 id. 
135 In Columbia Falls School District No. 6 v. State, 326 Montana 304 (2005), the Montana Supreme Court was 
faced with a similar lawsuit relating to another state education bill.  Here the court once again concluded that the 
system of public school financing laid out in the bill was unconstitutional, but noted—as it had failed to do in 
Helena Elementary School—that it could not adjudicate future education lawsuits until the legislature provided an 
objective definition of what constituted a “quality” education under the terms of Article X, Section 1.  When the 
Montana District Court first heard this case in January 2004, I was employed as a “permanent” substitute physical 
education teacher in both the Columbia Falls and Flathead (Kalispell) school districts.    
136 Paris, Framing Equal Opportunity at 172.  Combs was, however, ably assisted by education law expert Kern 
Alexander, who also participated in the DeRolph litigation discussed in the next chapter.   
137 id.   
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reverberate throughout the next decade as other jurisdictions accepted Kentucky Supreme 
Court’s holding as persuasive authority.138 
 Rose v. Council for Better Education, then, was handed down with bipartisan support, 
with the backing of many school districts, and in a state where both the legislature had been 
trying to pass education reform legislation for over a decade. Chief Justice Robert Stephens, 
writing for the majority, seized upon Brown as inspiration for the decision:   ‘Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms,’ [wrote Chief Justice Warren] and these thoughts…and the goals 
                                                 
138 Three things need to be said here about the “adequacy” standard.  The first is that it is clearly more palatable for 
state supreme court justices, since, according to Ladd and Hansen in Making Money Matter, it “places far more 
emphasis on outputs and outcomes than wealth neutrality and spending equalization” (p. 102).  The second is that, 
even among the courts and litigators who have advanced this theory, there is very little consensus on what it means 
beyond the fact that many Americans—who seem uncomfortable with the notion of a truly egalitarian society—are 
more accepting of it.  The third—and most important for my purposes in the present paper—was made  in a recent 
paper in Education Economics:  Although both adequacy and equity “wins” for plaintiffs “decrease resource 
inequities” (no mention is made of student outputs; that is not the subject of the work), lawyers and legal theorists 
who have argued that the latter is somehow “better” for students than the former are wrong, because “resource 
distribution patterns following court-mandated equity and adequacy reforms are not statistically different.”  Matthew 
Springer, Keke Liu, and James W. Guthrie, “The impact of school finance litigation on resource distribution:  a 
comparison of court-mandated equity and adequacy reforms,” 17 Education Economics 421 (December 2009).  This 
finding informs my historical treatment of these two standards:  while it is certainly noteworthy that “adequacy” has 
proved more successful than “equity,” the analytical distinctions between these two theories—such as they are—are 
largely irrelevant.  This is also what I have concluded about education clauses in state constitutions.  In spite of the 
efforts of scholars such as William Thro to place them into “categories” based on the nature of the language 
(obviously hortatory, semi-obligatory, etc.), this has had absolutely no impact on how the justices tasked with 
interpreting them have actually behaved.  See William Thro, “To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State 
Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Litigation,” 75 Virginia Law Review 1639; and Karen Swenson, 
“School Finance Reform Litigation:  Why are Some State Supreme Courts Activist and Others Restrained?” 63 
Albany Law Review 1147 (1999), where, inter alia, Thro’s “categories” of education clause are tested to see if  
“stronger” education clauses are outcome-determinative in this litigation.  Swenson concludes that, even though 
“courts appear to put considerable effort into comparing their state constitution’s education clause to the education 
clauses of other states, and in consulting the constitutional interpretations of sister state high courts…it appears that 
deference to another  state’s constitutional law is a random event.” (1175).  My own research seems to confirm the 
correctness of this conclusion.  Consider the examples of West Virginia (where education is a “fundamental right”), 
Ohio (where students are entitled to an “adequate education”), and Pennsylvania (where decisions regarding 
education spending are left to the discretion of the legislature):  all three of these states have education clauses with 
“thorough and efficient” language, with  West Virginia and Pennsylvania having modeled their clauses on the Ohio 
clause.  For a further discussion of the unhelpfulness of relying solely on the wording of these clauses to determine 
their present meaning, beyond what they tell us, historically speaking, about which group of people (“citizens,” 
“whites,” “all people,” etc.) were entitled to access to education (and how much, if anything, that education should 
cost), please refer to the previous chapter.    
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they express reflect the goals set out by the framers of our Kentucky Constitution.”139  After 
proceeding to summarize the state of school funding in Kentucky, Justice Stephens presented 
readers with a rhetorical question:  “Can anyone seriously argue that these disparities do not 
affect the basic educational opportunities of those children in the poorer districts?”140   
 Stephens thereafter turned to the remarks made by delegates at the state’s 1890 
constitutional convention regarding the education provision at issue.  He paid especial attention 
to the comments of one Delegate Beckner, who, in terms of defining “equality”, stated rather 
vaguely (but helpfully, for Stephens’ purposes) that “it [means] a system of practical equality in 
which the children of the rich and poor meet upon a perfect level and the only superiority is that 
of the mind.”141  Following his discussion of Kentucky precedents, he looked to the Pauley 
                                                 
139 Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W2d 186, 189 (Kentucky 1989), quoting Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
140 id. at 198. Stephens’ summary was concise and poignant:  “When one considers the use of property taxes as a 
percent of sources of school revenue, Kentucky is 7th among our neighboring states and 43rd nationally. The 
national average is 30.1% while Kentucky's rate is 18.2%. If any more evidence is needed to show the inadequacy of 
our overall effort, consider that only 68.2% of ninth grade students eventually graduate from high school in 
Kentucky. That ranks us 7th among our eight adjacent sister states. Among the 6 of our neighboring states that use 
the ACT scholastic achievement test, our high school graduates average score is 18.1, which ranks us 4th. 
Kentucky's ratio of pupil-teacher is 19.2, which ranks us 7th in this region” (197).  
141 id. at 205, quoting 3 Debates Constitutional Convention 1890 at 4459 (remarks of Delegate Beckner). In fact, the 
“history” section of this opinion consists almost exclusively of Beckner’s statements.  Beckner, in the course of 
discussing the state’s obligation to provide education to all of its citizens, laid out four “justifications for and 
characteristics of” the public schools (the most interesting of which being that “education should be given to all—
rich and poor—so that our people will be homogeneous in their feelings and desires”).  Stephens would use these as 
a model for his own rubric, mentioned both supra and infra, for what constituted an adequate education in 
Kentucky.  Although this is once again “anachronistic” from a historical standpoint—who knows what Beckner 
intended, as far as school finance litigation goes?—it is nonetheless a fascinating attempt to create what Cass 
Sunstein has labeled a “useable past.”  See “The Idea of a Useable Past,” 95 Columbia Law Review 601, 605 (1995):  
“The historian is trying to reimagine the past, necessarily from a present-day standpoint, but subject to the discipline 
provided by sources and by the interpretive conventions in the relevant communities of historians.  By contrast, the 
constitutional lawyer is trying to contribute to the legal culture’s repertoire of arguments and political/legal 
narratives that place a (stylized) past and present into a trajectory leading to a desired future.”  Insofar as state 
supreme courts that have read the remarks of their constitutional “framers” as leading to outcomes favoring 
plaintiffs in this sort of litigation, they are engaged in the latter activity—that of creating a “stylized” past “leading 
to a desired future”—rather than simply “reimagining the past.”  This is a crucial distinction, although, as I argue in 
the conclusion to the previous chapter, it is not even necessary to do that to reach a result in a given case.  What 
must be avoided in Sunstein’s opinion (and also in mine) is “reading history at a very high level of abstraction…and 
[then] concluding that some concrete outcome follows for us.” 
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decision and “the West Virginia Supreme Court’s142 (sic)…definition of “thorough and efficient” 
because “we consider foreign cases, along with our constitutional debates, Kentucky precedents 
and the opinion of experts in formulating the definition of efficient’ as it appears in our 
Constitution.”143  Finally, Stephens quoted Kern Alexander’s definition of  “efficient” as applied 
to a modern-day school system:   
Dr. Kern Alexander opined that an efficient system is one which is unitary. It is one in 
which there is uniformity throughout the state. It is one in which equality is a hallmark 
and one in which students must be given equal educational opportunities, regardless of 
economic status, or place of residence. He also testified that ‘efficient’ involves pay and 
training of teachers, school buildings, other teaching staff, materials, and adequacy of all 
educational resources. Moreover, he, like Dr. Salmon, believed that “efficient” also 
applies to the quality of management of schools. Summarizing Dr. Alexander's opinion, 
an efficient system is unitary, uniform, adequate and properly managed.144 
 
From all of this, Stephens formulated eight “characteristics” of a system of common schools and 
seven “capacities” they must develop in students.145  When applied to the system of school 
                                                 
142 It is the “Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,” although this unwieldy title is rarely written out in its 
entirety. 
143 id. at 210. 
144 id. at 211. 
145 The “characteristics” were as follows: “1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in 
Kentucky is the sole responsibility of the General Assembly. 2) Common schools shall be free to all. 3) Common 
schools shall be available to all Kentucky children. 4) Common schools shall be substantially uniform throughout 
the state. 5) Common schools shall provide equal educational opportunities to all Kentucky children, regardless of 
place of residence or economic circumstances. 6) Common schools shall be monitored by the General Assembly to 
assure that they are operated with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, and with no political influence. 7) 
The premise for the existence of common schools is that all children in Kentucky have a constitutional right to an 
adequate education. 8) The General Assembly shall provide funding which is sufficient to provide each child in 
Kentucky an adequate education.” As for the “capacities” of the individual students:  “(i) sufficient oral and written 
communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient 
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient 
understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her 
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical 
wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical 
heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to 
enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational 
skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in 
academics or in the job market” id. at 213.  Although these were not in any sense “quantifiable,” they amounted to 
the most detailed judicial explanation as to what the public schools were supposed to do yet articulated by a state 
supreme court.  It is largely for this reason that Rose is often compared with Brown.  In the sense that both of these 
cases were supported by much text that meant very little, this is indeed an accurate comparison.  
9) An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development of the seven capacities recited previously. 
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finance then existing in Kentucky, Stephens and the other justices in the majority were left to 
conclude that it failed to provide a “thorough and efficient” education.  The Kentucky legislature 
responded to the holding within a year, passing the Kentucky Education Reform Act (“KERA”), 
a document that had been shaped by many of the people involved with the two education reform 
organizations that had been parties to the Rose litigation.  The passage of KERA did not end the 
struggle over school finance in Kentucky, but it improved the system of public education funding 
to the point that the state was able to withstand a subsequent lawsuit brought by the Council for 
Better Education—one of the two advocacy groups involved in Rose—in 2003.146 
 This seems, at least superficially, like a tremendously “activist” decision, and it was 
interpreted as such by many legal scholars.147  But Michael Paris, in his monograph-length study 
of Rose, has argued compellingly that it was in fact a rather “restrained” holding:  “It propped up 
the legislature in its fight with the governor; it offered up a broad and inspiring rhetorical 
argument that called on others to seize the moment and make history; and it issued a 
‘nonremedy’ that left it up to others [many of whom had been intimately involved in the 
litigation] to do the legislating.”148  Throughout the course of the Rose lawsuit, its backers had 
reassured the public that they were not interested in a “Robin-Hood” resolution to the issue; in 
other words, although Justice Stephens made a show of discussing “equality” in his opinion, this 
case would not result in “equalization” of resources.149  
                                                 
146 Paris at 210.  The legislature approved a significant increase in education spending in 2006, and the lawsuit—
which had been pending since 2003—was dismissed by a trial court in 2007.  The Council for Better Education, 
satisfied by the legislative result, did not appeal the dismissal. 
147 As in the articles cited in n. 122 and n. 124, among many others. 
148 Paris at 192. 
149 Members of the Council for Better Education, one of the advocacy groups involved in the litigation, went out of 
their way to tell the public that they were “anti-Robin Hood…advocat[ing] an infusion of funds and leveling 
up…[with] no desire to take resources away from any district” (Paris, 173). 
 90 
 Meanwhile, in Edgewood School District v. Kirby (1989), the Texas Supreme Court 
sought to provide closure to the state school funding saga that had begun, nearly two decades 
earlier, with the line of Rodriguez decisions.150  The gap in funding among districts had widened 
in the ensuing years; spending per student ranged from $2,000 in the poorest districts to nearly 
$20,000 in the richest.151  Writing for the majority, Justice Oscar Mauzy authored an opinion in 
which these funding disparities were found to violate several state constitutional provisions:  the 
equal rights guarantee of Article I, Section 3; the due course of law guarantee of Article I, 
Section 19; and the “efficient system of public schools” clause of Article VII, Section 1.152   To 
buttress his holding, Mauzy provided an interpretation of the comments of delegates at the 1875 
Texas Constitutional Convention as well as a handful of dictionary definitions of the term 
“efficiency.”  Relying on remarks such as “I boldly assert that it is for the general welfare of all, 
rich and poor, male and female, that the means of a common school education should, if 
possible, be placed within the reach of every child in the State” and an 1864 Webster’s entry of 
“efficiency” that read “causing effects; producing results; actively operative; not inactive, slack 
or incapable; characterized by energetic and useful activity,” Mauzy concluded that “in 
mandating ‘efficiency,’ the constitutional framers and ratifiers did not intend a system with such 
vast disparities as now exist” but instead “stated clearly that the purpose of an efficient system 
was to provide for a ‘general diffusion of knowledge.’”153  All of this, coupled with a general 
statement from a prior case in which the Texas Supreme Court stated that it had the power to 
review legislative enactments, gave the court the authority to review the system of school finance 
                                                 
150 Edgewood v. Kirby 777 S.W.2d 391 (Texas 1989). 
151 id. at 391. 
152 id. at 392. 
153 id at. 398, quoting Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1864), p. 430 and S. 
McKay, Debates in the Texas Constitutional Convention of 1875 (1930) at 198. 
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at issue in Edgewood.  While slightly anachronistic in the strictest sense, it comports with what 
other many reformist courts had done with regard to issues of the “framer’s intent”:  they 
fashioned, from various statements, a sort of “useable past” that justified their decision in the 
present.154 
 What Mauzy and the others in the majority did not fashion, however, was a suitable or 
even an especially clear remedy to the constitutional violation they had announced.  Unlike in 
Rose, where the court had offered a handful of hortatory and remarkable quotes about public 
education and then left the matter in the hands of a state legislature already in the process of 
crafting an education reform bill, Edgewood was a tremendously unclear holding.  First, the 
court failed to give any instructions to the legislature:  were students to be made more equal, or 
taxpayers?  In the end, Mauzy offered the following advice:  “There must be a direct and close 
correlation between a district’s tax effort and the education resources available to it; in other 
words, districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar 
levels of tax effort.”155   
 This seemed to indicate that the legislature should focus on tax equity, thereby bringing 
spending among all of the state’s school districts in line with one another.  Subsequent opinions 
altered this focus to that of “per-pupil” equity; in the meantime, the second Edgewood decision, 
which attempted to clarify the holding in the first, suggested that a “Robin Hood” tax program 
                                                 
154 See n. 139, supra. Cass Sunstein, “The Idea of a Useable Past,” 95 Columbia Law Review 601, 605 (1995):  “The 
historian is trying to reimagine the past, necessarily from a present-day standpoint, but subject to the discipline 
provided by sources and by the interpretive conventions in the relevant communities of historians.  By contrast, the 
constitutional lawyer is trying to contribute to the legal culture’s repertoire of arguments and political/legal 
narratives that place a (stylized) past and present into a trajectory leading to a desired future.”  As I have mentioned 
repeatedly, this is the only way that they could be invoking this history, since the intent of the framers—as clearly 
indicated by the body of discursive materials (their own remarks at the conventions, court opinions from the 19th 
century, etc.) in which they are embedded—is obviously contra.  But it is not the only way they could have 
proceeded, nor was it the most helpful way; they could also have stated that they were simply acting in the spirit of 
these individuals by continuing to expand access to public education.   
155 id. at 397. 
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(so termed by its later opponents) setting minimum property tax rates across the state coupled 
with the consolidation of school districts would pass constitutional muster.156  That second 
holding enraged some legislators and created some momentum among conservative Republicans 
to vote all nine justices out of office in the next judicial election.157  Although this failed to 
happen—unseating incumbent judges is a difficult matter indeed158—the fallout from Edgewood 
prompted Democratic Governor Ann Richards to stake her political fortunes to a proposed 
constitutional amendment that would have forced richer school districts to share some of their 
revenue with poorer neighboring districts.159  Owing partly to voter apathy and partly to an “anti-
tax crusade” against the plan, the amendment was defeated by a 2-to-1 margin.160 Nevertheless, a 
modified version of this program—another sort of “Robin Hood” scheme, although the precise 
parameters varied slightly—was enacted by the legislature in 1994 and met with tentative 
judicial approval.  It never quite satisfied the public—two policy analysts remarked as it was 
                                                 
156 Edgewood Independent School Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W. 2d 491 (1991). 
157 As described in Reed, On Equal Terms, pp. 72-73.  
158 For more on this subject, see Chris W. Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections 
(Routledge, 2009). 
159 Amended over 326 times and checking in at nearly 30,000 words, the Texas Constitution is a remarkably long 
and convoluted document.  Voters in the state find themselves asked to decide on a constitutional amendment in 
nearly every single election, some of which are three paragraphs (or more) in length.  To put all of this in 
perspective:  the average state constitution is around 19,000 words (and has been amended 110 times, on average 
1.25 times per year); this chapter is close to 12,000 words; and the federal constitution runs approximately 4,300 
words.  See Robert F. Williams, “Amending and Revising State Constitutions” in The Law of American State 
Constitutions (Oxford, 2009), pp. 359-399. 
160 Sam Howe Verhovek, “Texans Reject Sharing School Wealth,” in The New York Times (05-03-1993).  Richards 
would herself go down in defeat in 1994, a victim of George W. Bush’s astute campaigning as well as the rising tide 
of grassroots right-wing support that propelled the Republicans to considerable success during that election season.  
The defeat likely not due to this:  however well-organized the “anti-tax crusade” which Verhovek discussed, only 
25% of the state’s eligible voters cast a ballot on the issue of the school amendment.  Verhovek highlights the 
generally apathetic response by noting that “nearly three times as many Texans lined up for a shot at the $50 million 
state lottery on Saturday as the more than 2.04 million who turned out at the polls.”  This measure did not generate 
the sort of turnout that Proposition 13 had, but perhaps that was because that issue was framed in the other direction; 
i.e., the capping of tax rates, rather than—as here—what seemed to amount to the diminution of local control of the 
schools.  For the most part, these pro-education constitutional amendment measures have rarely received, although 
the partial success of one such measure in Florida will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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being implemented that “a taxpayer revolt is a real threat”161—and ten year later it was held to be 
an unconstitutional “statewide property tax” by a very different Texas Supreme Court.162  
3.3.2 Victories, Defeats, and New Constitutional Language 
Both from a rhetorical as well as a practical standpoint, the most notable victories for school 
reformers in the 1990s occurred in the Northeast.  Supreme Courts in Massachusetts, New York, 
and Vermont all held their systems of school financing to be unconstitutional, each doing so in 
declarative prose that provided a clear mandate to its state legislature.163  All three courts are also 
relatively insulated from voters, with only the Vermont justices facing so much as a retention 
election—a fact remarked upon by participants in all three cases as crucial to their outcome, even 
as social science research on the subject has indicated that a state’s method of judicial selection 
seems to have little impact on the results of school funding litigation.164 
                                                 
161 William Hobby and Mark Yudof, “Texas Got Itself into This School-Finance Mess, How’s It Going to Get Out?” 
in Houston Chronicle (12-15-1991). 
162 It was held to be constitutional in Edgewood Independent School Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (1995), then 
declared unconstitutional in Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Independent School District, 176 S.W.3d 746 
(2005).  In the latter opinion, Justice Scott Brister, a staunch Republican and Rick Perry appointee, decided to use 
his impassioned concurrence/dissent to write some new history, attempting to modify the meaning of “efficiency” 
established by Justice Mauzy in the first Edgewood decision:  “Perhaps this [definition] made sense in 1989—before 
the Berlin Wall fell, before the Soviet Union collapsed, and before state-run businesses everywhere proved 
uncompetitive. Perhaps back then a government system was ‘efficient’ if it could get sufficient public funding. But 
surely not now. Today, we know that one thing above all else makes service providers efficient: competition. Even 
formerly communist countries recognize how efficiency is produced—not by protectionism, not by higher taxes, and 
not by state control, but by freedom for competition,” at 802.  
163 McDuffy v. Secretary of Education, 615 N.E.2d 516 (Massachusetts 1993); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State 
of New York, 86 New York 2d 307 (1995);  Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vermont 1997).  
164 See Karen Swenson, “School Finance Reform Litigation:  Why are Some State Supreme Courts Activist and 
Others Restrained?” 63 Albany Law Review 1147, 1167 (1999):  “These results do not appear to vary with the 
method of selecting justices, contrary to Hypothesis 8A (Elective courts are more likely than appointive courts to 
strike down school finance schemes in states with liberal mass publics; elective courts are more likely than 
appointive courts to uphold school finance schemes in states with conservative mass publics). This is not surprising, 
in light of the impact of retention elections amongst appointive supreme courts. Indeed, the consistent relationship 
between decision-making and public opinion is heartening to those who dislike activist courts that appear to make 
decisions based on no more than their members' own policy preferences.”  Paula J. Lundberg, “State Courts and 
School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis,” 63 Albany Law Review 1101, 1137-1138 (1999) is also instructive:  
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 In McDuffy v. Secretary of Education, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
(“SJC”), in the course of deciding a school finance lawsuit brought on behalf of sixteen students 
enrolled in schools throughout the state, revisited the education clause in its constitution 
discussed in the previous chapter.165  Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, in deciding the 
case of Roberts v. Boston in 1849, had concluded that municipalities had plenary power to 
organize their school districts as they saw fit.166  The lofty exhortation to the legislature “to 
cherish…the public schools” that John Adams had penned was, by the author’s own admission, 
much empty rhetoric.  But for Chief Justice Paul Liacos, who had been appointed to the SJC in 
1976 by Governor Michael Dukakis, this interpretation of what was now Part II, Chapter 5, 
Section 6 of the Massachusetts Constitution no longer suited the times:   “The content of the duty 
to educate which the Constitution places on the Commonwealth necessarily will evolve together 
with our society…and [o]ur Constitution, and its education clause, must be interpreted in 
accordance with the demands of modern society or it will be in constant danger of becoming 
atrophied and, in fact, may even lose its original meaning.”167 
 This statement followed a lengthy attempt by Justice Liacos to fashion a “useable past” 
out of the same history that, read carefully in search of the “original intent” of the figures 
involved, would appear to militate against a favorable result for the plaintiffs.  After an extensive 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Neither length of term nor method of attaining office are significantly associated with case outcomes…. Neither 
controlling for the partisanship of the traditionalistic states nor interacting state liberalism scores with court 
partisanship produces a significant result. The lack of significance of court partisanship (COURT), either as a direct 
or indirect effect on the judicial decision in school funding cases, sets these kinds of cases apart from those 
examined by other researchers, such as abortion and death penalty cases, where partisanship was found to be a 
significant contributor to case outcomes. An explanation for this might be that school funding does not have the 
same partisan salience with the public as does the either/or aspect of the controversies regarding abortion and the 
death penalty that are the subjects of prior research” (emphasis added).  Nevertheless, the jurists discussed in this 
section seem to believe, at least as regards their experiences, that this made a great deal of difference in how they 
decided and reacted to the cases.  
165 McDuffy v. Secretary of Education, 615 N.E.2d 516 (Massachusetts 1993). 
166 Roberts v. Boston, 59 Massachusetts 198 (1849). 
167 McDuffy at 554. 
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survey of educational developments in Massachusetts, Liacos concluded that all of this material, 
from the statements of John Hancock and Samuel Adams to the (seemingly contrary) holding in 
Commonwealth v. Dedham (1819), demonstrated incontrovertibly the “fundamental relation 
between republican government and public education, and the constitutional duty imposed by 
Part II, C. 5, § 2, to provide for the education of the people.”168 From this, he stated that “the 
reality is that children in the less affluent communities (or in the less affluent parts of them) are 
not receiving their constitutional entitlement of education as intended and mandated by the 
framers of the Constitution.”169  As to what that opportunity was, he quoted the guidelines 
presented in the Rose decision and then left it to “the Legislatures to define the precise nature of 
the task which they face in fulfilling their constitutional duty to educate our children today, and 
in the future.”170 
 McDuffy was re-litigated on several occasions, and the Supreme Judicial Court 
maintained jurisdiction of the case for the fifteen years. During this period, and for reasons that 
have been disputed by social scientists, Massachusetts’ public schools have outpaced the 
performance of schools in every other state, and now constitute the only state school system 
competitive at the world level.171  Justice John Greaney, who was in the McDuffy majority, had 
his own explanation for why the litigation went so smoothly: 
                                                 
168 Commonwealth v. Dedham, 16 Massachusetts 141 (1819).  This case, described in detail in the previous chapter, 
seemed to specify only intradistrict equality for pupils so situated:  “Common schools should be maintained for the 
benefit of the whole town, as it is the wise policy of the law to give all the inhabitants equal privileges, for the 
education of their children in the public schools.”  Roberts further limited this holding, noting that the mandate, such 
as it was, needed to be interpreted in such a way as to give the municipal government as much discretion to organize 
its schools as possible.  Liacos’ interpretation of the spirit of all this material, however, is entirely consistent with 
how other jurists involved in this litigation have “used” history to justify their claims.    
169 McDuffy at 552. 
170 id. at 556. 
171 See Amanda Ripley, “Your Child Left Behind,” in The Atlantic, December 2010.  Accessed at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/12/your-child-left-behind/8310/.  These rankings of 
“competitiveness” are based exclusively on test score data, and will be discussed in greater detail in the final 
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In Massachusetts, we are unelected judges.  We serve until age seventy.  So if there’s any 
backlash, which there really wasn’t over McDuffy, we cannot be removed.  They can do 
certain other things, but they can’t get rid of us.172 
 
He went on, however, to stress that what really determined the outcome in these cases were the 
voting choices of the justices:   
[In the early 2000s], two other judges were new to the court, and, if the membership 
changes, even in an unelected court like ours, results can change.  The [new justices] 
wanted the McDuffy decision overruled.  It was their position, basically, that the 
education clause had been so misconstrued, and, even if it hadn’t been misconstrued, the 
remedy was so daunting that the court should not have been involved in the first place.  
One of them used the word ‘judicial imagination’ in characterizing the decision in 
McDuffy.  There were two judges…who dissented because we wanted to forge on.  That’s 
where the case is now, except that the three [voted in a way] that left a little narrow 
opening that might allow the case to come back—in other words, that if it comes back, 
that 3-2-2.173 
 
The case to which Justice Greaney was referring, Hancock v. Commissioner of Educ. (2005), 
offered a typical conclusion to this sort of litigation.  In Hancock, the SJC, per new Chief Justice 
Margaret Marshall (a William Weld appointee), held that the state and its school districts were 
meeting the constitutional mandate put to them by the courts, and that, as in McDuffy, it was left 
to the governor and legislature to continue to work to improve the quality and evenness of 
funding throughout the state.174 
 In New York during this same period, the Ford Foundation-backed Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity (“CFE”) had initiated a school finance lawsuit that reached the New York Court of 
                                                                                                                                                             
chapter.  Some, such as economist Eric Hanushek, attribute the strong performance of these schools to improved 
“teacher accountability”; others attribute it to increased and more uniform funding.   
172 Transcript of “Equal Educational Opportunity” symposium at Columbia Teachers College in 2007, reprinted in 
the appendix to Rebell, Courts and Kids, p. 109.  The “backlash” against the justices in these matters seems limited 
to spirited op-ed pieces and campaign challenges, such as the one that Ohio Justice Alice Robie Resnick faced after 
the DeRolph litigation that is discussed in the next chapter, that ultimately prove unsuccessful.  See Paula J. 
Lundberg, quoted at n. 162:  “An explanation for this might be that school funding does not have the same partisan 
salience with the public as does the either/or aspect of the controversies regarding abortion and the death penalty 
that are the subjects of prior research.” 
173 id. at 110. 
174 Hancock v. Commissioner of Education, 443 Massachusetts 428, 462 (2005). 
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Appeals in 1995.  The CFE had grown weary of repeated political impasses between the 
legislature and the executive, and pursuing a legal strategy in which it argued that the state was 
not providing an “adequate” education, placed the matter before the unelected judges of the 
Court of Appeals.175  Judge Albert Rosenblatt, the only one of Governor George Pataki’s 
appointee who would vote with the majority in holding that New York’s method of funding its 
schools was unconstitutional, believed that, in doing so, he was performing a critical public 
function:   
The courts have the obligation [to decide these matters] because the courts have no 
choice.  When a litigation is filed, the courts must decide it, and the courts do so 
seriously, even if not necessarily cheerfully.  In the context of the separation of 
powers…the judges are the ones that can be counted on ‘to do the right thing.’ The 
reason the legislators are not willing to ‘do the right thing’ is that the voters don’t want 
them to.  We live in a democracy, and we always have to bear in mind that when the 
voters don’t want something to happen and the judges are called upn to do something, 
then what they are doing in a sense is antimajoritarian…[but] we want to be careful about 
that because judges don’t like to be seen as elitist or as activists.  They don’t want to be 
seen as people who have jobs protected by life tenure, by appointment, that will enable 
them to beat the heck out of the taxpayers.176 
 
 Here, the Court of Appeals, per Judge Ciparick, showed little hesitation in overruling Levittown 
v. Nyquist, an early-1980s case in which the plaintiffs had attempted to prevail by means of an 
“equity-based” argument.177  The interpretation of the “Education Article” in New York’s 
constitution is fascinating:  Both Ciparick and Judge Hugh R. Jones, author of the Levittown 
decision, accepted that this constitutional provision imposed an affirmative duty on the 
                                                 
175“Campiagn for Fiscal Equity History,” http://www.cfequity.org/static.php?page=our_history&category=about_us. 
176 Transcript in Rebell, p. 114. 
177 Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (New York 1982).  The argument, summarized in the first few paragraphs 
of that case, was quite simple:  expenditures in districts throughout the state were grossly unequal, and thus quite 
obviously ran afoul of the equal protection provision of New York’s constitution.  The Court of Appeals refused to 
accept that argument, holding that “because decisions as to how public funds will be allocated among the several 
services for which by constitutional imperative the Legislature is required to make provision are matters peculiarly 
appropriate for formulation by the legislative body (reflective of and responsive as it is to the public will), we would 
be reluctant to override those decisions by mandating an even higher priority for education in the absence” (at 369). 
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legislature to provide a “sound public education.”178  Where they differed was in deciding 
whether the state was fulfilling this duty.  Ciparick, after dismissing an argument based on the 
state constitution’s equal protection clause179 and noting that a prima facie Title VI violation had 
been alleged but needed to be reinstated at the trial court so it could be litigated on its merits, 
concluded that, under the terms of the education article, the plaintiffs had indeed presented a 
sufficient case that many New York students were not receiving a “sufficient” education.180  The 
case was thereafter remanded to the trial court for a decision on the merits, thus ending the 
struggle over the viability of school finance litigation in New York—such complaints were now 
actionable under the education clause in the constitution—but by no means terminating the 
lengthy, contentious dialogue among the three branches of state government over this issue.181 
 In a 1997 per curiam opinion, the Vermont Supreme Court went further than even the 
courts in New York and Massachusetts had, at least rhetorically speaking, by interpreting its state 
constitution to provide all citizens with a fundamental right to education.182 In reaching this 
result, their effort to create a “useable past” for the state was put squarely on the issue of access.  
What mattered for them was not how the education clause in the state’s first constitution was 
meant to be interpreted, but rather the fact that it was there at all:   
                                                 
178 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 86 New York 2d 307, 315 (1995).  Only in the dissents to these 
cases did any judge advance the notion that the provision was merely hortatory in nature; Ciparick dismissed this 
claim in Campaign for Fiscal Equity with a simple statement that “contrary to the dissenting expression of Judge 
Simons, we are unable to adopt the view that the constitutional language at issue is, in effect, hortatory.” 
179 See n. 175.  On this ground, he agreed with the majority in Levittown. 
180 id. at 319. 
181 See Neil deMause and Elizabeth Green, “The Campaign for Fiscal Equity Lawsuit Was the Best Hope for City 
Schools. It Failed,” in The Village Voice, 01-21-2009.  After the Court of Appeals ordered the state and city to spend 
an additional $5.6 billion on NYC schools in 2004, changed economic circumstances and massive budget shortfalls 
made the implementation of that mandate impossible.  Two years earlier, Judge Rosenblatt had remarked, 
“Ultimately, there must be a political resolution with the judges in the role of pointing [the other branches] in the 
right direction.  Judges do not have budgets to make allocations.  Judges don’t cut checks.”  Rebell at 121.  In this 
unfortunate instance, no checks could be cut at all, since they would have “bounced.” 
182 Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (1997). 
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The important point is not simply that public education was mentioned in the first 
Constitution. It is, rather, that education was the only governmental service considered 
worthy of constitutional status. The framers were not unaware of other public needs. 
Among the first statutes enacted by the General Assembly in 1779 were two separate acts 
for the maintenance and support of the poor and infirm…The other statute, entitled “An 
Act for Maintaining and Supporting the Poor,” required towns to ‘take care of, support, 
and maintain their own poor,’ id. at 97, giving rise to what has euphemistically been 
called ‘poor farms.’  Despite the obvious public concern for those least able to care for 
themselves, the framers made no provision in the Constitution for public welfare or ‘poor 
relief’ as it was then known. Indeed, many essential governmental services such as 
welfare, police and fire protection, transportation, and sanitation receive no mention 
whatsoever in our Constitution. Only one governmental service-public education-has ever 
been accorded constitutional status in Vermont.183 
 
This claim was then supplemented, as is characteristic of nearly all of these opinions, with a 
grab-bag of lofty statements about education made by various framers, founders, and other 
important figures from the distant past—but it need not have been, for their earlier, simpler 
statement would have sufficed (as, to be certain, would a simple majority vote,184 coupled with a 
short explanation of some sort about what the majority had decided).185  From there, the court 
went on to explain that the system need provide only “substantial equality” rather than “true 
equality” of funding, yet at the moment was offering neither.  It then left the matter of achieving 
“substantial equality” to the legislature, stating that “the specific means of discharging this 
broadly defined duty is properly left to its discretion.”186 
 However, in three of the states with the largest education budgets—Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and Florida—plaintiffs’ lawsuits based on both “equity” and “adequacy” grounds 
                                                 
183 id. at 391. 
184 See Greaney’s statement at n. 171 regarding the significance of the “vote” in constitutional adjudication.  This 
will become even more apparent with the discussion of the DeRolph case in the next chapter, given how much 
shifting lineups of justices impacted that litigation. 
185 e.g., “From the earliest period in this State, the proper education of all the children of its inhabitants has been 
regarded as a matter of vital interest to the State, a duty which devolved upon its government....The constitution of 
the State especially enjoins upon the legislature the duty of passing laws to carry out this object... [T]he whole 
subject of the maintenance and support of common schools has ever been regarded in this State as one not only of 
public usefulness, but of public necessity, and one which the State in it sovereign character was bound to sustain” (at 
394).  None of this language, such as it is, creates a single enforceable right—but the holding in Brigham does.   
186 id. at 398.  
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met with defeat.  The Illinois Supreme Court, in fact, explicitly rejected each theory in separate 
cases.  In Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar (1996), the majority, per Justice John 
Nickels, interpreted Article X, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution to create no legally 
enforceable rights.187 Nickels, in reaching this conclusion, was able to reflect on the work of the 
relatively recent 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, where delegates “embraced this limited 
construction that the constitutional efficiency requirement authorized judicial review of school 
district boundaries, but they did not intend to otherwise limit legislative discretion.”188  Here 
was, as in Montana with the Helena Elementary School case, an instance where the “framers’ 
intent” had been precisely articulated in a contemporary context, immediately after school 
finance lawsuits had commenced in various states.  But again:  how much deference was due to 
these statements, given their non-binding nature?  For Justice Nickels and the majority, such 
information was dispositive:  “We conclude that the question of whether the educational 
institutions and services in Illinois are “high quality” is outside the sphere of the judicial 
function…[and] to the extent plaintiffs' claim that the system for financing public schools is 
unconstitutional rests on perceived deficiencies in the quality of education in public schools, the 
claim was properly dismissed.”189  Three years later, in Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, a lawsuit brought 
                                                 
187 Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Illinois 2d 1 (1996). That section of the Illinois Constitution 
reads as follows:  “A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the 
limits of their capacities.  The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational 
institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such 
other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.” 
 
188 id. at 16.  The commentary on this provision also supports Nickels’ contention.  See ILCS Ann., 1970 Const., art. 
X, § 1, Constitutional Commentary, at 789:  “There is no indication that the Convention intended to alter the line of 
cases in which the courts have deferred to the legislature on the meaning of terms such as ‘efficient.’”  Delegate 
Dawn Clark Netsch, after proposing some of the language the wound up in the final article, noted that “[t]he State 
has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education” and that this provision was 
“hortatory…[creating] no legally enforceable duty.”  It would merely “function as a conscience to the General 
Assembly to assume a greater proportion of the financing of public schools of the state.”  5 Illinois Convention of 
1969-1970 at 4145, 4502. 
189 id. at 32. 
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on “adequacy” grounds was rejected with little discussion, and for precisely the same reason:  
“We now reaffirm our recent holding in Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar (1996), that 
questions relating to the quality of a public school education are for the legislature, not the 
courts, to decide.”190 
 Meanwhile, Pennsylvania—which, like West Virginia, had adopted the “thorough and 
efficient” language added to the Ohio Constitution in 1851—continued to interpret this provision 
differently than those states did.   In the 1979 case Danson v. Casey, decided contemporaneously 
with Pauley in West Virginia, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that school finance 
decisions were non-justiciable “political questions” to be resolved by the state legislature.191 As 
the so-called “third wave” of adequacy-based litigation crested in the 1990s, the court affirmed, 
without comment, two decisions of its intermediate appellate courts.  First, in Marrero v. 
Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Court decided against a suit brought by several Philadelphia 
students and the NAACP based on an “equity” argument that would, if accepted, have required 
significant revenue equalization throughout the Pennsylvania school system.  The court, in 
rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument, pointed to the well-established interpretation of Article 3, 
Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution—viz., that it “conferred no particular right upon 
each student to a particular level or quality of education.”192  The Commonwealth Court relied 
heavily on Danson’s determination of the intent of the delegates at the state’s 1873 constitutional 
convention, where the education article had been drafted:  “In originally adopting the ‘thorough 
and efficient’ amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873, the framers considered and 
rejected the possibility of specifically requiring the Commonwealth's system of education be 
                                                 
190 Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Illinois 2d 198 (1999). 
191 Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pennsylvania 1979).  See also n. 92, supra. 
192 Marrero v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956, 962 (1998). 
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uniform.”193  In the companion case of Pennsylvania Association of Rural and Small Schools v. 
Ridge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s determination that 
an “adequacy” argument was unacceptable, and for precisely the same reasons.194  Here, then, 
was a necessary reaffirmation:  the “history” of these clauses, at least as concerned the resolution 
of school finance litigation cases, would always intersect with the policy preferences of the 
judges involved, and so would always be determined by a majority vote.  
 In Florida, however, something rather different occurred at the close of the 1990s:  the 
very language of the state’s education clause was changed by a majority vote of the general 
electorate.   This alteration occurred after the Supreme Court of Florida handed down its decision 
in Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding v. Chiles, a per curiam opinion where 
the court rejected an “adequacy”-based lawsuit in part because the plaintiffs had failed to present 
any clear guidelines for determining “adequacy” and in part because the court did not wish to 
intrude on matters which it believed were left to the discretion of the legislature.195  This 
decision was based on the court’s interpretation of Article IX, Section 1 of the Florida 
Constitution, which at the time read as follows:  “Adequate provision shall be made by law for a 
                                                 
193 id. at 961. 
194 Pennsylvania Association of Rural and Small Schools v. Ridge, 737 A.2d 246 (1999).  In the petitioner’s brief, 
the attorneys for the Pennsylvania Association of Rural and Small Schools had presented an argument regarding the 
“framers’ intent” that was quite similar to the reasoning presented by courts that had held for plaintiffs in these 
cases:  “Public education in Pennsylvania has roots in several traditions. First, there is the commitment of William 
Penn and the early frames of government to public education and, in particular, the provision of free education for 
children whose parents were unable to pay for their schooling. In addition, there was the tradition of public 
education brought to the Commonwealth by German immigrants. Early in the Nineteenth Century, the ‘common 
school’ movement developed in Pennsylvania, as elsewhere. This movement was committed to the provision of free 
elementary schooling for every child, with increasing state control and state financial support for local schools. 
These developments culminated in the adoption of the Education Clause of the 1874 Constitution, which provided: 
‘The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public 
schools, wherein all the children of this Commonwealth above the age of six years may be educated, and shall 
appropriate at least one million dollars each year for that purpose.’ The drafters of the 1874 Constitution specifically 
intended that poor and wealthy districts alike should have a substantially equal ability to provide quality education to 
their students.  Petitioner’s Brief at 3.   
195 Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400, 401 (1996). 
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uniform system of free public schools and for the establishment, maintenance and operation of 
institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people 
may require.”196  The court concluded that the word “adequacy” could not be properly defined 
either by historical analysis—of which it engaged in very little, relative to other opinions of this 
sort—much less by the current members of the court, who were not well-positioned to constantly 
reevaluate legislative decisions regarding school funding.197 
 In response to this decision, Florida legislators began a reexamination of the education 
article in the state’s constitution.198  The process of deciding upon new language was a 
contentious one, with some interested parties wanting Florida to return to the wording of its 1868 
constitution (“Education is the paramount duty of the state…”) and others seeking to add specific 
individual rights to the wording.199  The language finally presented to the voters in November 
1998 seemed to indicate that it would be, using the framework established and followed by many 
legal scholars, a “strong” education clause.  Certainly it would not be a merely “hortatory” one:   
                                                 
196 Florida Constitution, Article IX, Section 1 (superseded). id. at 406.  The addition of this language to the Florida 
Constitution, which itself superseded a provision which stated that it was the “paramount duty” of the state to 
educate all of its children, is discussed in the section on Reconstruction-era constitutional framing in the previous 
chapter.   
197 id. at 407. 
198 Daniel Gordon, “Failing the State Constitutional Education Grade:  Constitutional Revision Weakening Children 
and Human Rights,” 29 Stetson Law Review 271, 284-286 (1999).  Although the language of the state’s new 
education article had been hailed by reformers such as Michael Rebell and even recently discussed at a recent panel 
on new model language for the Pennsylvania constitution, Gordon correctly (and presciently, given the date that this 
article was published) assessed its effectiveness:  “For educational reformers in Florida in the 1990s, no state 
constitutional route seemed to work. Litigation strengthened the power of the Legislature that was often the target of 
complaints in litigation. Constitutional revision through the ballot initiative process faltered because the initiative 
proposal impacted the Legislature too broadly. In addition, the creation of a strong fundamental right to a public 
education and an explicit, strong definition of an adequate provision for public education was weakened by the 
Florida Constitution Revision Commission.  Overall, the state constitutional basis for the provision of a public 
education was lessened. The Florida Constitution Revision Commission missed the opportunity to release the 
Florida courts from the power limitation that the courts imposed on themselves in Coalition for Adequacy. The 
commission also missed the opportunity to free education reformers and Florida's school children from the 
restrictiveness of the Florida constitutional initiative revision process. Finally, the Florida Constitution Revision 
Commission missed the opportunity to empower the Florida Constitution as a source of human rights protection for 
individuals by barring them from utilizing the most effective means of protecting human rights, bringing claims 
based on individual injuries,” at 302.  
199 id. at 286, 301-302. 
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The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It 
is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education 
of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a 
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows 
students to obtain a high quality education.200 
 
This ballot measure, unlike the one that took place several years later in Alabama, passed with 
relative ease.201 It was not opposed in any substantive way by an organized anti-tax coalition, for 
reasons that would become clear as the clause came to be interpreted by the state’s courts.  First, 
in Bush v. Holmes (2006), a decision on the issue of school vouchers, the court offered an 
explanation of how this new clause differed from the previous one.  The court stated that the new 
clause had the effect of making education a “fundamental value” of the state, then cited the 
commentary of the Constitutional Revision Committee in further clarifying what this meant:  
“Early proposals presented before the Constitution Revision Commission framed education in 
terms of being a ‘fundamental right.’ In response to concerns of commissioners that the state 
might become liable for every individual's dissatisfaction with the education system, the term 
‘fundamental value’ was substituted.”202  It has had little effect on school finance litigation, 
much as its framers at the time had assured voters that it would not.  In several cases during the 
late 2000s, plaintiffs advancing every manner of school finance argument (including a new 
“inadequacy of outputs” argument) have been unable to reach the Supreme Court of Florida for a 
hearing on the merits of their cases.  The only notable decision, a ruling at the Circuit Court level 
in the case of Schroeder et al. v. Palm Beach Co. School Bd. et al. (2009), merely reaffirmed the 
holding in Coalition for Adequacy.  This so-called “model” revision, then, has seemed to capture 
                                                 
200 id. 
201 id at 300.  The Alabama reform measure was defeated largely because interested voters had no assurances that it 
would not result in successful education finance litigation. 
202 Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392 (Florida 2006). See also Gordon’s concerns, 298-302. 
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American attitudes toward education in microcosm:  it appears to say a great deal, has cost very 
little, and has, thus far, had no practical ramifications whatsoever. 
3.3.3 Variation on a Theme:  Sheff v. O’Neill 
What arrests one’s attention in the wake of the Rodriguez and Milliken decisions is how little 
effort was made to fashion arguments that explicitly linked race and class.203  Decisions such as 
Sweatt and Brown, and the arguments advanced by plaintiffs to win them, appeared to offer a 
framework for doing so.  But, as Derrick Bell has explained, these decisions were the product of 
a “convergence of interest” among involved parties—an uneasy Cold War consensus that, 
arguably, no longer obtained in the United States after the late 1960s.204  Thus, the school 
finance litigation of the past three decades—whether rooted in claims of “equity,” “adequacy,” 
or an argument for affording “strict scrutiny” to matters impinging on the “fundamental right” to 
education—has, if not necessarily tiptoed around issues of race and class, at least been framed in 
a way to suggest that the latter category is, for purposes of constitutional adjudication, 
independent of the former.  This was, of course, not always entirely the case; e.g., the plaintiffs 
in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York advanced a Title VI claim as well as a claim 
under the state constitution, and Marrero was litigated on “equity” grounds by the Pennsylvania 
chapter of the NAACP.  Yet it is fascinating to note how far the arguments of John Coons and 
William Clune have taken the struggle over school funding from its early 20th century origins; 
after all, as polemicists such as Jonathan Kozol have argued in impassioned prose, it is still the 
                                                 
203 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (holding that 
students cannot be assigned to public schools solely for the purpose of achieving racial integration), which is 
discussed in the final chapter, further served to weaken this nexus. 
204 Derrick A. Bell, Jr. “Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma.”  93 Harvard Law 
Review 518, 525-526 (1980). 
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case that a strong and obviously invidious relationship between race and education spending 
exists in many school districts throughout the country.   
 That is why I end this chapter with an examination of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sheff v. O’Neill (1996).205  In Sheff , eighteen plaintiffs, represented by a coalition of 
New York attorneys, had filed suit against the state of Connecticut alleging a denial of their 
fundamental right to education under the state’s constitution.  The argument they made was two-
pronged: first, that they were denied their right to an equal educational opportunity because their 
schools, located in inner-city Hartford, were severely under-funded and under-staffed; and 
second, that this “socioeconomic deprivation” were directly connected with the “racial and 
ethnic segregation” imposed on them by a 1909 Connecticut statute that, while not mandating de 
jure segregation, had established school district boundaries that resulted in the permanent and 
near-complete separation of one set of ethnic and racial groups from another.206 
                                                 
205 Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Connecticut 1 (1996). 
206 id. at 10.  The majority opinion devotes a considerable amount of time establishing the link between racial 
segregation and socioeconomic deprivation:  “The stipulation of the parties and the trial court's findings establish the 
following relevant facts. Statewide, in the 1991-92 school year, children from minority groups constituted 25.7 
percent of the public school population. In the Hartford public school system in that same period, 92.4 percent of the 
students were members of minority groups, including predominantly students who were either African-American or 
Latino. Fourteen of Hartford's twenty-five elementary schools had a white student enrollment of less than 2 percent. 
The Hartford public school system currently enrolls the highest percentage of minority students in the state. In the 
future, if current conditions continue, the percentage of minority students in the Hartford public school system is 
likely to increase rather than decrease. Since 1980, the percentage of African-Americans in the Hartford student 
population has decreased, while the percentage of Latinos has increased. Although enrollment of African-American 
students in the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns has increased by more than 60 percent from 1980 to 1992, 
only seven of these school districts had a minority student enrollment in excess of 10 percent in 1992. Because of 
the negative consequences of racial and ethnic isolation, a more integrated public school system would likely be 
beneficial to all schoolchildren. A majority of the children who constitute the public school population in Hartford 
come from homes that are economically disadvantaged, that are headed by a single parent and in which a language 
other than English is spoken. The percentage of Hartford schoolchildren at the elementary level who return to the 
same school that they attended the previous year is the lowest such percentage in the state. Such socioeconomic 
factors impair a child's orientation toward and skill in learning and adversely affect a child's performance on 
standardized tests. The gap in the socioeconomic status between Hartford schoolchildren and schoolchildren from 
the surrounding twenty-one suburban towns has been increasing. The performance of Hartford schoolchildren on 
standardized tests falls significantly below that of schoolchildren from the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns.” 
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 This argument had not succeeded at the trial court level—in fact, the plaintiffs’ defeat 
had “Governor John Rowland literally popp[ing] champagne bottles at a press conference to 
celebrate the state’s victory”—but the Connecticut Supreme Court, in a 4-3 vote, decided in their 
favor.207  The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Ellen Ash Peters, acknowledged the trial 
court’s finding that “poverty, and not race or ethnicity, is the principal causal factor in the lower 
educational achievement of Hartford students.”208  However, Peters explained that, owing to the 
court’s earlier decision in Horton v. Meskill, this was a very different circumstance since “the 
affirmative constitutional obligation of the state to provide a substantially equal educational 
opportunity, which is embodied in article eighth, § 1 differs in kind from most constitutional 
obligations…[because] organic documents only rarely contain provisions that explicitly require 
the state to act rather than to refrain from acting.”209  Moreover, she continued, “the scope of the 
state's constitutional obligation to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity is 
informed and amplified by the highly unusual provision in article first, § 20, that prohibits 
segregation not only indirectly, by forbidding discrimination, but directly, by the use of the term 
‘segregation,’ providing … ‘no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be 
subjected to segregation or discrimination ... because of ... race [or] ... ancestry.’”210  Here, then, 
was an innovative jurisprudential moment:  Chief Justice Peters had chosen to read together two 
separate provisions in the Connecticut Constitution, with the clause providing for equal 
educational opportunity thereby enhanced by the explicit anti-segregation mandate found later in 
the document.   
                                                 
207 Reed, On Equal Terms, p. 169. 
208 Sheff at 11.   
209 id. at 26. 
210 id. at 27 
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 She buttressed this conclusion with her own particular reading of the circumstances under 
which these provisions were added to the constitution, stating that “the history of [these articles] 
supports our conclusion that these constitutional provisions include protection from de facto 
segregation, at least in public schools....not only because of the contemporaneous addition, in 
1965, of these two provisions to our constitution, but also the strong commitment to ending 
discrimination and segregation that is evident in the remarks of the delegates to the 1965 
constitutional convention.”211  But this history, standing alone, was not the only appropriate 
grounds for decision, since “sound principles of public policy also support our conclusion that 
the legislature's affirmative constitutional responsibility for the education of all public 
schoolchildren encompasses responsibility for segregation to which the legislature has 
contributed, even unintentionally.”212  
 This was an extraordinary statement, and Peters attempted to limit the impact of her 
remarks by noting that a suitable remedy to the de facto segregation in the urban Hartford 
districts would have to come from the General Assembly.  In fact, her concluding words indicate 
the recognition—found to varying degrees in all of these opinions, from Brown to DeRolph in 
the succeeding chapter—of the court’s ability to effect immediate change:  “Although further 
judicial intervention should be stayed…we do not wish to be misunderstood about the urgency of 
finding an appropriate remedy for the plight of Hartford's public schoolchildren….[and] we are 
confident that with energy and good will, appropriate remedies can be found and implemented in 
time to make a difference before another generation of children suffers the consequences of a 
segregated public school education.”213 
                                                 
211 id. at 30. 
212 id. at 36. 
213 id. at 46.   
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 The dissent by Justice David Borden excoriated the majority opinion for its overbreadth:  
“The majority cannot mean that these terms do not require such an intent irrespective of the legal 
context…[because] that would necessarily mean that, with respect to the exercise of all civil and 
political rights, the state would be required to take affirmative steps to assure that these rights are 
not exercised by racially or ethnically concentrated groups, regardless of any state intent to 
segregate.”214  Indeed, the holding presented by Peters in her colleagues in Sheff would prove 
impossible to enforce.  The eighteen named plaintiffs in Sheff returned to court in 1998 to press 
for further reforms; in 1999, they abandoned the case, dissuaded by new appointments made by 
Governor Rowland to the Connecticut Supreme Court and determined to pursue their agenda 
through vigorous lobbying of the General Assembly.215  Regardless of what Sheff had meant—
and it is still “good law” in Connecticut, in the sense that it has not been overturned—there is no 
mechanism for enforcing it.  It was, as Justice Borden wryly noted, “a very nice thought.”216  
3.4 CONCLUSION 
What, then, is to be made of this “bramble bush” of case law?  There are, of course, some 
practical results to be addressed, such as increases in school funding and, in certain cases, 
improvements in student test performance; I will return to those in the final chapter.  It is also 
worth pointing out that these cases constitute part of a “dialogue” with other branches of 
government—the contours of which I hope become more apparent in the next chapter, a case 
study of Ohio’s short, tumultuous experience with school finance litigation. But I want to end 
                                                 
214 id. at 99. 
215 Natasha Gural, “Lawyers, Plaintiffs in Landmark Case Will Not Appeal” in Associated Press (03-23-1999) 
216 id. at 101. 
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this chapter with a brief comment about two aspects of judicial decision-making:  1) what courts 
are able to decide; and 2) how they are able to operationalize these decisions. 
In this instance, state supreme courts have stepped into the breach, and a rather sizeable 
breach at that, left abandoned when the federal courts had ceased attempting to engineer a 
remedy to the great school funding inequities of the early 20th century.  These inequities were, at 
base, fostered by the conjunction of racial segregation and socioeconomic deprivation.  When 
deciding the school finance lawsuits put before them, state supreme court justices have all been 
free to do what they liked in seeking to remedy these deprivations.  They were able to fashion 
new protections for individual rights, so long as those protections were based on their state 
constitutions.  And, in justifying such new protections, they could reason however they pleased: 
they could create a “useable past,” interpreting the 19th-century case law and remarks of 
delegates at 19th-century constitutional conventions to suit what they viewed as the changing 
needs of the present.  Alternatively, they could claim that “policy reasons” impelled the decision  
they had reached.  Or, if desirous of leaving the settled law undisturbed, they could simply re-
present the older viewpoint, viz., that school funding matters were left to the discretion of the 
legislature.  In every case, however, the deciding was easy.  As the next chapter on school reform 
in Ohio illustrates, the enforcement of those decisions was another matter altogether. 
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4.0  DEROLPH V. OHIO:  A CASE STUDY IN SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
 
Somewhere between the ostensible courtroom “successes” achieved by the education reform 
movement in West Virginia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, and Vermont and the 
“failures” in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Florida that were discussed in the preceding chapter lies 
the extremely complicated yet extremely representative case of school finance litigation in Ohio.  
What transpired in Ohio from 1991 to 2002—the constant re-litigation of unsettled points of law, 
the ceaseless “dialogue” among the three branches of state government, and the slow and 
contested but nonetheless significant increase in state funding for education—underscores all of 
the problems and tensions inherent in subnational constitutional adjudication of this sort.  It is for 
this reason that I have chosen to explore in intimate detail the ramifications of the struggle for 
“adequate” school funding in the state dubbed by many political pundits as America’s most 
“representative” state.1 
In 1991, a coalition of Ohio school districts and other interested individuals began 
litigation in the Perry County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a determination that Ohio’s 
method of funding its schools violated the education clause in that state’s constitution; the series 
                                                 
1 Its status as a “bellwether” of the national mood is discussed most recently in Adam Del Deo and James Stern’s 
documentary …So Goes the Nation (2006)—the title of which is a play on the older phrase “as Maine goes, so goes 
the nation.” 
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of four rulings known collectively as DeRolph v. Ohio was its manifestation.2  On a practical 
level, the sum of these rulings constituted a “defeat” for advocates of school funding reform, 
since the court—unwilling to prolong indefinitely its review of every subsequent funding 
package developed by the state legislature—eventually relinquished its jurisdiction of the matter.  
On a rhetorical level, however, the court’s first opinion represented a massive triumph, a judicial 
excoriation of an inadequate school finance system that failed many of its students.  Because of 
this disconnect between language and effect, DeRolph presents an intriguing opportunity for a 
legal historian who wishes to untangle the skein of human history that appears in the margins or 
between the lines of policy journal articles, newspaper editorials, and law review notes.   
Like most collective or “class action” litigation aimed at constitutional reform, DeRolph 
v. Ohio has a byzantine procedural background.  Here, then, is a “Cliffs Notes” summary 
intended to familiarize the reader with the rudiments of DeRolph: The case arose out of a suit 
filed by the Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of School Funding (“OCEASF”) in 1991 in 
against the State of Ohio for its failure to provide adequate funding to educate the state’s 
students.  In 1996, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio’s reliance upon local property taxes to 
fund schools violated Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.  Following that decision, 
the Ohio Supreme Court reheard the case three times.3  The Ohio General Assembly attempted to 
redress this violation by directing more state funds to school districts rather than undertaking an 
overhaul of its method of school funding.  Both in 2000 and 2001, the court held that these 
changes did not satisfy its order to the General Assembly to enact a constitutional school-funding 
                                                 
2 DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997);  678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997); 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000); 780 
N.E.2d (Ohio 2002). 
3 The pertinent passage of the Ohio Constitution, art. VI, § 2, reads as follows:  “The General Assembly shall make 
such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state” (emphasis mine). 
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system.  Following another rehearing in 2002, the court again held that the system was 
unconstitutional but terminated its jurisdiction over the case.  As of 2008, Ohio’s method of 
funding its schools remains “unconstitutional” in the strictest sense, although the state—like 
other states where plaintiffs prevailed in such litigation—is now allocating billions of additional 
dollars to its public schools.4   
I have organized this chapter on DeRolph into three sections.  The first section provides a 
brief examination of the origins of the education clause in Ohio’s state constitution and the cases 
interpreting that clause that preceded DeRolph.  I use the second section to examine the DeRolph 
v. Ohio rulings and evaluate the Ohio General Assembly’s myriad responses.  To contextualize 
these rulings, I discuss the reactions of the governor, legislators, major newspapers, and the 
justices themselves.  Throughout this section, I utilize the findings of journal articles and other 
secondary sources that address the efficacy of reforms in Ohio and elsewhere. 
In the final section, I place DeRolph in a broader schema of activist state judicial policy.  
I discuss how the failure of the initial DeRolph decision to effect change amounted might have 
amounted to a defeat for teachers’ unions, children enrolled in underfunded public schools, and 
followers of the Brennan approach to state constitutionalism—but a defeat that I characterize 
differently from education activists such as Jonathan Kozol.5  I conclude by arguing that 
DeRolph serves as a case study in the limitations of subnational adjudication:  although state 
constitutional challenges remain a useful mechanism for spurring recalcitrant legislatures into 
action, they cannot function as a substitute for substantive systemic reform of American public 
education.  The DeRolph court eventually came to understand the limitations of its mandate; no 
                                                 
4 As noted in Douglas Reed, On Equal Terms (Princeton University Press), pp. 16-35: “A meaningful relationship 
exists between judicial intervention and changes in the revenues available to school districts.” 
5 e.g., Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities (HarperPerennial, 1991). 
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amount of judicial oversight, however beneficent the judges’ intentions, can hasten a haphazard 
process of education reform that has continued for 200 years despite its mixed results and lack of 
finite, quantifiable objectives.  
4.1 CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMING AND THE ROAD TO DEROLPH 
Ohio, like other states of the early American West, had benefited from reservations of federal 
lands for the maintenance of public schools—1/36th of every township in the Territory, as 
mandated by the Land Ordinance of May 1785—as well as the lofty exhortation, contained in the 
Northwest Territory Ordinance, that “schools and means of education shall forever be 
encouraged.”6  Ohioans included a specific reference to education in their first Bill of Rights, 
observing that “…knowledge, being essential to good government and the happiness of mankind, 
shall forever be encouraged by legislative provision, not inconsistent with the rights of 
conscience.”7  At the second Ohio Constitutional Convention, and following on the heels of Ohio 
educator Calvin Stowe’s transnationally-themed “Report on Elementary Public Instruction in 
Europe,” delegates voted to include a new education clause that spelled out in clear language the 
state’s obligation to its public schools.8  Article VI, Section 2 of the new Ohio Constitution 
contained the first reference to a state’s affirmative duty to maintain a “thorough and efficient ” 
                                                 
6 Northwest Territory Ordinance art. III, § 14 (1787); 1 Stat. 51. 
7 Ohio Constitution of 1802, art. VIII, § 3 (1802). 
8 Calvin Stowe, “Report on Elementary Public Instruction in Europe,” was presented to the Governor of Ohio in 
1837 and later reprinted by the legislatures of Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.  
Stowe was particularly taken by the skillful quality of Prussian pedagogues and the strict pupil discipline enforced in 
the centralized Prussian school system.  He also came to believe that “the Bible cannot be introduced into common 
schools” for fear of fostering a “sectarian bias.” 
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system of schools, language that would soon be adopted by twenty-two other states.9 Although 
the framers of the second Ohio Constitutional Convention did not provide precise definitions for 
terms like “common school” and “thorough and efficient,” one of the justices who decided 
DeRolph—upon surveying the work of Calvin Stowe, Stowe’s contemporary and Ohio’s first 
Superintendent of Common Schools Samuel Lewis, and the statements of various delegates to 
the convention—remarked that this standard was meant to be one of “excellence rather than 
mediocrity; and the education of the public was intended to be a fundamental function of the 
state.”10 
Two subsequent constitutional conventions, in 1874 and 1912, only served to further 
enhance the centralized control of Ohio’s public schools.  At the former convention, a handful of 
delegates attempted to strike language blocking the diversion of school funds to religious 
schools—non-sectarianism having been at the core of both Calvin Stowe’s education report and 
many of the 1851 delegates’ approach to education—in response to a handful of judicial setbacks 
including Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Minor (1872), an Ohio Supreme Court decision 
that held that the Ohio Constitution does not require that the Bible be used in schools despite that 
document’s vague reference to “religion…[being] essential to government.”11 Catholics who 
were seeking to win their private schools a share of public education funds, taxpayers interested 
in restricting the size of the school system and the expansion of the “fancy branches” of its 
curriculum, and religious Protestants seeking to mandate the use of the Bible in daily classroom 
instruction were all sorely frustrated by the outcome of the convention.  Its sole result was the 
                                                 
9 See William E. Thro,  “The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation,” 79 
Education Law Reporter 19, pp. 23-24.  According to Thro, frequent borrowing of such constitutional language by 
the framers of subnational constitutions has problematized the process of constitutional interpretation at that level. 
10 DeRolph, 677 N.E. 2d at 772.   
11 Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 Ohio 211 (1872); Ohio Constitution, art. I, § 7. 
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state’s need for a system of education owing to the fact that, in the words of one delegate, “the 
people must learn to think.”12 
The 1912 convention, faced with the challenge of an increasingly localized, marginalized, 
and difficult-to-operate system of public schools, aimed to “centraliz[e] the schools in Ohio” in 
order to alleviate the burden on small townships and sub-districts lacked the financial 
wherewithal to operate their schools on even a part-time basis.13  Enormous funding 
discrepancies in the public schools had inspired delegates to revisit the movement for 
standardization and centralization inaugurated by Calvin Stowe’s 1837 report.  The result—and 
about this there had been little dispute among the delegates—was the adoption of the following 
language in Article VI, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution:  “Provision shall be made by law for 
the organization, administration, and control of the public school system of the state supported 
by public funds.”  According to the report of the convention, such language was necessary “so 
that there can be no question about the control of the school systems as well as the handling of 
the school funds” and also to “establish definitely that the state shall for all time, until the 
constitution is further amended, have complete control over the educational system and that no 
city…or part of the state can withdraw itself…from the public educational system of the state.”14 
It would be a very long time, however, before the Ohio Supreme Court would have the 
opportunity to render an authoritative statement about what all of this constitutional language 
actually meant for students in Ohio’s public schools.  Was it merely hortatory language that 
enabled the state legislature to fund the public schools as it pleased, and thus a non-justiciable 
                                                 
12 2 Ohio Debates of 1874, at 2186 (a majority of the members of the committee had sought, and failed, to restrict 
the teaching of “fancy branches” of knowledge such as trigonometry, geology, and philosophy) and at 2217-2218 
(remarks of Delegate Peas). 
13 Thomas Harvey, then-Commissioner of Common Schools for Ohio, quoted in Jim B. Pearson & Edgar Fuller, 
editors, Education in the States:  Historical Development and Outlook (National Education Association, 1969), at p. 
957. 
14 2 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the Ohio Constitution (1913), at 1499 and 1504.   
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issue in all instances save where the legislature was providing no funding at all?  Or did it imply 
some duty to the students, perhaps even guaranteeing those students’ fundamental right to an 
education? In 1981, the seven justices of the Ohio Supreme Court decided the first case that 
raised these issues. Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Walter had originated the Hamilton 
County Court of Common Pleas three years after the Supreme Court of the United States’ ruling 
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.15  The plaintiffs in Walter challenged 
Ohio’s method of funding its schools on various grounds—all of which were predicated on the 
more general claim that the “foundation program” in place at the time in the state, which 
guaranteed a certain minimum level of funding to each school district, provided insufficient aid 
to impoverished districts whose straitened conditions were described in Dickensian terms first in 
the plaintiffs’ briefs and later even by the justices who decided DeRolph v. Ohio—and won at the 
trial court and Ohio Court of Appeals levels.16 Those lower courts read Ohio’s constitution, 
unlike its federal counterpart, as containing language that did create a fundamental right to 
education for Ohio residents. 
Ohio’s Supreme Court, a body whose members are selected in supposedly “nonpartisan” 
elections but who are in fact nominated for election by the two major political parties, consisted 
at that time of four Democrats (Chief Justice Frank Celebrezze, a staunch Roman Catholic who 
eventually fell from power due to his questionable relationships with various organized crime 
figures; and Justices A. William Sweeney, William B. Brown, and Ralph Locher) and three 
Republicans (Justices Robert Holmes, Thomas Herbert, and Paul W. Brown) when it decided 
                                                 
15 Board of Education v. Walter, 390 NE 2d 813, 817 (Ohio 1981). 
16 State aid to school districts takes one of three forms: flat grants, foundation programs, and percentage equalizing. 
Although a number of states previously relied on flat grants and equal distribution of funds to each district, today no 
state relies exclusively on such a system. See Mark G. Yudof et al., Education Policy and the Law,  p. 593 (West, 
1992). 
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Walter.  Although partisan squabbles have not been not uncommon among elected judges, the 
Ohio justices voted six-to-one to overturn the decision of the lower court.  William B. Brown 
wrote the majority opinion, with which five other justices concurred, and Ralph Locher wrote the 
dissent. 
Brown’s opinion relied on many of the same federal Supreme Court precedents utilized 
in other school funding decisions of the 1980s.  He quoted Chief Justice Warren Burger on the 
importance of local control of the public schools:  “Local control is not only vital to continued 
public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an education standpoint as 
well…[because] the success of any school system depends on a vast range of factors that lie 
beyond the competence and power of the courts.”17  Brown also saw the wisdom in Justice 
Lewis Powell’s position on acceptable levels of inequality:  “While it is no doubt true that 
reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with 
respect to expenditures for some districts than for others, the existence of ‘some inequality’ in 
the manner in which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient basis for striking 
down the entire system.”18   
Despite its apparent foreclosure of one avenue of opportunity for funding reformers, 
Walter also contained some language that prefigured the first DeRolph v. Ohio ruling.  First, 
Brown explained that challenges to Ohio’s school funding system were not nonjusticiable 
political questions.19  He then cited the discussion of the Ohio Constitution’s education clause in 
                                                 
17 id. at 821, quoting Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia 407 U.S. 451 (1972) at 478. 
18 id. at 822, quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50, 51. 
19 id. at 823.  The defendant school board’s use of certain language from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the reapportionment of state legislative districts is not a political question, 
was unpersuasive on this point.  
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a prior decision, Miller v. Korns (1923).20  The majority in Miller had upheld the statute in 
question—which concerned the legality of using property tax revenues raised in one district to 
help fund public schools in another, a point which had seemingly been resolved by the revisions 
made to the constitution in 1912 that established explicit state control of education funding—and 
included the following observation about Article VI, Section 2:  “A thorough system could not 
mean one in which part or any number of the school districts of the state were starved for funds. 
An efficient system could not mean one in which part of any number of the school districts of the 
state lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment.”21  Based on his reading of this passage in Miller, 
Brown concluded that a school system could not be thorough or efficient if any school district in 
Ohio “was receiving so little local and state revenue that the students were effectively being 
deprived of educational opportunity.”22 
Ralph Locher, who voted to sustain the lower court’s decision, authored a cogent dissent.  
Basing his analysis on an alternative interpretation of Rodriguez, Locher read Article VI, Section 
2 as creating an explicit fundamental right to education:  “Applying the ‘Rodriguez test’ [for 
determining whether rights are explicitly found in constitutions]…it follows that, in Ohio, 
educational opportunity is a fundamental interest entitled to strict scrutiny under Ohio's Equal 
Protection Clause.”23 Waxing poetic, he buttressed his conclusion with the claim that “the 
fundamental right to equal educational opportunity is the American Dream as incarnate as 
constitutional law.”24  Relying on 400 pages of findings of fact about the wretched state of 
Ohio’s schools adopted by the lower court, Locher concluded that “there is a clear connection 
                                                 
20 Miller v. Korns,107 Ohio 287, 140 N.E. 773 (1923). 
21 id. at 825.   
22 id. 
23 id. at 827.   
24 id. 
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between the meager financial resources and the general malaise of many schools, particularly 
those located in urban areas of the state.”25 
4.2 DEROLPH V. OHIO AND THE OPENING OF A “DIALOGUE” 
Sixteen years after the Walter decision, these problems had become more acute.  The state school 
system in which named plaintiff Nathan DeRolph was enrolled still had too many underfunded 
schools—perhaps even more than before, in terms of relative dollar-per-pupil figures—that could 
not provide basic services to their students.26  By the time DeRolph v. Ohio reached the Ohio 
Supreme Court, “crumbling plaster, leaky roofs, outdoor plumbing and coal bins-turned-
classrooms…earned Ohio the dubious distinction of having the worst school buildings in the 
country.”27  In 1990, the year before the litigation commenced, Ohio “ranked forty-eighth out of 
the fifty states in the extent of disparity of revenue and expenditure per pupil.”28  According to a 
study done by Kern Alexander, a school finance expert and professor at Virginia Tech 
University, Ohio lagged far behind states of similar size and wealth in a number of significant 
categories, ranging from standardized test scores to computers-per-school.29 
The DeRolph plaintiffs were backed by the Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of 
School Funding, an association of education reformers representing school districts throughout 
the state.  Five school districts—ranging from Youngstown in the northwest to tiny, isolated 
                                                 
25 id. 
26 Suzanne E. Drummond, “Déjà Vu:  The Status of School Funding in Ohio after DeRolph II,” 68 University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 435 (2000), at p. 441.   
27 Jim Siegel and Catherine Candisky, “School Funding:  Has Ohio Fixed It?” in Columbus Dispatch (03-25-2007). 
28 DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E.2d 733, 759 (Ohio 1997). 
29 Alexander’s report is available, in part, at the website of the Coalition of Rural and Appalachian Schools, which 
partially funded his research:  http://www.coras.org/early%20history.htm.   
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Lima on the state’s eastern border—served as named plaintiffs, along with a host of individuals 
including Nathan DeRolph.  Represented by the Columbus law firm of Bricker & Eckler, the 
plaintiffs pursued a strategy built around arguing for the “inadequacy” of the extant system rather 
than its inability to create “equal” or “equitable” educational opportunities. As Michael Paris and 
others have noted, this approach—bringing together urban school districts with rural ones, 
heavily African-American districts with heavily Caucasian ones, and pursuing claims that seek 
only to raise the “foundation” of state funding rather than redistributing the considerable wealth 
of more prosperous districts—has generally proven a more successful litigation strategy, and, as 
noted in the preceding chapter, is characteristic of the so-called “third wave” of education 
finance litigation that began with the Kentucky decision in 1989.30   
Seven new justices sat on the court that heard DeRolph; none remained from the 
contingent that had decided Walter.  Unlike that court, which had a Democratic majority, the 
DeRolph court contained five Republicans (Chief Justice Thomas Moyer and Justices Paul 
Pfeiffer, Deborah Cook, Andrew Douglas, and Evelyn Lundberg Stratton) and two Democrats 
(Justices Francis Sweeney and Alice Robie Resnick).  Resnick and Sweeney favored upholding 
the Ohio Court of Appeals decision, which—faced with the imposing task of evaluating a 
massive trial court record, including the court’s findings of fact, that ran to over 5,000 pages—
had held Ohio’s method of funding its schools to be unconstitutional.31  Douglas and Pfeiffer, 
who frequently voted with those two Democrats, supported them.32    Cook, a conservative jurist 
who was later considered as a potential nominee to the Supreme Court by the Bush 
                                                 
30 Michael Paris, Framing Equal Opportunity:  Law and the Politics of School Finance Reform (Stanford Law 
Books, 2010).  See also Yohance C. Edwards and Jennifer Ahern. 2004. “Unequal Treatment in State Supreme 
Courts:  Minority and City Schools in Education Finance Reform Litigation,”  79 New York University Law Review 
326 (2004), which uses bivariate analysis of a closed data set to demonstrate that this claim—at least in their 
opinion—is empirically verifiable. 
31 Joe Hallet, “What Went on in the Supreme Court” in Columbus Dispatch (03-18-2007).  
32 id. 
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administration and the McCain campaign team, took the position that school funding decisions 
were the province of the legislature and maintained this position throughout all four DeRolph 
rulings.  Although Moyer and Stratton initially appeared to favor the majority position, both 
eventually voted with Cook.33 
Because of this, the majority could not use a six-to-one result to send a powerful call to 
action to the legislature and then-Governor George Voinovich.  Nonetheless, Francis Sweeney’s 
majority opinion offers a stinging rebuke of Ohio education policy as well as a neat clarification 
of several points of law:  “ By our decision today, we send a clear message to lawmakers: the 
time has come to fix the system. Let there be no misunderstanding. Ohio's public school 
financing scheme must undergo a complete systematic overhaul.”34 
DeRolph featured a lengthy recounting of the egregious privations visited upon 
underfunded school districts.  One school district operated with a barely-functioning high school 
science lab.  Another district rationed the supplies given to its teachers, offering them a limited 
quantity of art supplies, chalk, and toilet paper while refusing to put their paychecks in envelopes 
to save paper.35  Various schools in the plaintiff districts were found to lack functional heating 
and air conditioning systems, to contain unsafe amounts of asbestos in their insulation, and to 
have gymnasia and other fitness facilities where the floors were so uneven that running and other 
physical activities were almost impossible.36  According to the 1990 Ohio Public School Survey, 
which had been commissioned by the General Assembly, less than half of Ohio’s schools had 
                                                 
33 id. 
34 DeRolph v. Ohio 677 NE 2d 733, 747 (1997). 
35 id. at 762. 
36 id. at 764-765.  For example, “When Chris Thompson was at Shawnee [School], the gymnasium had a leaking 
roof, and at one time part of the gym was flooded due to leakage.  When a ball hit the ceiling while students were 
playing kickball or volleyball, part of the ceiling came down.  The locker rooms below the stage area and adjacent to 
the gym had almost no water pressure, stunk, and were unfit for student use.  Students changed clothes in two 
storage rooms next to the stage, but had no shower facilities available.”   
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“adequate” electrical systems, 31% had “satisfactory” roofs, and a mere 17% had “safe” heating 
systems.  Repairs to these facilities were estimated to cost over $10.2 billion.37 
After recapitulating these complaints, Sweeney wrote that the language from Miller cited 
in Walter—that of schools “starved for funds”—clearly applied to an Ohio school system in such 
a state of disrepair.  Furthermore, his analysis of the debates over the drafting of Article VI, 
Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution—as well as the West Virginia Supreme Court’s examination 
of those same debates—indicated to him that education was a fundamental right guaranteed to all 
Ohio residents, although this latter belief did not win the support of a majority of his 
colleagues.38  From these two conclusions, he determined that Ohio’s present method of funding 
its schools was unconstitutional.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Pfeiffer reemphasized this 
point, stating that “a system of funding that relies heavily on property taxes while producing such 
disparities and further exacerbates the disparities by providing state funds to wealthy school 
districts cannot be considered thorough and efficient.”39  
Chief Justice Moyer conceded in his dissent that “one cannot disagree with the 
aspirations of the majority to provide a school system that enables children to ‘participate fully in 
society,’ that provides ‘high quality educational opportunities,’ and that ‘allows its citizens to 
fully develop their human potential.’”40  Nevertheless, he disagreed with the majority’s notion 
that “all schools [must] be of the same undefined level of high quality without relying on any 
                                                 
37 id. at 744. 
38 id. at 772.  The West Virginia Supreme Court, in Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859, 867 (West Virginia 1979), 
wrote:  “There was no explicit definition of the words ‘thorough and efficient’ that appeared in the final committee 
report which the 1851 Ohio Convention adopted.  The tenor of the discussion, however, by those advocating the 
entire education section as it was finally adopted, leaves no doubt that excellence was the goal, rather than 
mediocrity; and that education of the public was intended to be a fundamental function of the state government and a 
fundamental right of Ohioans.”  Despite this language and the language used by Sweeney in his opinion, the Ohio 
Supreme Court did not hold that education is a fundamental right for Ohio residents.  Rather, the court held that the 
state needed to operate a thorough and efficient system of public schools and that the current system was neither.  .   
39 id. at 781.   
40 id. at 782. 
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supporting text of the Constitution.”41  In his opinion, one could not equate “imperfect schools” 
with “an unconstitutional system of funding.”42  Echoing several earlier state supreme court 
decisions in other states with similar constitutional provisions, Moyer reiterated the position that 
the “thorough and efficient” language of Article VI, Section 2 was a “question of quality, which 
is a [non-justiciable] political question that the Ohio Constitution leaves to the legislature to 
determine.”43 
The majority opinion, which mandated reform but established no mechanism for 
accomplishing it, sparked an immediate controversy.  George Voinovich, the so-called 
“Education Governor,” accused the justices of “legislating from the bench” at a press conference 
held the day after the decision.44 Possibly influenced by members of Voinovich’s staff, the 
state’s major newspapers also criticized the decision.  The Columbus Dispatch said that DeRolph 
was “one highly injudicious lurch” and published an op-ed piece by a law professor who argued 
that the Ohio Supreme Court should be stripped of its jurisdiction in this case; or, in the 
alternative, that the justices be impeached and the Ohio Constitution amended.45 The Plain 
Dealer described the case as a “blank check” for spendthrift legislators.  The Cincinnati Enquirer 
opined that "education policy for 11 million Ohio residents will be dictated in a rural flyspeck on 
the state map, by a county judge who answers to less than one-thousandth of our population." 
                                                 
41 id. 
42 id. 
43 id.   
44 Joe Hallet, “What Went on in the Supreme Court” in The Columbus Dispatch (03-18-2007).  
45 David N. Mayer, “Ohio’s School Funding Dilemma:  Is the Court on the Right Track?” in The Columbus Dispatch 
(05-14-2000).  According to Larry Obhof’s account of the legislative wrangling that accompanied the DeRolph 
litigation, many conservative members of Republican legislative caucuses began to contemplate legislation that 
would strip the court of its jurisdiction in school funding cases.  See  Obhof, “Ohio’s Long Road to an Adequate 
Education.” 2005 BYU Education and Law Journal 83 (2005). 
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And The Blade of Toledo appended the pejorative label “the Gang of Four” to the four members 
of the majority.46   
Justices Douglas and Pfeiffer were astonished by this harsh reaction.  “We don’t have 
spin doctors…[so] it was like shooting fish in a barrel when they came after us,” Pfeiffer said.47  
Douglas said that he felt as if the justices “were on a lonely island” but he did not doubt for a 
moment “about whether what we did was right.”48  Of course, progressive scholars in the legal 
academy authored short pieces lauding the DeRolph majority—but few of these writers were 
there in Columbus to offer succor to the embattled justices.49  
Following the first DeRolph ruling, Voinovich and the legislature attempted several hasty 
reforms.  Voinovich endorsed a penny-on-the-dollar sales tax increase, designed to raise $1 
billion dollars, that was put before Ohio voters and soundly defeated.  The legislature made 
several changes to its school funding formula and appropriated millions of dollars for facilities 
upgrades.  But this proved insufficient; in 1999, the trial court held that the legislature had not 
complied with the DeRolph ruling.  This holding was appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.50 
In this second installment of DeRolph v. Ohio, several questions left unanswered by the 
first holding reemerged.  The plaintiff districts again asked the Ohio Supreme Court to hold that 
education was a fundamental right, an issue that had been raised but not resolved in the prior 
case.  And although the Ohio General Assembly had passed several pieces of legislation since 
DeRolph I, this legislation had the effect of merely increasing the overall state allocation for 
education rather than redressing the imbalance between state and local spending.   
                                                 
46 Hallet. 
47 id. 
48 id. 
49 e.g., “Ohio Supreme Court declares State’s Public School Financing System Unconstitutional” appeared in 111 
Harvard Law Review 855 (1998) soon after DeRolph came down.  In the note, this decision was described as “a step 
in the right direction.” 
50 id. 
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Justices Cook, Moyer, and Stratton remained in opposition to the original holding.  
Justice Pfeiffer argued with Douglas, Sweeney, and Resnick to support an order, not 
unprecedented in the history of separation of power conflicts in Ohio, that would instruct 
legislators to stop all spending until they resolved the education crisis.51  Those three justices 
refused to follow Pfeiffer’s dramatic suggestion but did form a block that reaffirmed the original 
DeRolph holding. 
Justice Resnick was assigned to write the majority opinion.  She urged legislators to 
correct state-local funding disparities even as she heaped praise upon the General Assembly and 
new Governor Robert Taft for their concerted if imperfect response to the problem.  While 
acknowledging that the new funding packages fell short of its constitutional obligations, Resnick 
underscored “the progress the General Assembly has made in this area” despite a continuing 
“problem of overreliance on local property taxes that must be independently addressed.”52  Her 
opinion remained silent on the issue of whether education was a fundamental right guaranteed to 
Ohio citizens, but it did restate the burden imposed on the General Assembly by Article VI, 
Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. 
In a remarkably self-aware concurrence, Justice Douglas heaped praise on Robert Taft for 
his adroit handling of this matter:  “Central to all of this is the role of Bob Taft…[a] governor 
who [has chosen] to lead.  The attention he and his staff have devoted to the school facilities 
                                                 
51 During the 1985 savings-and-loan collapse, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a similar order, which brought 
government activity to a standstill and forced a swift legislative response.  The legitimacy of such an order is itself 
uncertain; Ohio has no formal ‘separation of powers’ doctrine, a matter that would be addressed in later parts of the 
DeRolph rulings.   Pfeiffer--—a self-described “gentleman farmer” with “a herd of Angus that know him as the guy 
with the hay”—offered the following rationale for his position:  “I knew it would create a bit of a constitutional 
crisis and (legislators) would be enormously angry at us, but I always thought that was the answer to this. Blame the 
court and do what's right, and go home and say, 'Geez, folks, the court made us do it.'’"  Joe Hallet, “What Went on 
in the Supreme Court” in Columbus Dispatch (03-18-2007) and Pfeiffer’s own website 
(http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/SCO/justices/pfeifer/).   
52 DeRolph v. Ohio, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1008 and 1015 (Ohio 2000). 
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problem has been extraordinary.”53  To prove this point, he cited an editorial in the April 13, 
2000 Columbus Dispatch that claimed that Taft had “taken the court’s ruling seriously and 
reoriented state priorities to put education needs at the top of the list.”54 
In contrast to his fulsome treatment of Taft, Douglas criticized former Governor George 
Voinovich as well as the dissenting justices.  After discussing the efforts of Michigan Governor 
John Engler to overhaul Michigan’s education funding system without judicial interference, 
Douglas lambasted the dissenters as “problem maker[s]” who “would continue the status quo by 
saying, ‘Let George do it.’”55  Unfortunately for Ohio residents, “‘George’ hasn’t done it…[and] 
was nowhere to be found until our decision in DeRolph I.”56 
Chief Justice Moyer used his dissent to restate his alternative interpretation of Article VI, 
Section 2 and to present research about the ineffectiveness of increased education expenditures 
as a method of boosting student performance.  Adducing a student law review note that itself 
cited a Plain Dealer analysis of Ohio school outputs and inputs, Moyer argued that “factors 
related to families and economic opportunity—not school districts—most influence how well 
students perform on standardized tests.”57  Although somewhat distressing for advocates of 
funding reform, this claim—articulated forcefully in James Coleman’s 1966 Equality of 
                                                 
53 id. at 1023.   
54 id. 
55 id. at 1026.  Douglas noted in a footnote that “George” is “generic in nature and makes reference to no particular 
individual, alive or dead.”  Despite this disclaimer, the intent of his earlier remarks is obvious.   
56 id. 
57 1034.  Moyer referenced Steven Rodgers, “Centralized Wisdom?  DeRolph v. State and the Rise of Judicial 
Paternalism,” 45 Cleveland State Law Review 753, 765-766 (1997).  The author of this somewhat confusing note 
appears to have misinterpreted the actual holding of the first DeRolph ruling—a forgivable error given the length (70 
pages) and complexity of that decision.   
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Educational Opportunity Study—has been reaffirmed in several longitudinal studies of student 
performance in states that have undertaken significant reforms of their school finance systems.58   
Following DeRolph II, Justice Resnick faced a difficult election challenge from Ohio 
attorney Terrence O’Donnell.  O’Donnell hoped to take advantage of the toxic atmosphere that 
prevailed in the wake of the second DeRolph decision as well as Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers 
v. Sheward, a tort reform case in which Resnick had stated that caps on tort recovery were 
unconstitutional because they violated citizens’ rights of due process.59 O’Donnell raised over 
$1.3 million—to Resnick’s $790,000—and, with the full support of the Ohio Chamber of 
Commerce, commenced an ugly campaign characterized by the inflammatory “attack ads” 
produced by his backers.60  Although most of the advertisements focused on Resnick’s perceived 
deference to the “plaintiff’s bar” of trial lawyers, a few referenced her role in the DeRolph 
litigation.  One such ad depicted students who had been left unattended in the classroom, with 
voiceover narration noting that “Justice Resnick had blocked the legislature’s effort to ensure 
that teachers spend more time in the classroom” before going on to state that “today in Ohio, 
instructors learn and students teach, in spite of Alice Robie Resnick.”61 O’Donnell, for his part, 
disavowed that advertisement and others that the groups supporting him had run on his behalf—
“I want to run a positive campaign and have not spoken negatively about my opponent,” he 
explained—and wound up losing a race that, at least by the standards of judicial elections, was 
                                                 
58 See Helen Ladd’s Making Money Matter and Arthur Wise’s Rich Schools, Poor Schools for an even fuller 
discussion of this subject.   
59 Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E. 2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). 
60 T.C. Brown, “2 Campaigns for Top Court Exceed $6 Million: Spending, Attack Ads Some of the Worst in 
Country,” Plain Dealer (12-27-2000).  Issue-based groups such as the Ohio Chamber of Commerce that had been 
adversely affected by Resnick’s stance on tort reform also opposed her, and wound up spending several million 
dollars in the unsuccessful effort to replace her with O’Donnell. 
61 Spencer Hunt, “Campaign 2000: Anti-Resnick Ad Pulled, Replaced,” Cincinnati Enquirer  (10-25-2000). 
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reasonably close.62  Ohio State Senator Larry Obhof and others have made much of the fact that 
Resnick was challenged, at least in part, based on her role in the DeRolph decision—but voter 
outrage over an education finance decision has never once led to the electoral defeat of any state 
supreme court justice.63 
 Months after Resnick’s election victory, the General Assembly continued to manipulate 
its education funding scheme in order to allocate additional monies to underfunded school 
districts.  In June 2001, the Ohio Supreme Court held hearings on whether these measures 
satisfied Article VI, Section 2.  Because of the tumult precipitated by the previous rulings, Chief 
Justice Moyer was eager to rid the docket of this controversial case.  For the third installment of 
DeRolph, he persuaded Justices Pfeiffer and Douglas—no strangers to swing voting—to leave 
the original majority and sign on to a new holding with him and Justice Stratton.64   
In this new majority opinion, Moyer attempted to satisfy the other three justices while 
giving a final bit of guidance to the legislature.  He discussed the various perspectives adopted 
by his colleagues, noting that Justice Douglas “expressed the belief that the court…should 
declare education to be a fundamental right afforded to each Ohio child pursuant to the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution” while Justice Cook believed “that the court exceeded 
its proper role in addressing the merits of this case.”65  While their positions may have differed 
                                                 
62 id. 
63 Larry Obhof, “Ohio’s Long Road to an Adequate Education.” 2005 BYU Education and Law Journal 83. For 
more about what issues are salient in judicial elections—to date, decisions regarding the death penalty and gay 
marriage, as well as gross personal incompetence and criminal behavior on the part of the justices running for re-
election—refer to Chris W. Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections (Routledge, 2009).  
Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapter—a state’s method of selecting its justices has no bearing on the 
outcome of education finance litigation, and party affiliation (Democrat/Republican) only a slight correlation with 
positive and negative outcomes, respectively.  For more on that subject, see Karen Swenson, “School Finance 
Reform Litigation:  Why Are Some State Supreme Courts Activist and Others Restrained?” 63 Albany Law Review 
1147 (2000). 
64 DeRolph v. Ohio, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001). 
65 id. at 1189.   
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“with respect to whether the legislature or the judiciary has the ultimate authority to determine if 
the goals have been achieved…we all agree upon the fundamental importance of education to the 
children and citizens of this state.”66  Following that declaration, Moyer undertook the sort of 
rigorous quantitative analysis of legislative funding measures that occupied much space in prior 
decisions.  By this point, that discussion—recounted in painstaking detail in a law and economics 
treatise, The DeRolph Case:  Ohio’s struggle for a constitutional finance system, that contained 
the full text of the two previous rulings as well as numerous charts, graphs, and statistical 
models—had reached a level of sophistication that exceeded even the appellate attorneys’ ability 
to articulate it.67   
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Moyer placed his faith in a funding scheme limned in the 
body of his opinion—a modification of the scheme already in place minus portions severed by 
the court.  If the General Assembly followed this scheme—which was later shown to contain a 
woeful underestimation of the amount of money that the state would have to spend—“the plan 
will meet the test for constitutionality created in DeRolph I and DeRolph II.”68  Thus, Moyer 
ordered “the state…to implement the changes described above” but, owing to “the defendants’ 
good faith,” decided that the Ohio Supreme Court would not retain jurisdiction of the case.69 
In order to forestall “the inevitable criticism of each of us individually and all of us 
collectively that is sure to follow,” Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion that contained an 
                                                 
66 id.   
67 Richard Lucier, The DeRolph Case:  Ohio’s struggle for a constitutional finance system (Thomson Custom 
Publishing, 2001).  This book, written by a Denison University economics professors, focuses on the financial 
statistics put forth by both parties to the litigation, and notes that one constant in the DeRolph litigation was that no 
one seemed to have an especially firm grasp on this subject.   
68 DeRolph v. Ohio, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1201 (Ohio 2001).  Moyer estimated that the reforms would cost $300 million 
dollars.  Subsequent estimates placed the cost of these reforms at $1.2 billion dollars. 
69 id. 
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intricate discussion of Ohio’s separation of powers doctrine as it applied to DeRolph.70  After a 
disquisition on the oaths sworn by public officials in all branches of government, Douglas 
posited his understanding of the Ohio Supreme Court’s role in this drama.  “Out of deference to 
the General Assembly,” he wrote, “we have recognized that the scope of our review is limited to 
determining whether the funding method meets the educational mandate of the Ohio 
Constitution.”71 
Justice Sweeney, the writer of the majority opinion in DeRolph I, dissented, “find[ing] it 
incredible that the majority takes it upon itself to make unconstitutional legislation 
constitutional.”72  Beyond the “good faith” of the defendants, he wrote, “what assurances do we 
have that these changes and the rest of the current plan will be fully implemented?”73  Nothing in 
the new majority, in his view, remedied the “overreliance on property taxes” that plagued the 
legislation at issue in the previous rulings.74   
Gross fiscal miscalculations led Governor Taft to request that the court reconsider 
DeRolph III after it had been handed down.  The justices had not expected the cost of reform to 
be so high; Justice Stratton said that she was “truly taken aback” while Chief Justice Moyer 
observed that “the amount [of the miscalculation] was so high that the state would have filed for 
reconsideration regardless of what anybody said.”75 
As the justices prepared to hear DeRolph IV, new concerns loomed.  Justice Douglas 
would reach mandatory retirement age at the end of the 2001 term, and Chief Justice Moyer 
                                                 
70 id. at 1202.   
71 id. at 1204. 
72 id. at 1241. 
73 id. 
74 id. 
75 Joe Hallet, “What Went on in the Supreme Court” in Columbus Dispatch (03-18-2007).  
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thought that “it was crucial for the case to end on this court’s watch.”76  But Moyer would not be 
part of the final majority:  Douglas, Pfeiffer, Resnick, and Sweeney reunited to prevent any 
attempt to rescue the DeRolph III holding.  While Moyer “still felt that we should put an end to it 
by telling the General Assembly what you need to do,” the others wanted no part of such a 
solution.77  Justice Douglas considered “order[ing] [Treasurer Joseph Deters] not to pay the 
General Assembly, or the court, until this matter is resolved.”78 
Sweeney, however, believed that the court needed to get rid of the case.  He suggested 
the idea to Justice Pfeiffer, who “went home and got on the tractor and thought about it for a 
while…[before] conclud[ing] that Francis was right, and the best position in which we could 
leave the school districts of this state that brought this litigation was one final declaration that it’s 
still unconstitutional, dismiss the case, and then (the state) can’t come running back with a new 
court and suddenly get it blessed as constitutional.”79  With the support of Justice Stratton, who 
agreed to support the decision to remove the case while refusing to change her vote as to its 
unconstitutionality, the court voted to affirm its original holding and relinquish its jurisdiction. 
In the last majority opinion in this set of rulings, Justice Pfeiffer “direct[ed] the General 
Assembly to enact a school-funding scheme that is thorough and efficient, as explained in 
DeRolph I, DeRolph II, and the accompanying concurrences.”80  Pfeiffer again recounted 
constitutional history.  Based on his reading of this history, he reasoned as follows:  The framers 
wanted a thorough and efficient system of common schools; the current system was not thorough 
                                                 
76 id. 
77 id. 
78 id. 
79 id.  According to the article, Ohio’s sitting justices—elected by the state’s voters to six-year terms—feared that 
the unpopularity of the decision would be seized upon by challengers as a way of winning their judicial elections.  
Upon taking office, these new justices might rehear and then overturn this important holding, thereby vitiating the 
prior court’s determination that Ohio’s method of funding its schools was neither thorough nor efficient. 
80 DeRolph v. Ohio, 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (2002). 
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and efficient; and because of this the current system was unconstitutional.  While conceding that 
“the General Assembly cannot spend money it does not have,” Pfeiffer explained that “the 
Constitution protects us whether the state is flush or destitute.”81   Justice Resnick added in her 
brief concurring opinion an exhortation to the Ohio voters to “pass a constitutional amendment to 
the Thorough and Efficient Clause…which for all time will require an adequate amount of 
funding to be spent on every Ohio student regardless of where in the state that child resides.”82 
4.3 THE LEGACY OF DEROLPH 
Even as DeRolph served the admirable purpose of exposing the shameful conditions of the 
state’s schools, the remedy that the majority sought to fashion was never fully implemented.    
Although the state of Ohio earmarked billions of additional dollars for its public schools, the 
percentage of the cost of a student’s education borne by the state remained static.  In 1997, the 
state paid 45 percent of this cost; in 2007, that figure had increased slightly, to 45.5 percent.83  
While state funding increased by over seven percent during each year that the court retained 
jurisdiction over DeRolph, it has increased by only two percent per year since the court released 
that jurisdiction.84   
Perhaps the newsworthiness of the case and the angry reactions it engendered spurred the 
General Assembly to action; perhaps the removal of those stimuli has caused it to rest on its 
laurels.  At any rate, such speculations exceed the purview of this chapter.  All that I can write 
                                                 
81 id. at 532.   
82 id. at 534. No such amendment passed in the years following DeRolph IV.   
83 Jim Siegel and Catherine Candisky, “School Funding:  Has Ohio Fixed It?” in Columbus Dispatch (03-25-2007).  
Most of these additional funds were spent on facilities construction in at-risk Ohio school districts.   
84 id. 
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with certainty is that, twelve years after DeRolph I, Ohio’s continuing reliance on property taxes 
in funding local schools has created disparities greater than those that obtained prior to that 
decision, even with the infusion of more than $5 billion in state aid.85   
Even the states cited in the DeRolph decisions as exemplars of judicial and legislative 
reform—Massachusetts, Kentucky, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Vermont—have experienced 
mixed results.  While school districts in these states have achieved some rough measure of 
funding parity, the additional dollars that have been spent purchased negligible increases in 
student performance and parent satisfaction.86  Test scores have increased slightly, but this has 
been attributed to a shift in curriculum—an increase in time devoted to “teaching to the tests.”87  
And some schools in southern Ohio, which received considerable attention in the “horror story” 
section of DeRolph I, still remain in a state of extreme need.88  The lasting legacy of DeRolph 
might prove to be facilities construction, with billions of dollars set aside for that objective, 
although the process of allocating this additional funding has been plagued by corruption and 
cronyism.89 
                                                 
85 id.  And here I mean disparities between the state’s richest and poorest districts.  Although all districts in the state 
now receive more state funding than they did prior to DeRolph, rapid funding increases in the richest districts 
(spurred by increases in property tax revenues that have occurred for reasons unrelated to that decision) have 
widened the gap between the upper ten percent of school districts and the bottom percent.  cf. Jim Siegel, “Stuck in 
the middle with less” in Columbus Dispatch (03-21-2007) and Catherine Candisky, “Suburban abundance” in 
Columbus Dispatch (03-20-2007).  
86 William Duncombe and Jocelyn Johnson, “The Impacts of School Finance Reform in Kansas:  Equity is in the 
Eye of the Beholder”; Ann Flanagan and Sheila Murray, “A Decade of Reform:  The Impact of School Reform in 
Kentucky”; Julie Berry Cullen and Susanna Loeb, “School Finance Reform in Michigan:  Evaluating Proposal A”; 
Jennifer Imazeki and Andrew Reschovsky, “School Finance Reform in Texas:  A Never-Ending Story”; and Thomas 
Downes, “School Finance Reform and School Quality:  Lessons from Vermont.”  All of these articles were 
published first in various journals but have since been collected in John Yinger’s Helping Children Left Behind:  
State Aid and the Pursuit of Educational Equity (MIT Press, 2004).   
87 Jim Siegel and Catherine Candisky, “School Funding:  Has Ohio Fixed It?” in Columbus Dispatch (03-25-2007). 
88 Candice Candisky, “Decades of gains dissipating” in Columbus Dispatch (03-24-2007).  In this article, Candisky 
examined worsening conditions in Southern Local School District.  
89 id.  But see David Varda, quoted in “School Funding:  Has Ohio Fixed It?”:  "You can argue that, on the school-
facilities spending, you probably can't find another state that's undertaken it like Ohio has.”  Even if this claim is not 
entirely accurate, Ohio was among the ten states that allocated the most funds for facilities construction (as a 
percentage of their state education budgets) from 2002-2004.   The problems with the allocation of these state 
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Putting aside such criticisms, one must concede that the Ohio Supreme Court operated as 
well as can be expected under difficult circumstances.  Decisions that appear predetermined 
when studied in the abstract—as disembodied strings of holdings, useful for arguments, 
projections, and little besides—are actually the result of fraught negotiations among 
policymakers faced with a host of paradoxical pressures.  Elections, other elected officials, their 
own partisan loyalties and ethno-religious prejudices:  The justices had to account for all of these 
factors as they attempted to arrive at a fair and sustainable result.  In the end, they conceded 
defeat—but not before making an important statement.  At times, this is all that even the most 
“activist” judges—who of course must operate without the power of sword or purse—can hope 
to accomplish. 
In Savage Inequalities, Jonathan Kozol described the defeat of school funding reformers 
in San Antonio and elsewhere as “a tragedy” because “all our children ought to be allowed a 
stake in the enormous richness of America…[w]hether they were born to poor white 
Appalachians or to wealthy Texans, to poor black people in the Bronx or to rich people in 
Manhasset or Winnetka.”90  However, it is precisely those accidents of birth and environment—
considered by many education researchers to be the primary determinants of academic success—
that may preclude the achievement of true equality even if these funding dilemmas were 
resolved.   
Could the justices have handled DeRolph differently?  Was “punting” the matter back to 
the legislature after engaging in a “dialogue” with the other branches of government the best way 
to proceed in these circumstances?  It is this question that I plan to address—with the assistance 
                                                                                                                                                             
funds—much of which were used to hire administrators and support staff rather than teachers—are discussed in 
Candisky’s article “Decades of gains dissipating.”  Nepotism might have been the motivation behind some of these 
hires.     
90 Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities (HarperPerennial, 1991), p. 233. 
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of social science research, insights from justices who have participated in this litigation, a 
discussion of recent developments in the long-running Abbott litigation in New Jersey, and the 
curious example of a 2004 Alabama referendum on the outdated, segregation-era education 
provision in that state’s constitution—in my concluding chapter. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION:  REFLECTIONS, REMEDIES, AND PROSPECTS 
In the last chapter, I charted the trajectory of the DeRolph v. Ohio school finance litigation.  That 
case had a remarkably short “shelf life,” with the Ohio Supreme Court ending its jurisdiction of 
the matter after six tumultuous years.   In 2006, Democrat Ted Strickland was elected to serve as 
Governor of Ohio.  Working in conjunction with a Democratic State House of Representatives, 
Strickland fashioned an appropriation bill that would have increased the state’s share of 
education spending by over 7%.  The bill passed the House in early 2010, and a watered-down 
version was then put before the Ohio State Senate.  Before Strickland’s vision of school finance 
reform could come to fruition, he was defeated by former U.S. Representative John Kasich in a 
hotly contested 2010 election.1 Kasich, who entered office with his own set of priorities, tabled 
discussion of Strickland’s reform legislation.  Thus, school reform in Ohio, emanating this time 
from the branches of government that had traditionally handled such matters, once again became 
a “back burner” issue.   
 Two aspects of this scenario are relevant to the chapter that is about to unfold.  First, 
school finance reform was reignited by a single, popularly elected individual.  Strickland 
prioritized education reform and very nearly succeeded at implementing it in a short period of 
time.  Second, this “moment” was much narrower and more tenuous than the outcome of a state 
                                                 
1 Access Network, “Ohio on Track for Constitutional Compliance?” Accessed at 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/policy/04-09-09Ohio.php3. 
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supreme court case:  by changing executives, the people of Ohio effectively shifted the state’s 
priorities.  One is left to wonder, then, what constitutes the most efficacious method for 
redressing school finance inequalities:  via elections, or via the courts?2   
 I explore that question in the first section of this chapter.  In the course of addressing it, I 
discuss how judicial decisions for plaintiffs have led, on the aggregate, to moderate, systemic 
funding increases.  I proceed from there to a brief survey of the circumstances by which some of 
the state supreme courts discussed in chapter three—noted for their “landmark” decisions—came 
to terminate their jurisdiction of school finance litigation during the first decade of the 21st 
century.  I then evaluate concerns raised by some scholars regarding the continued viability of 
“adequacy”-based litigation theories, in the process adverting to how there were so few notable 
state supreme court holdings on the issue of school finance during that decade.  I close this 
section with a reflection on the lengthy Abbott v. Burke (1985) litigation, focusing my attention 
on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s twenty-first holding in that case and Republican Governor 
Chris Christie’s subsequent forceful response to it.3  Christie’s well-coordinated, if ultimately 
unsuccessful, campaign against the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests that some of the earlier 
“advantages” the judiciary was believed to possess, such as insulation from the political process, 
may be effectively used against justices interested in attempting to mandate that the other two 
branches of government implement specific reforms.   
                                                 
2 Sol Stern puts it thusly in “The March of Folly,” his short, tendentious account of school finance litigation in New 
York:  “While all that energy was consumed in the courtroom, and so many smart people wasted their time trying to 
answer an unanswerable question, the political process has, willy-nilly, moved along...[and] the amount of money 
going to the city’s schools has almost doubled.  It happened through the give and take of democratic politics, as 
flawed as that politics is in New York, rather than by having a judge arbitrarily impose spending increases on 
unwilling taxpayers.”  In Eric A. Hanushek (ed.), Courting Failure (Hoover Institution Press, 2006), p. 33.  Stern’s 
take on the matter is quite obvious from this passage.  The real answer, of course, is far more complicated than that.     
3 Abbott v. Burke, 100 New Jersey 269 (1985); Abbott v. Burke, M-1293-09 (2011). 
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 The second section of this chapter focuses on a curious moment in Alabama’s recent past 
where voters rejected an amendment that would have removed segregation-era language from the 
state’s education clause.  In its place, the amendment would have opened the door to the drafting 
of a more modern education clause—one that might have stated that education was a 
“fundamental right” or “fundamental value” of the state.  However, a ferocious anti-tax 
campaign led by a former state supreme court justice and the president of the state chapter of the 
Christian Coalition, ensured that the measure was rejected by the slimmest of margins.  This 
vote, one of dozens that take place every year as state constitutions continue through processes of 
constant revision and amendment, received modest national media attention even as its deeper 
implications passed unnoticed.  Returning to the discussion of school finance inequities in the 
“Jim Crow” South presented at the beginning of Chapter Three, I argue that this situation affords 
us many useful insights into American attitudes toward education, providing concrete evidence 
of how faith in educational equality “dims when held in the bright light of competing norms and 
conflicts, like localism, ideological differences, and racial divides.”4  
 The last section of this chapter concerns solutions to the challenges presented by the 
state-by-state school finance litigation that has occupied the attention of many state supreme 
courts during the past years.  Although these jurists have not acted in vain, they have had to work 
within institutional constraints that have limited their effectiveness.  I begin the section by gently 
critiquing the claim, advanced by Michael Rebell, that lengthy court oversight of these decisions 
is the best “practical” solution.  From there, I evaluate a new litigation theory that may offer the 
possibility of reform through the federal courts.  While this “federal turn” is promising in the 
abstract, it seems unlikely to sway the currently right-leaning federal judiciary responsible for 
                                                 
4 Douglas Reed, On Equal Terms (Princeton, 2001), p. 123.  This was Reed’s conclusion after conducting extensive 
polling to determine voter attitudes toward educational opportunity.   
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such recent decisions as Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
(2007).  Finally, I offer my own proposal:  in light of data showing how uncompetitive the 
individual states are with regard to most industrialized nations, it seems that only an amendment 
to the federal constitution creating a unitary national public school system could possibly yield 
the results that most reformers desire.  Since many of the nations that are “lapping” the United 
States in terms of educational performance have unitary or more highly centralized school 
systems, it behooves policymakers in the United States to consider endorsing such a radical 
solution.   
5.1 HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH? ABBOTT AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL 
OVERSIGHT OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
The intervention of state supreme courts in school finance reform has been a difficult exercise, 
but it has not been, as some detractors would claim, a vain and pointless one.5  In The Hollow 
                                                 
5 An important note must be made here:  the word “success,” in this context and in any other, is only significant in 
the context of the goal to be evaluated.  If, for example, my goal was to gain 50 pounds and I accomplished this, 
then I was “successful”; if my goal was to have lost a certain percentage of body fat and I gained 50 pounds, then I 
most likely would not have been (absent an extraordinarily rigorous regimen of physical exercise and chemical 
“doping”).  The same reasoning applies to the use of words such as “efficient”:  yes, a completely free market would 
be “efficient” in the sense that it would “efficiently” consolidate wealth in the hands of a few individuals; but if the 
aim of “efficiency” was defined as providing a uniform standard of living for all people, then it would obviously not 
be “efficient.”  Those who support school finance reform view “success,” by and large, as any outcome that results 
in the distribution of additional money to the public schools (and, for sake of the simplicity, that is how it will be 
used in this chapter).  Those who oppose it do not quibble with the fact that it results in increased spending; rather, 
they suggest it has been “unsuccessful” because their definition of “success” is concerned with “outcomes” 
(graduation rates, standardized test scores, etc.).  And, in the main, there has not been a strong correlation between 
increased spending and improved outcomes, although there is a growing body of recent research that calls that into 
doubt.  For example, in “Public School Funding and Performance,” FREC/CANR Conference Papers at the 
University of Delaware, John Mackenzie analyzes 2002-2003 state level public education finance and performance 
data and concludes that “there is a significant positive relationship between overall per-pupil funding and NAEP 
scores.”  It also bears noting—and I will repeat it later in this chapter—that in Alabama, a state where a school 
finance lawsuit has never been successful, 2.3% of students scored highly on standardized math tests and 1.8% 
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Hope, law professor Gerald Rosenberg argued that three constraints typically prevent courts—in 
his study, the Supreme Court—from effecting social change.6  These constraints have been 
discussed in the previous chapters, but bear repeating here:  the need for a case/controversy to 
review; the inability to implement policy decisions owing to a court’s lack of access to either the 
“purse” or the “sword”; and the inability to proceed in the face of significant opposition from the 
other two branches of government.  The nature of these limitations has been understood for a 
very long time,7 and they have certainly curtailed the ability of some supreme courts to achieve 
the rapid implementation of their mandates.8   In The Hollow Hope, Rosenberg leans heavily on 
research suggesting that Brown v. Board of Education desegregation decision was not followed 
in any significant respect until after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“CRA”).  This 
claim, however, severely understates the positive impact Brown made on the nascent civil rights 
movement.9  
Funding increases owing to school finance litigation are, of course, not directly 
implemented by state supreme courts,10 and attempts by certain courts to dictate precise funding 
formulae (as had been the case in DeRolph v. Ohio) have met with failure.  However, many 
courts have been successful at forcing state legislatures to act, in most cases without the decade-
                                                                                                                                                             
scored highly on standardized reading tests.  In Finland, a nation with a unitary education system, those numbers 
were 20.4% and 5.3%, respectively. Of  the five US states that are even remotely competitive with the rest of 
the First World on standardized math tests (i.e., that rank within the “top 30”), four have had plaintiff’s liability 
victories at the state supreme court level:  Massachusetts, Vermont, New Jersey, and Washington.  In the only state 
that has not, Minnesota, plaintiffs lost their 1993 suit, Skreen v State, 505 N.W. 2d 299, only because the court held 
that, unlike in several neighboring states, “the state’s portion of the funding is equally distributed–and admittedly 
provides the funding for an adequate education.” Source:  Education Next, as made available in The Atlantic at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/11/your-child-left-behind/66069/.   
6 Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope:  Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago, 1991). 
7 It is, after all, addressed in Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 78,” a work upon which Rosenberg relies heavily:  
“The judiciary has no influence over either the sword or the purse, ...It may truly be said to have neither force nor 
will, but merely judgment."  Accessed at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm. 
8 As is discussed in the conclusion of the previous chapter. 
9 See Susan E. Lawrence, “Review of The Hollow Hope,” 86 American Political Science Review 812. 
10 i.e., the courts do not pass the appropriation bills.  
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long “lag” that separated Brown from the CRA.  Thus, the “lack of purse or sword,” while in 
some sense a “constraint,” can be mitigated by the development of an effective “dialogue” with 
legislatures that have been motivated to reexamine systemic funding disparities in the wake of a 
court decision.11 
In his study of financial impact of favorable and unfavorable judicial decisions on school 
finance litigation, Douglas Reed determined that, in five states where plaintiffs prevailed, there 
was, over the course of nine years, a 29.38 percent decline in levels of inequality among the 
schools in those states.12  His research was not concerned with how revenues increased at the top 
and bottom levels, but rather with how “transfers to all districts [affected] revenue 
distribution.”13  From this, he concluded that “we see all states indicate increasing equity 
(whether modest or great) after the state supreme court decisions that invalidated the school 
finance system.”14  In the three states where plaintiffs had not prevailed, Reed determined that 
levels of inequality among districts were either flat, as in North Carolina (which would later hold 
that its system of school finance was unconstitutional, and where the legislature was already 
working on school funding solutions), or significantly worse, as in Oklahoma (a 13.6% increase 
in levels of inequality after the court’s unfavorable decision) and Illinois (19%). 
                                                 
11 As was the case with the Rose decision in Kentucky, where afterwards “legislative leaders announced their 
immediate agreement to set up a twenty-one member Task Force on Education Reform, consisting of six legislative 
leaders and five people appointed by the governor.”  Paris, Framing Equal Opportunity, p. 201.  Sandy Levinson 
stresses the importance of the roles of courts as “dialogue participants” in his recent law review article, noting that 
the state courts—representing more manageable geographic units—are better positioned than the US Supreme Court 
to initiate a dialogue with the public and with the other branches of government.  He does not believe, however, that 
judicial elections, or anything else that would make these judges more attentive to the will of the majority, are 
necessary accompaniments of such a constructive “dialogue.”  “Courts as Participants in a ‘Dialogue,’” 59 
University of Kansas Law Review 791 (2011). 
12 Reed, On Equal Terms at p. 29.  The five states where plaintiffs prevailed were New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, 
Kentucky, and Connecticut.  The three states where defendants prevailed at the state supreme court level were North 
Carolina, Illinois, and Oklahoma.   
13 id. at 26. 
14 id. 
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Reed’s work was impressionistic; he selected the “unfavorable” examples in his sample 
because he believed they mirrored the “favorable” examples.  For example, he argued “we can 
compare North Carolina outcomes to outcomes in Kentucky because these are Southern or 
border states in which Appalachian rural poverty constitutes a significant feature of school 
financing inequalities.”15  Illinois and New Jersey were comparable because of their “urban, 
predominantly black poverty.”16  Reed’s findings, however, have been confirmed on a much 
larger scale: economists Matthew Springer, Keke Liu, and James Guthrie used data from the US 
Census of Governments’ School System Finance to determine that court-mandated reforms both 
“decreased horizontal inequity” among districts (as Reed had claimed in his much smaller 
sample) and led to increased spending on education.17 
Of course, the argument over school finance litigation has never been primarily about 
whether or not states wind up spending more money on their public schools.  Some states, such 
as Ohio, have wound up spending less than, say, New York and New Jersey in response to this 
litigation—partly due to a shorter period of supervision and partly due to the state supreme 
court’s inability to develop a constructive “dialogue” with the other branches of government.18  
But the principal disagreement on this subject concerns “results,” and in that sense it is the 
                                                 
15 id. 
16 id. 
17 Matthew G. Springer, Keke Liu, and James W. Guthrie, “The impact of school finance litigation on resource 
distribution:  a comparison of court-mandated equity and adequacy reforms,” 17 Education Economics 421, 440 
(2009).They were unable, however, to conclude whether this increased spending “benefited students requiring 
additional resources or found all districts spending more.”  The chief purpose of their paper was to   determine 
whether the legal rationale behind the court’s decision—“equity” or “adequacy”—led to divergent outcomes.  They 
concluded that it did not, further substantiating my own claim that how these cases are decided, although 
undoubtedly important to lawyers and legal scholars, is not as important as the fact that they are decided.  In other 
words, the justices are voting for their policy preferences; the opinion itself, although perhaps useful (as in Rose) for 
opening a “dialogue,” is primarily a justification for the policy preference that the court has voted to espouse.   
18 Recall that, in the chapter about DeRolph, one Ohio justice actually used his concurring opinion to take potshots at 
outgoing Ohio Governor George Voinovich (“Let George do it!  Well, George hasn’t done it”).  Michael Rebell 
takes the position in Courts and Kids that the early termination of court jurisdiction in these cases is unwise; I will 
use recent developments in the Abbott v. Burke litigation in New Jersey to offer a gentle critique of this position.   
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extension of a broader educational debate about “inputs” and “outputs” that has been ongoing at 
least since the publication of the Coleman Report in 1966.  Opponents of increased school 
spending that has occurred without evidence of improved student results (i.e., “accountability”) 
were given new legs with the publication of the 1983 Reagan administration-commissioned 
education report A Nation at Risk. The report’s authors argued that “declining” results on various 
standardized tests could be remedied with “competitive, market-sensitive, and performance-
based” teaching and an increasing reliance on rigorous regular testing to determine whether 
“standards and expectations” were being met.19  This has been the position taken by Eric 
Hanushek, an economist and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute who has become the leading 
opponent of judicial involvement in school finance decisions. 
Over the course of dozens of articles and several books, Hanushek reaffirmed his central 
hypothesis:  School finance litigation has not improved student achievement.  As he writes in 
Courting Failure (2006), “the simplest summary is that no currently available evidence shows 
that past judicial actions about school finance—either related to equity or to adequacy—have had 
                                                 
19 The entire report is available online:  http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html.  The gist of the report 
appears to be that public education should be run, as nearly as possible, like a for-profit private business.  “Salary, 
promotion, tenure, and retention decisions should be tied to an effective evaluation system that includes peer review 
so that superior teachers can be rewarded, average ones encouraged, and poor ones either improved or terminated.”  
“Attendance policies with clear incentives and sanctions should be used to reduce the amount of time lost through 
student absenteeism and tardiness.”  Incentives, performance reviews, and the like would counter “the mediocre 
educational performance that exists today. As it stands, we have allowed this to happen to ourselves. We have even 
squandered the gains in student achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge. Moreover, we have 
dismantled essential support systems which helped make those gains possible. We have, in effect, been committing 
an act of unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament.”  This was, in short, a rather bizarre document, but rhetoric 
of the sort quoted in the preceding passage helped inaugurate a new and even more feverish rush to “reform” 
America’s “failing” schools.  The impact of such apocalyptic language—“failure,” “declension,” “wholesale 
collapse,” “mediocre educational performance”—is discussed in considerable detail in David C. Berliner and Bruce 
J. Biddle, The Manufactured Crisis (New York:  Basic Books, 1996). Berliner and Biddle conclude that most of this 
is just political gamesmanship, that the halcyon past to which A Nation at Risk points was the pre-Brown era where 
few African-Americans and poor whites even reached high school to take their standardized tests, and that “failure” 
is an amorphous term that can be easily manipulated by those who wish to claim that something/someone is 
“failing.”  See n. 5, regarding the similar use of “success.”   
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a beneficial effect on student performance.”20  This is a relatively easy argument to make, as 
most research dating back to the Coleman Report (discussed in Chapter Three) has concluded 
that the correlation between per-student expenditures and student performance was very weak.  
From this, Hanushek has produced a large body of writing—one often cited in briefs opposing 
plaintiffs in this litigation, or by recalcitrant governors such as Chris Christie—built on the 
following syllogism:   
Major Premise:  There is no link between school spending and student performance.21 
Minor Premise:  School finance litigation is concerned with, and sometimes leads to, an 
increase in school spending. 
Conclusion:  Since all school finance litigation can do, at best, is increase school 
spending, there can be no link between student performance and school finance 
litigation. 
From this follows a host of specific criticisms.  There is no clear definition of what an 
“adequate” education is.  No one knows how schools spend all of their money.  Serious test 
preparation and market-based teacher compensation—the key recommendations in A Nation at 
Risk—are the only way to improve the schools (again, “accountability”—counting what 
Hanushek (and others) believe can be counted).  All of that, while interesting, nonetheless leads 
                                                 
20 Eric A. Hanushek (ed.), Courting Failure:  How School Finance Lawsuits Exploit Judges’ Good Intentions and 
Harm Our Children (Palo Alto:  Hoover Institute, 2006), pp. xxiii-xxiv. 
21 Even this hoary truism has been challenged by many researchers.  See, inter alia, Bruce Baker, Revisiting that 
Age-Old Question:  Does Money Matter in Education? (Albert Shanker Institute, 2012): “On average, aggregate 
measures of per-pupil spending are positively associated with improved or higher student outcomes. In some studies, 
the size of this effect is larger than in others and, in some cases, additional funding appears to matter more for some 
students than others. Clearly, there are other factors that may moderate the influence of funding on student 
outcomes, such as how that money is spent – in other words, money must be spent wisely to yield benefits. But, on 
balance, in direct tests of the relationship between financial resources and student outcomes, money matters. 
Schooling resources which cost money, including class size reduction or higher teacher salaries, are also positively 
associated with student outcomes. Again, in some cases, those effects are larger than others and there is also 
variation by student population and other contextual variables. On the whole, however, the things that cost money 
benefit students, and there is scarce evidence that there are more cost-effective alternatives.”  Accessed online at 
http://www.shankerinstitute.org/images/doesmoneymatter_final.pdf. 
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one down a blind alley.  In large part, this is because such arguments overlook research done in 
the past three decades regarding how increased school funding could be properly allocated in 
ways that lead to an improvement of school performance.22  Furthermore, this could never be a 
judicial function, since, short of writing some general guidelines as in the Rose decision, there is 
really no way for judges to engage in such activity.  The courts can provide a mandate; it is left 
to the legislators, and, perhaps even more importantly, the administrative agencies, to settle the 
particulars.23 
 “Settling the particulars” has proved extremely difficult in New Jersey, where the lengthy 
dialogue over the terms of the Abbott v. Burke (1985) litigation has outlasted the efforts of 
numerous governors, such as Democrat Jim Florio (1990-1994) and Christine Todd Whitman 
(1994-2001), to dictate the terms of this engagement.  The first Abbott v. Burke decision occurred 
as a result of a lawsuit brought by Paul Tractenberg, the director of Rutgers-Newark Law 
School’s Education Law Center (“ELC”) and a man who has managed to have a significant 
scholarly career while also compiling an astonishing record of success at litigating and re-
litigating school finance cases in New Jersey.24  In Abbott I, Tractenberg and the ELC challenged 
                                                 
22 As summarized in “Improving the Productivity of Schools,” in Helen F. Ladd and Janet S. Hansen, Making 
Money Matter (National Research Council, 1999), pp. 134-162.  Many of Hanushek’s suggestions for evaluating 
performance can be operationalized and enhanced through the appropriate allocation of funds.  According to Ladd 
and Hansen, it is not, as Hanushek might argue, simply a matter of spending money correctly; sometimes it is a 
matter of having more money to spend, especially in those instances where schools do not have enough money to 
keep the heat on in the gymnasium, repair the plumbing in the bathrooms, order updated textbooks, or purchase new 
(or any) computers for the classroom, etc.   
23 As noted in the previous chapter, state supreme court attempts to shape the parameters of the debate over 
funding—such as when, in DeRolph III, the majority presented a funding structure that, having been based on 
erroneous revenue projections—have typically proved impracticable.  Judge Albert Rosenblatt, who voted with the 
majority in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity decision in New York, remarked on this subject as follows:  “In CFE in 
theory we could have said, ‘Here is what we think we need, x billions of dollars, and if you do not come up with x 
dollars in x months, here’s what’s going to happen to you.’  There is no way we would do that in our court—almost 
inconceivable—because it would have shown an arrogance that the New York Court of Appeals would not use.  We 
were saying, in effect, to the governor, the legislature, ‘This is your job; do it.  We have confidence you’re going to 
do it’” (quoted in Rebell, Courts and Kids appendix, at p. 120). 
24 Abbott v. Burke, 100 New Jersey 269, 495 A.2d 376 (1985).   
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the constitutionality of the Public School Education Act (“PSEA”), alleging that it did not 
properly allocate funding in a way that would achieve equalized results between urban and 
suburban districts.  This was a bold claim, but one that the ELC thought was justified because 
children in cities like Newark “have demonstrably greater educational needs, as evidenced by 
large numbers in need of compensatory and bi-lingual education, and by low test scores, high 
dropout rates, and low college attendance…[and] are deprived of equal educational opportunity 
under New Jersey’s school finance scheme.”25  Justice Alan Handler, writing for the majority in 
Abbott I and sympathetic to the ELC’s argument, remanded the case to an administrative tribunal 
created by the court in order to develop “a record sufficient to guide the adjudication of the 
constitutional issues on any future appeal.”26  This was a reasonable decision, but the process by 
which it was implemented (18 more Abbott decisions by the New Jersey Supreme Court and 
eight governors came and went before the court, in Abbott XX (2009)27, held that school reform 
legislation passed by Governor Jon Corzine was constitutional) was characterized as “a 
nightmare of legalism” by its leading chronicler.28 
 Five months after the Abbott XX decision was handed down, Corzine lost his bid for re-
election to Chris Christie.  Christie, a skilled appellate litigator, had run on a platform of “fiscal 
responsibility” and immediately took aim at Corzine’s School Funding Reform Act (“SFRA”) of 
2008.  The act, which had been designed precisely with the years of Abbott litigation in mind, 
allocated 60 percent of state aid to 31 of its 588 school districts.29  In spite of this fact, it was not 
                                                 
25 ELC complaint in Abbott v. Burke I, quoted in Paris, Framing Equal Opportunity, p. 84.   
26 Abbott at 383.  
27 And even then, “only to the extent that the record permitted its review.”  Abbott v. Burke XX, 199 New Jersey 140 
(2009). 
28 Michael Paris, Framing Equal Opportunity, p. 153. 
29 Bill Wichert, “Chris Christie claims former Abbott districts get 70 percent of the state aid” in The Star-Ledger 
(12-01-2011).  This unevenness was, of course, the ELC’s goal in pursuing the Abbott litigation.  Throughout his 
career, Tractenberg had been uncomfortable with the mere “wealth neutrality” advocated by men like John Coons; 
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an especially high-salience issue in the minds of New Jersey citizens; polling done by 
researchers at Fairleigh Dickinson University showed that most people in the state hadn’t heard 
of “Abbott districts” at all.30  When informed about what these districts were, a majority of 
respondents expressed approval of them.31  Christie was determined to change that, and took a 
strong public stand against the funding priorities imposed by the SFRA, refusing to submit a 
budget in 2010 that fully subsidized the Abbott districts.  The result was a constitutional 
showdown, with the New Jersey Supreme Court holding in Abbott v. Burke XXI that Christie’s 
decision to cease providing the recommended levels of supplemental funding for the Abbott 
districts would not be tolerated:   
The State argues that the Court must defer to the Legislature because the legislative 
authority over appropriations is plenary pursuant to the Appropriations Clause of the 
Constitution. See N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 2. Although it is true that past decisions of 
this Court have recognized the Legislature’s authority to work a modification of other 
statutes through the adoption of an annual appropriations act, a different question is 
presented here. The State seeks, through the legislative power over appropriations, to 
diminish the Abbott districts’ pupils’ right to funding required for their receipt of a 
thorough and efficient education after representing to this Court that it would not do so in 
order to achieve a release from the parity remedy requirement. In such circumstances, the 
State may not use the appropriations power as a shield to its responsibilities.32 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
“that theory…did not come close to saying and doing what he wanted law to say and do…[and] he set out on his 
own to find an alternative legal theory” (Paris at 155-156).  Michael Paris seems somewhat critical of Tractenberg’s 
work, viewing it as leading to the creation of a large body of conflicting and convoluted New Jersey jurisprudence, 
but—as I have made clear in prior chapters—I am sympathetic to any and all efforts to articulate new legal doctrines 
that serve to implement useful policy objectives (the law, after all, is whatever courts say it is, and if they are willing 
to accept one’s novel argument, so be it).   
30 Only 12% of respondents stated that they had heard a “great deal” about the decision and 57% had heard nothing 
at all about them.  See “Voters Unfamiliar with Abbott and Mount Laurel,” http://publicmind.fdu.edu/nj0806/. 
31 id.  According to Peter Woolley, the political scientist who directed the poll: “Voters don’t know the details but 
they agree with the principles. However, those who approve of the decisions are also more likely than those who 
disapprove to have heard little or nothing about them.” 
32 Abbott v. Burke XXI, M-1293-09 (May 2011).  In her dissenting opinion, Justice Helen Hoens wrote that the 
majority opinion “treads on the constitutional prerogatives of the Legislature and the executive branch.” 
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Christie, like several other Republican governors elected between 2008 and 201033, sought to 
enforce fiscal responsibility by refusing to increase taxes or raise additional revenue in order to 
meet what he viewed as imprudent spending obligations.  When the New Jersey Supreme Court 
handed down its opinion on May 24, 2011, Christie reacted immediately and forcefully.  In a 
public statement delivered the day of Abbott XXI, he articulated a more limited vision of the 
judiciary’s role in school finance litigation, one that had been accepted by supreme courts in 
states such as Pennsylvania and Illinois:   
The Court should not be dictating how taxpayer dollars are spent and prioritizing certain 
programs over others. The Supreme Court is not the Legislature; it should not dictate 
policy, it should not be in the business of discussing specific taxes to be raised and it 
should not have any business deciding how tax dollars are spent.34 
 
He stopped short, however, of threatening to completely disregard the court’s holding.  In the 
process, though, he presented a compelling statement of his own beliefs, a statement similar to 
those being made by his fellow Republican governors in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania:   
However, as Governor of New Jersey, I realize that regardless of my personal beliefs, I 
must comply with the New Jersey Constitution as interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court. In February, I submitted my budget to the Legislature for review and 
consideration. That is my constitutional obligation. Now the legislature has until June 
30th to fulfill its constitutional obligation to pass a final budget. My principles remain the 
same. New Jersey has some of the highest taxes in America. New Jerseyans are already 
incredibly overtaxed. Therefore, as I have repeatedly stated, I do not believe raising taxes 
is the answer. That has not changed.35 
 
The danger here, however, was not that Christie would refuse to comply.  In fact, owing to a 
surprising surplus of actual revenues vis-à-vis projected revenues, he grudgingly conceded two 
                                                 
33 e.g., Scott Walker (R-WI) and Tom Corbett (R-PA) both engaged in spirited battles over the budgets in their 
states, slashing funding in various critical areas.  In these cases, as well in Christie’s case, the argument was that 
“the state can’t spend money that it doesn’t have.”  
34 Available at the official Governor Chris Christie YouTube page:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9c-
jQ25JlD8. 
35 id. 
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days later, while remaining unclear about exactly how the nearly $1 billion in funding would be 
allocated.36  What mattered was that Christie, one of the savviest communicators among the new 
generation of Republican politicians, had made a low-salience political issue—recall the polling 
done at Fairleigh Dickinson University—into a significant talking point.  He had, at least as far 
as high-level politicians go, a strong grasp of the nuances of school finance litigation, and rarely 
missed an opportunity to draw unfavorable attention to the unelected New Jersey Supreme 
Court:   
Abbott v. Burke is an example of exactly what I was talking about in the campaign of 
2009 about why we need to change the supreme court.  We do not any longer need a 
supreme court where those people, who are not elected by anyone, are making laws from 
the bench.  And that’s what they’re doing:  they’re directing how your money is meant to 
be spent.  Let’s go from 1988 forward, the last twenty years.  The taxpayers of New 
Jersey have sent $68.2 billion dollars to the Abbott districts in this period, with funding 
going up each year and enrollment in those districts going down.  And do you know what 
the judges decided last week?  The problem is we’re not spending enough money!  The 
question here is:  can the court order us, order the state of New Jersey, to raise taxes?  
Now, I don’t have a contingency plan for this, because I can’t even imagine this would 
ever come to pass.37   
 
If nothing else, that is powerful rhetoric.  The behavior of the “imperial judiciary” is a secondary 
concern, folded into Christie’s larger message about drawing a line in the sand regarding 
taxation, and it should concern school finance reform advocates that their work can so easily be 
incorporated into that broader critique.  Although the public remained generally supportive of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court during this conflict, the possibility that school finance litigation can 
be bootstrapped onto the same “small government” platforms that elected many Republicans in 
2010 suggests that justices ought to proceed with caution when engaging with executives like 
                                                 
36 “N.J. Governor Christie Wisely heeds Supreme Court order on Abbott district funding,” The Times of Trenton (05-
26-2011). 
37 Statement at a town hall meeting in Hammonton, New Jersey (03-30-2011) available on Chris Christie’s YouTube 
page:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SMO7K63d7-o&feature=relmfu.  
 151 
Christie.38 Christie, while versed in the Abbott litigation, has little regard for the specifics of 
what the justices intended; rather, he appears to be using loaded terms like “failing schools” and 
“wasteful spending” to justify his program of across-the-board budget cuts.39   
This is all well and good, and may indeed fail to resonate with voters, but the success of 
Proposition 13 in California offers a notable counterexample.  There were, of course, a host of 
other reasons for the success of that measure, such as the rapid and disruptive modernization of 
property tax assessments throughout California, but anti-tax activists joined those complaints 
with a critique of the 1971 Serrano decision to pass a measure that severely limited the ability of 
municipalities to provide essential services.40  At the very least, justices should bear this sort of 
reaction in mind when deciding such cases and overseeing the implementation of their mandates, 
even if they believe themselves heavily insulated from public opinion.  Joyce Elliot, a 
congresswoman who had participated in fashioning a legislative remedy after school finance 
litigation in Arkansas, stressed the importance of proactively and constructively involving the 
public in this process: 
                                                 
38 Patrick Murray, “Christie v. Abbott” in PolitickerNJ (05-24-2011):  “From a public opinion point of view, the 
decision will go largely unnoticed.  Part of the reason is that most New Jerseyans pay little attention to the court.  
Part of it is that, over the past 20 years, we have become used to the idea that certain (i.e. Abbott) school districts 
receive extra state aid. My own research into public attitudes toward school funding in New Jersey indicates that the 
public thinks there is an element of fairness in giving extra resources to those that need it most. Ultimately, Christie 
would have had to argue that the court was taking education funding away from suburban districts and undermining 
the promise of future property tax relief.  All of that, however, would have been a heavy lift in the court of public 
opinion.  He would have had to do it without appearing to attack the court.  Why?  Most New Jerseyans have a 
basically positive view of the court.   It’s unlike opinion of the legislature, where most of the public concurs with 
Christie’s ‘do-nothing’ moniker.”  Murray is right, I believe, but the possibility nonetheless exists that a skilled 
politician such as Chris Christie, given sufficient time, may be able to successfully link the “do-nothing” legislature 
and the “imperial judiciary” in the minds of a significant number of voters.   
39 David G. Sciarra, “5 myths about Gov. Chris Christie’s ed reform in New Jersey,” The Washington Post (09-30-
2011):  “The governor offers no reason why the SFRA doesn’t provide adequate and equitable funding for all 
students. And Christie conveniently ignores the fact that when compared to most other states, New Jersey stands out 
as a model for reform in public school funding.”  Christie also fails to note that New Jersey is one of the few states 
competitive with other First World nations on standardized reading and mathematics tests.  See n. 5, supra. 
40 Jeffrey Chapman, Proposition 13: Some Unintended Consequences (Public Policy Institute, 2000).  Local school 
districts, for instance, have lost the ability to raise revenues beyond a “ceiling” set by Proposition 13, and many have 
become heavily reliant on state aid, which has varied significantly from year to year due to frequent battles over the 
budget in Sacramento.    
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In regard to remedies, I would do two things.  First, a legislative remedy should involve a 
great deal of engagement with the general public. One of the things I’ve always wanted 
us to do as legislators and leaders of a community is to go out and have face-to-face 
discussions with the people to help them why this is important.  We have to come up with 
a rational way to engage people rather than just criticize them for not being supportive.  
It’s going to have to be done or we are not going to have the will, the support, or the 
authority to do what we need to continue to support our schools.41 
 
Elliot’s advice is worthwhile, but, as the next section makes clear, not all public involvement is 
created equal, nor is all of it “constructive.” 
5.2 ALABAMA 2004:  THE DEFEAT OF AMENDMENT 2 
Recall Mississippi Governor James Vardaman’s response, offered early in the 20th century, to 
what he viewed as wasteful education spending:   
Remove the Constitutional hindrance and the remedy will be discovered.  Money spent 
today for the maintenance of the public schools for Negroes is robbery of the white man, 
and a waste upon the negro. You take it from the toiling white men and women, you rob 
the white child of the advantages it would afford him, and you spend it upon the Negro in 
an effort to make of the negro what God Almighty never intended should be made, and 
which men cannot accomplish.42 
 
Vardaman’s attempt to limit expenditures on African-American schools that came from 
Mississippi’s school fund was echoed throughout the South, with conservative Democrats in 
other states arguing that such funds should be expended according to the “public welfare” (i.e., 
the discretion of the local school board) rather than by population.  Such a shift provided a basis, 
in turn, for “expend[ing] school funds for the benefit of the white people…expend[ing] every 
                                                 
41 Quoted in Courts and Kids, p. 122. 
42  “Message of James K. Vardaman, Governor of Mississippi, to the House and Senate of Mississippi, Thursday 
January 9, 1910” quoted in Horace Mann Bond, The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order 
(Octagon:  New York, 2d ed. 1966), p. 103.  For more on school funding in the “Jim Crow” South, see Chapter 3, 
Section 1. 
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cent they are willing to tax themselves for the benefit of their own children.”43  It was in this 
spirit that delegates at the 1901 Alabama Constitutional Convention included the following 
language in their state’s education clause:  “Separate schools shall be provided for white and 
colored children, and no child of either race shall be permitted to attend a school of the other 
race.”44  This passage was amended in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education by a state 
legislature concerned with the broader implications of that decision.  Amendment 111 clarified 
Section 256, stating unequivocally that “nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as 
creating or recognizing any right to education or training at public expense, nor as limiting the 
authority and duty of the legislature, in furthering or providing for education, to require or 
impose conditions or procedures deemed necessary to the preservation of peace and order.”45 
 Both the original language in the education clause and the text of Amendment 111 remain 
part of Alabama’s state constitution, an extraordinarily long and convoluted document that 
contains numerous outdated sections.46  For example, until the passage in 2000 of Amendment 
667, Section 102 forbade “any marriage between any white person and a negro, or descendant of 
                                                 
43 1 Proceedings of Virginia Constitutional Convention 1194-1204, quoted in Louis Harlan, Separate and Unequal:  
Public School Campaigns and Racism in the Southern Seaboard States 1901-1915 (Chapel Hill, 1958), p. 142. 
44 Alabama Constitution of 1901, Article XIV, § 256.  The clause also provided that “The public school fund shall 
be apportioned to the several counties in proportion to the number of school children of school age therein, and shall 
be so apportioned to the schools in the districts or townships in the counties as to provide, as nearly as practicable, 
school terms of equal duration in such school districts or townships.”  As both Harlan and Horace Mann Bond note, 
“equal” duration in school terms often varied by as many as two months, and the public school fund, once allocated 
by population, was spent in whatever way the local board saw fit.  The Constitutional Convention of 1901 contained 
155 delegates, all of whom were white and only a few of whom were Republicans.  In the presidential address to the 
delegates, John Knox articulated the spirit in which the state’s governing document would be drafted:  “There is a 
difference…between the uneducated white man and the ignorant negro.  There is in the white man an inherited 
capacity for government, which is wholly wanting in the negro.”  1 Official Proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention of the State of Alabama of 1901 12. 
45 Alabama Constitutional Amendment 111.  The legislature also passed a resolution, with only four votes in 
opposition, declaring Brown to be “null, void, and of no effect.” 
46 There have been numerous attempts to condense the Alabama Constitution of 1901 into a more user-friendly 
document.  The various problems with the document were the subject of a Fall 2001 issue of the Alabama Law 
Review that was produced in recognition of the constitution’s centennial.   
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a negro.”47 Even prior to its annulment, of course, that provision had been rendered 
unenforceable by the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia (1967).48  But its presence 
in Alabama’s governing document, however difficult to find, proved sufficiently obnoxious that 
it was at last removed by popular vote as part of a general period of constitutional reform that 
also witnessed the removal of Article VIII, the 1901 constitution’s detailed discussion of various 
race-based voting restrictions, by Amendment 579.49   
 Although a wholesale revamping was urged by many activists (with some going so far as 
to call for a new constitutional convention), by 2002 only the gradual excising of select 
segregation-era provisions had been undertaken with regard to a document that, in the words of 
one constitutional scholar, “was and still is impossible to separate from race relations…[and] 
cannot be understood without an understanding of the politics of race.”50  With the backing of 
the state chapter of the NAACP as well as the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, Amendment 2 
was added to the ballot in 2004 in the hopes of achieving yet another piecemeal constitutional 
reform.  It was simply worded:  “Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of Alabama of 
1901, to repeal portions of Section 256 and Amendment 111 relating to separation of schools by 
race and repeal portions of Amendment 111 concerning constitutional construction against the 
right to education, and to repeal Section 259, Amendment 90, and Amendment 109 relating to 
the poll tax.”51 
                                                 
47Alabama Constitution, § 102: “Miscegenation laws. The legislature shall never pass any law to authorize or 
legalize any marriage between any white person and a negro, or descendant of a negro. This section has been 
annulled by Amendment 667.” 
48 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional race-based restrictions on marriage).  
49 These measures were first advanced by the Alabama Citizens for Constitutional Reform (“ACCR”).  See ACCR, 
“Who We Are,” at http://www.constitutionalreform.org/whoweare.shtml. 
50 William H. Stewart, The Alabama State Constitution:  A Reference Guide (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 
1994), p. 5. 
51 Quoted in “2004 Referendum General Election Results, Alabama,” at 
http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?fips=1&year=2004&f=0&off=51&elect=0. 
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 Amendment 111, in its limited modern context, did appear to offer significant protection 
for the state government in the event of a school finance lawsuit.  As Figure 1 indicates, by 2011 
only a handful of state supreme courts had held that education was a fundamental right in the 
course of declaring the system of school finance in their state to be unconstitutional.  But the 
likelihood of this occurring in Alabama, already minimal, was further reduced by the fact that the 
plain text of the constitution explicitly prohibited such an outcome.   
 
Figure 1 - Basis of Plaintiff Liability Victory52 
Only California, Connecticut, West Virginia, and Vermont (in that order) had reached such a 
result; the drafters of Florida’s new education article, which appeared to indicate that education 
was a “fundamental right,” had noted in an accompanying commentary that this provision merely 
                                                 
52 Source: Westlaw (West Publishing). 
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made education a “fundamental value” of the state.53  Of course, the Deep South has proven 
unusually resistant to school finance litigation, as Figure 2 makes clear.54 
 
 
Figure 2 - School Finance Litigation Outcomes by State55 
Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana had always lagged behind most other states in 
terms of education spending, and as of 2010 were also lagging behind most First World nations 
                                                 
53 See Chapter 3, Section 3, subsection 2 for a fuller discussion of the re-drafting of the education article in Florida’s 
constitution.   
54 “Plaintiff liability victory” in Figure 2 indicates that a given state supreme court has declared its system of school 
funding to be unconstitutional; “defendant state liability victory” indicates that the state has succeeded in defending 
its method of school funding.  “No court decision” does not indicate (with the exception of Hawaii and Iowa, where 
the former has a unitary state school system and the latter has no education clause in its state constitution) that no 
lawsuits have been filed, only that none have yet reached that state’s supreme court.   
55 Source:  Westlaw (West Publishing).  The asterisk beside North Dakota indicates that, although a majority of that 
court found that state’s method of funding its schools to be unconstitutional according to an “equity” theory, the 
result was non-binding because it was not made by a “super-majority” of justices.  Additionally, the results of school 
funding litigation in Arizona, pursued both in state and federal courts, have been inconclusive, but the past decade 
has seen a number of attempts by the state legislature, prodded by the state’s supreme court, at developing a new 
method of funding the state’s public schools.   
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in education performance.56  Yet the mere prospect that Amendment 2’s bland wording might 
lead to an adverse court hearing, which in turn might lead to an increase in taxes levied upon 
Alabama citizens, sufficed to “trigger an intense reaction from groups claiming to represent 
conservative Christians…[who began] to crank up Web sites and issue press releases, warning of 
higher taxes, anti-religious actions, or worse.”57  John Giles, president of the Alabama chapter of 
the Christian Coalition, opposed Amendment 2 not because it would remove the language 
regarding segregated schools from the constitution (he supported doing so), but because it would 
repeal Amendment 111.  Giles argued that “the Christian Coalition favors keeping education as a 
gift from the state rather than making it a constitutional right.”58  Joining with Giles in 
opposition to Amendment 2 was former Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore, who believed that 
“removing the 1956 provision from the constitution could lead to judges ruling that education is 
a constitutional right and then ordering the state to spend more on public schools.”59   
This seemed an unlikely outcome given both the reception that school finance litigation 
had received in the Deep South as well as the fact that the Alabama Supreme Court was in 2004 
(and still is, as of 2012) composed of conservative Republican justices selected in partisan 
                                                 
56 Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana ranked ahead of only twelve countries (among them Kyrgyzstan and 
Azerbaijan) and behind Turkey and Uruguay, in the most recent comprehensive study of US educational 
performance, published in Education Next.  Georgia came in near bottom of the list as well, only three slots above 
Turkey.  See “Miseducation Nation,” an interactive data presentation at The Atlantic Online: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/11/your-child-left-behind/66069/. 
57 H. Bailey Thomson, The Struggle in Alabama for Constiutional Reform (ACCR Working Papers, 2004), p. 29. 
58 Phillip Rawls, “Black Caucus Says it Will Filibuster Any New Version of Amendment 2,” The TimesDaily of 
Florence (AL), 12-17-2004.  In a statement, the Alabama Christian Coalition, while reaffirming that it was a 
“multiracial organization committed to Christian principles of social justice,” provided scriptural justification for its 
claim that education was a gift rather than a right, quoting 1 Corinthians 4:7: “For what gives you the right to make 
such a judgment? What do you have that God hasn't given you? And if everything you have is from God, why boast 
as though it were not a gift?” (New Living Translation, emphasis mine).   
59 id.  Moore is perhaps best known for having been relieved of his duties as Chief Justice by the Alabama Court of 
the Judiciary after repeatedly refusing, in spite of direct orders from a federal judge, to remove a monument of the 
Ten Commandments from the Alabama Judicial Building.  See Jannell McGrew, “Moore Suspended” in The 
Montgomery Advertiser, 08-23-2003. 
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elections in a state that typically votes Republican.60  Nevertheless, Giles was convinced that 
“these activists on the bench know no bounds…[and their decisions are] a trial lawyer’s dream.” 
He led a committed effort to resist the amendment’s passage,61 in the process “employing an 
argument that was ridiculed by most of the state's newspapers and by legions of legal 
experts…[in which he claimed] that a right to public education would then open a door for 
‘rogue’ federal judges to order the state to raise taxes to pay for improvements to its public 
school.”62  This was an “argument [that] played to Alabama’s primal fear of federal control.”63 
 By itself, hostility to school funding litigation had proved incapable of passing 
Proposition 13 or removing an incumbent justice in a hotly-contested Ohio Supreme Court 
election.  But here, men like Giles and Moore connected concerns over such litigation with a 
generalized and admittedly rather paranoid fear regarding the loss of local control.  When voters 
went to the polls, the breakdown by county served to express an eerie, unspoken truth.64 
                                                 
60 And never mind, furthermore, that in Ex Parte James, 713 So.2d 869 (Alabama 1997), the Alabama Supreme 
Court had concluded a long-running series of education lawsuits by holding that the legislature, rather than the 
courts, bears the primary responsibility for devising a constitutionally valid public school system.  The court had, if 
anything, become even more conservative during the intervening years.  Moreover, the notion that the federal courts 
would intervene as a result of school funding litigation seems even less likely, given that San Antonio v. Rodriguez 
remains a well-settled precedent.    
61 Rawls, n. 54, supra. 
62 Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Alabama Vote Opens Old Racial Wounds,” The Washington Post (12-28-2004). 
63 id. 
64 Recall Charles Sumner’s critique of Southern attitudes toward education from Chapter 2, Section 3:  “The contrast 
between the rebel States and the loyal States appeared early.  It was conspicuous in two Colonies, each of which 
exercised a peculiar influence.  Massachusetts began her existence with a system of free schools…[and] at the same 
time Virginia set herself openly against free schools.  The papers of the day…show how the original spirit of 
Virginia…still animates these states.  A motion to print two hundred copies of the report of the State Superintendent 
of Public Education was promptly voted down in the Senate of Louisiana, while a Senator…‘denounced the public 
education scheme as an unmitigated oppression, an electioneering device, an imposition…’” (emphasis mine). 
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Figure 3 - Amendment 2, 2004 Vote By County65 
Here the “no” votes, represented by shades ranging from bright red (> 50% “no”) to dark red (> 
70%), and the “yes” votes, represented by shades ranging from bright green (> 50% “yes”) to 
dark green (> 70% “yes), correspond rather neatly with the racial divisions in those counties.  In 
almost every county in Alabama with a majority African-American population in 2005, 
Amendment 2 passed by a substantial margin.   
 
 
                                                 
65 Source:  “2004 Referendum General Election Results, Alabama,” at 
http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?fips=1&year=2004&f=0&off=51&elect=0. 
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Figure 4 - African-American Majority Counties, 2004-200566 
The final vote, with 690,376 opposed and 688,530 in favor, was close enough to trigger a 
mandatory recount; however, the recount merely confirmed the original result.67  State 
representative Alvin Holmes, a member of the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, claimed that 
the defeat of Amendment 2 was the work “of an unholy axis of the Christian right, racists, and 
right-wing neo-Nazis…who used the tax issue so they wouldn’t appear openly racist.”68  Tommy 
Woods, a former Alabama school administrator, offered a slightly more measured assessment of 
the outcome:  “There are people here who are still fighting the Civil War…[and] holding on to 
things that are long since past, almost like a religion.”69 
                                                 
66 Source:  US Census data. 
67  “2004 Referendum General Election Results, Alabama,” at 
http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?fips=1&year=2004&f=0&off=51&elect=0. 
68 Phillip Rawls, “Black Caucus Says it Will Filibuster Any New Version of Amendment 2,” The TimesDaily of 
Florence (AL), 12-17-2004.   
69 Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Alabama Vote Opens Old Racial Wounds,” The Washington Post (12-28-2004). 
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 Woods is not entirely correct; in a variety of respects, Alabama and the other states of the 
Deep South have come a long way since 1865.70  But with regard to education finance, they have 
not come very far at all.  These states’ school systems were the most poorly funded in America 
in 1900, when W.E.B. DuBois edited and compiled his report on African-American public 
education, and they remain among the worst today.71  They are competitive with schools in 
countries like Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan, but are significantly outperformed by other former 
Soviet republics such as Latvia and Lithuania, as well as nearly every other state and First World 
country.72  Furthermore, African-American students, who appear to have the most to gain from 
increases in school funding, have had especially negative outcomes in Alabama’s schools:  “73 
percent of black eighth-graders rated below basic competency in math, compared with 32 percent 
of white eighth-graders.”73 Although it is unclear if the passage of Amendment 2 would have 
changed any of this, its failure to pass evinces a clear desire on the part of many to resist such 
changes. 
                                                 
70 See, for example, Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South (Oxford, 1992).  One notable respect in which 
the South has improved since 1865 is the achievement of near-universal literacy.   
71 W.E.B. DuBois (ed.), The Negro Common School (1901), pp. 70-75.  Accessed at 
http://books.google.com/books/reader?id=iFoOAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=GBS.PA75.   
72 Both of which had, as of 1970, higher overall literacy rates (100%) than either Alabama or Mississippi, as well as 
top-down, unitary systems of public education that were installed by the Soviet government.  See “Education in 
Azerbaijan,” Azerbaijan Ministry of Education, http://portal.edu.az/English/Pages/default.aspx. 
73 Roig-Franzia, supra. Bruce Baker, summarizing recent developments in education research, noted that increases 
in education spending that have subsidized the cost of longer school days and smaller class sizes appear to have had 
a demonstrable, disproportionate effect on African-American students:  “Furthermore, on average, overall student 
achievement on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) masks the fact that scores for subgroups, 
such as African- American students, have actually improved quite dramatically over time, and achievement gaps 
have narrowed.”  Revisiting the Age-Old Question:  Does Money Matter in Education? at p. 15. This has, as Sean 
Reardon noted in his recent working paper “The Widening Education Gap between the Rich and the Poor,” led to a 
decrease-in the black-white test gap, even as the test gap between rich students and poor students has continued to 
widen (the appendices to this paper are available at 
http://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/reardon%20whither%20opportunity%20appendix.pdf).   However, since 
the black-white test gap in Alabama remains substantial, as Roig-Franzia reports, it may indeed be remediable by 
precisely the sort of increased funding to troubled districts that often results from school finance litigation (as, say, 
in New Jersey).  Such funding increases do appear to bear fruit:  in a recent paper, Michigan State economist Leslie 
Papke found that “increases in spending have nontrivial, statistically significant effects on math test pass rates, and 
the effects are largest for schools with initially poor performance.”  89 Journal of Public Economics 821 (2005). 
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5.3 REMEDIES AND PROSPECTS 
As we enter the second decade of the 21st century, it appears that the great  “third wave” of 
adequacy-based school finance lawsuits that commenced in 1989 has crested and begun to 
recede.   
 
Figure 5 - Chronological Distribution of School Funding Decisions74 
The majority of decisions are clustered between 1989 and 1999; since 2001, only the supreme 
courts of Colorado and Kansas have declared their systems of public school finance to be 
unconstitutional, in both cases owing to “adequacy” arguments.75  The first ten years of this 
                                                 
74 Source:  Westlaw (West Publishing). 
75 Montoy v. State, 278 Kansas 769 (2005) (holding that state’s funding formula failed to provide adequate resources 
for to enable a suitable education for students in middle and large sized districts with a high number of “at-risk” 
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decade have also seen the termination of state supreme court jurisdiction over long-running and 
high-profile cases in West Virginia and Massachusetts.76  Furthermore, both New York and New 
Jersey struggled to implement the mandates of their supreme courts; the New York legislature 
simply could not meet a $5 billion shortfall, while only a surprising revenue surplus staved off a 
serious separation-of-powers conflict in New Jersey.77 
 It is, however, precisely this continued judicial oversight of school finance litigation that 
many view as the most practical means of ensuring that the funding disparities are remedied.  
“Personally I think there needs to be long-term oversight by the courts,” remarked Arkansas 
Congresswoman Joyce Elliott, “[even though] most legislators want the judges to bow out after a 
short term.”78  Justice John Greaney of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, who voted 
with the majority in McDuffy, noted that “the desegregation cases have been going on since 
1950…and Sandra Day O’Connor, before she stepped down, noted that they couldn’t go on 
forever, but they should go on for another twenty-five years…[so] you’re talking about fifty 
years of court involvement in affirmative action…and I think you’re talking about similar 
periods in these education cases.”79  Michael Rebell, the executive director of the Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity, argued that “retention of jurisdiction in sound basic education cases until basic 
reforms are implemented and prove effective also is a sensible use of judicial 
                                                                                                                                                             
students); Lobato v. State, No. 08SC185 (2009) (holding that school funding issues are justiciable; remanded to 
lower court, which found for plaintiffs on “adequacy” grounds). 
76 The former ended when Governor Don Wise, who had been an expert witness for the plaintiffs in the original 
Pauley v. Kelly litigation, signed the final agreement bringing it to an end.  The latter concluded when the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, with a changed lineup from when the original McDuffy v. Secretary of 
Education decision was handed down in 1993, ended its jurisdiction over school finance litigation in Hancock v. 
Commissioner of Education, 443 Massachusetts 428 (2005).  For a fuller discussion of McDuffy and Hancock, see 
Chapter 3, Section 3, subsection 2. 
77 See Chapter 3, Section 3, subsection for a discussion of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity litigation in New York, 
and Chapter 5, Section 1 for an analysis of Chris Christie’s reaction to the 2011 Abbott decision.  
78 Quoted in Rebell, Courts and Kids, p. 117. 
79 id.   
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resources…[because] decisions to terminate jurisdiction [early in the process] mean that the case 
has to be reopened and additional hearings held.”80  University of Virginia law professor James 
Ryan wrote that “the simple truth about funding litigation is that it requires continued court 
involvement in order to succeed over the long run.”81 
 All of these individuals may well be correct:  continued court oversight of funding 
litigation is, at present, the best and most practical means of ensuring legislative compliance.  
But another simple truth is that this court oversight is highly contingent, being subject to 
premature termination at any time; e.g., when the justices begin to “feel the heat” (as noted by 
both Joyce Elliott as well as the Ohio justices involved in the DeRolph litigation), when turnover 
in judicial personnel occurs, or when someone already on the bench changes his or her mind.82  
Justice Greaney acknowledged this reality when the Hancock decision was announced in 2005:  
“Two other judges were new to the court…[and] they wanted the McDuffy decision overruled.”83 
 The great possibility of the “new judicial federalism” was the opportunity for 
experimentation it afforded state supreme courts; however, at least in the area of school finance 
                                                 
80 id. at 83.  Of course, the retention of jurisdiction also ensures that courts need to keep doing most of these things, 
and in many cases, much more of them.  In fact, the post-2001 period in school finance litigation in states has been 
characterized not so much by groundbreaking decisions in the Rose mold but the re-litigation of specific aspects of 
the decisions that were handed down during the 1990s (in states where plaintiffs did not achieve favorable results in 
the 1990s, the 2000s have been characterized by more defeats, typically at the trial court level).  See “Legal 
Developments” at the Campaign for Fiscal Equity Access Network for an overview of developments during this 
period: http://schoolfunding.info/legal-developments/. 
81 James K. Ryan, “Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation,” 86 Texas Law Review 1223, 1260 (2008). 
82 Joseph C. Hutcheson, “The Judgment Intuitive:  The Function of the ‘Hunch’ in Judicial Decision,” 14 Cornell 
Law Quarterly 274, 288 (1929): “I, after canvassing all the available material at my command, and duly cogitating 
upon it, give my imagination play, and brooding over the cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch--that intuitive flash 
of understanding which makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision, and at the point where the 
path is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light along the way.”  BL, a law school classmate of mine who clerked 
for Indiana Supreme Court Justice Brent Dickson (who, like his former colleague Randall Shepard, is a noted 
advocate of “judicial federalism”), described Justice Dickson’s decision-making policy as follows:  “He was in no 
way a deep thinker, but he was an extremely staunch Republican. When he assigned me an opinion, he would tell 
me the result, perhaps mention a relevant case, although if there was some political aspect of it, he was always 
cognizant of it.  I never got the sense that the court was anything but a political court.” (e-mail correspondence with 
the author, 03/10/2010, emphasis mine). Cf. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge, 2002).  
83 Quoted in Rebell, p. 109. 
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litigation, this was also a significant weakness.  Yesterday’s holding can be qualified or 
overturned tomorrow, or—and perhaps this is even more important, given the ease with which 
most state constitutions can be amended—voted out of existence by an amendment that succeeds 
at the ballot box.    
 One possible remedy, articulated recently in the Cornell Law Review by Lauren Gillespie, 
concerns pursuing school finance litigation through the federal courts.84  In making her argument 
that federal school finance litigation could constitute a “fourth wave” of this process, Gillespie 
highlights the possibility that “judicially manageable standards” now exist in the wake of the 
passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”).85  Moreover, in Gillespie’s opinion, 
something approaching “a consensus definition of an adequate education has emerged from the 
proliferation of state court litigation.”86 Owing to the NCLB’s goal of 100% proficiency for all 
American students, the “important function” of public education associated with state and local 
government in the Brown decision appears to have been “federalized.”  As a result, the very 
foundation on which Justice Lewis Powell based his cautious holding in Rodriguez no longer 
exists, and the Court should, perforce, reevaluate this decision. 
 Gillespie’s claims are cogent and certainly worthy of consideration, but it seems that, 
given the current composition of the Supreme Court, such a reevaluation is extremely unlikely.  
Once again, the justices’ votes are what matters; without the existence of an obvious 5-4 majority 
                                                 
84 Lauren Nicole Gillespie, “The Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation:  Pursuing a Federal Right to an 
Adequate Education,” 95 Cornell Law Review 989 (2009).   
85 id. at 1007.  Gillespie believes that the passage of NCLB sufficiently addresses Justice Lewis Powell’s concerns 
that “the proper goals of a system of public education…were unsettled.”  San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 56 (1973).  The data compiled for determining whether schools have made Adequate Yearly 
Progress per the terms of NCLB will “provide litigants with data and statistics illustrating the current status of public 
education and will further provide courts with a means by which to assess whether public schools are providing an 
adequate education.”   
86 id.  With regard to the decisions that were handed down between 1989 and 1999 (which Gillespie discusses in the 
first part of her article), this is probably true; it is not, however, true across the United States (and certainly not true 
in those states where plaintiffs have not prevailed!).  See Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, supra.   
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amenable to it, any notion of such a “federal strategy” is doomed to failure.  If anything, the 
holding in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2007) 
indicates that the Court is moving toward an even more restrictive approach regarding education 
issues.87  In response to a lawsuit brought by a group of parents who were challenging Seattle 
School District No. 1’s policy of taking race into account when assigning slots to oversubscribed 
high schools, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, held that race-based programs 
such as this could only exist if they were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest—
and that a mere “racial imbalance” did not constitute such an interest.88  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy concurred in the 5-4 judgment, writing separately to stress that “in the administration of 
public schools by the state and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of 
schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is 
its racial composition.”89 
 This is a truly ambiguous remark, and also a critical one. Since Kennedy was the swing 
vote in Parents, he had the opportunity to qualify the holding as he deemed fit.  He concurred in 
the judgment, thus ending a program that appeared to pass constitutional muster under the 
Court’s prior decisions on bussing and student assignments.  However, he left ajar a door that 
some skilled litigator might attempt to force open:  Would an economically diverse student body 
constitute a compelling state interest?  More and more data is becoming available to suggest that 
the most significant achievement gap is now between rich and poor students, not white and 
African-American students.   
                                                 
87 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
88 id. at 721:  “We have emphasized that the harm being remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that 
is traceable to segregation, and that ‘the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without 
more.’” He then cited Milliken v. Bradley , 433 U.S. 267 (1977) as the controlling precedent for this claim. 
89 id. at 788.  In support of this, Kennedy cited the Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(holding that Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program did not violate Fourteenth Amendment because it 
was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of promoting diversity). 
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Figure 6 - Class vs. Race90 
Such an argument, perhaps coupled with Gillespie’s “federal strategy,” could lead to a reversal 
of Rodriguez and thus the dramatic restructuring of public school finance throughout the United 
States. Nevertheless, it too is almost entirely contingent on a change in personnel, or the 
emergence of a truly unusual case where Justice Kennedy finds himself compelled to vote with 
the four-member “liberal” bloc in accepting this approach.   
 I close with my own recommendation for a remedy.  As I have stated repeatedly, the 
problem with leaving these matters up to the courts is that doing so puts the onus on a handful of 
elite policymakers, most of whom are either completely or partially insulated from public 
                                                 
90 Source: Social Capital Blog, accessed at http://socialcapital.wordpress.com/tag/sean-reardon/.  See n. 69, supra. 
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opinion by undemocratic selection methods.91  But allowing questions of school finance to be 
handled exclusively in state legislatures has also proved quite troublesome, given the reluctance 
of many legislators to fashion any remedy that either results in the spending of additional money 
or results in the spending of money that is not allocated exclusively to their home districts.  If the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had not been ratified shortly after the Civil War, would 
African-American citizenship and voting rights have long survived the Compromise of 1877?  
During the very same congressional hearings where those issues were being debated, Charles 
Sumner carefully articulated the necessity of direct federal involvement in public education:   
You have prescribed universal suffrage.  Prescribe now universal education.  The power 
of Congress is the same in one case as in the other.  And you are now under an equal 
necessity to exercise it.92 
 
His call to action appears to have been forgotten; I did not notice it referenced in any of the 
various filings associated with the Parents decision, or even with the much earlier Rodriguez 
decision, that are accessible through the Westlaw digital archive.  Given the difficulty of 
amending the federal constitution to create a unitary national system of public education, this 
would be an admittedly “pie-in-the-sky” solution.     
 Yet a model for its implementation exists within the United States itself:  Hawaii operates 
a unitary state school system.   Its education clause provides for “the establishment, support, and 
control of a statewide system of schools.”93 This clause was added during the Hawaii 
Constitutional Convention of 1968 with the intention of creating “a single unified school 
system…unique within the United States” in which “the state assumes the obligation to provide 
                                                 
91 For more on the subject of judicial selection methods, see Chris W. Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall, In Defense 
of Judicial Elections (Routledge, 2009).  For more on the rather suspect methods by which some justices reach their 
decisions, see n. 78. 
92 Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 1st Session, March 16, 1867 (emphasis added).  Accessed at 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=078/llcg078.db&recNum=302. 
93 Hawaii Constitution, Article X, § 6. 
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equal educational opportunities for our children regardless of whether they live in rich or poor 
areas…[and where] far-reaching policy-making decisions affecting education are conducted in 
Honolulu.”94 
 Douglas Reed’s extensive polling of American attitudes towards equal educational 
opportunity revealed that, while a majority of Americans express some abstract support for equal 
school funding, “localism is paramount in American attitudes toward public education…[and] 
reforms that seek to diminish local control are much less likely to meet approval than those that 
do not.”95  Thus, “when the goal of broadened educational opportunity comes with a price tag of 
diminished local control, there is a substantial drop in public support for the reforms.”96  In 
Milliken v. Bradley (1974), Chief Justice Burger remarked that “no single tradition in public 
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy 
has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for 
the public schools and to the quality of the education process.”97  However, all of this concern 
with thinking locally has caused American schools to suffer globally.  Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Finland—three of the world’s four best-performing nations, as ranked by percentage of students 
achieving proficiency on standardized math examinations—operate unitary, national systems of 
public education.98  If “global competitiveness”—the ostensible desideratum of policymakers in 
both major American political parties—is to be more than a buzzword, this parochial orientation 
                                                 
94 2 Hawaii Convention of 1968 430, 450. 
95 Douglas Reed, On Equal Terms (Princeton, 2002), p. 121. 
96 id. 
97 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-742 (1974). 
98 The fourth nation in that cluster, South Korea, operates unitary systems in each of its four provinces; given its 
population (48 million) and administrative complexity, it is perhaps a better analog to the United States.  Germany, 
which ranks 15th in that same survey, uses a system of school administration similar to South Korea’s.  The highest-
ranking state in the survey, Massachusetts, is 17th; it is separated by 26 countries from the lowest-ranking state, 
Mississippi.  See “Miseducation Nation,” an interactive data presentation at The Atlantic Online: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/11/your-child-left-behind/66069/. 
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must be overcome.  However unlikely its ratification, a constitutional amendment authorizing the 
creation of a national school system would remove that particular obstacle.  
 171 
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